EU institutions

[field_auth], 25 August 2016

The fragmentation of financial systems along national borders was one of the main handicaps of the Eurozone both prior to and in the initial phase of the crisis,  hindering the shock absorption capacity of individual member states. The EU has taken important steps towards the deeper integration of Eurozone financial markets, but this remains incomplete. This column argues that a fully-fledged financial union can be an efficient economic shock absorber. Compared to the US, there is significant potential in terms of private cross-border risk sharing through the financial channel, more so than through fiscal (i.e. public) means.

[field_auth], 20 August 2016

Some economists are approaching a consensus that the Eurozone’s financial architecture is now resilient enough to withstand another shock similar to that of 2010-11. This column argues that such a view may be overly optimistic. Economic and financial instability persists in member states and the banking sector, and institutions to tackle a shock remain incomplete. While the Eurozone remains vulnerable to a bad shock, the blanket application of burden sharing without consideration of current economic and financial conditions is unwise.

[field_auth], 15 August 2016

The UK’s Brexit referendum is providing us with the first significant test of the new regulatory system. This column asks whether banks have sufficient capital and liquidity to withstand the ‘shock’. Unless the global financial system as a whole is well capitalised, it remains only as strong as its weakest link.  And while the UK authorities have done a reasonable job of strengthening their banks and financial system, a number of large European banks are seriously undercapitalised.  

[field_auth], 01 August 2016

The German Council of Economic Advisors recently proposed a mechanism for the orderly restructuring of sovereign debt in the Eurozone. This column argues that the proposal suffers from some inherent weaknesses. The proposal builds on logical errors and embeds well-established ideas in a setup that suffers from serious limitations. It also neglects alternative strategies that favour targeting large debts as soon as possible.

[field_auth], 30 July 2016

The presence of multiple national authorities in the EU poses substantial coordination problems for the supervision of multinational banks. The Single Supervisory Mechanism aims to solve the resulting coordination failures. This column explores how banks could strategically react to the introduction of a supranational supervisor. The banking system is likely to endogenously react by reverting to an organisational form for which supranational supervision is actually less essential.

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