Europe's nations and regions

Holger Breinlich, Elsa Leromain, Dennis Novy, Thomas Sampson, 20 November 2017

On 23 June 2016, the UK voted to leave the EU. As soon as the result became clear, sterling depreciated sharply and, since the vote, UK inflation has dramatically increased. This column asks how much of the rise in inflation is due to the referendum. It finds that the referendum result pushed up UK inflation by 1.7 percentage points, which amounts to an annual (and potentially permanent) cost of £404 for the average British household.

László Bruszt, Nauro Campos, 17 November 2017

The many benefits and costs of economic integration are notoriously difficult to pinpoint. This column introduces new institutional measures for 17 EU candidate countries since 1997 to explore whether deep integration helps the build-up of state capacity. Estimates highlight the relationship between judiciary capacity and bureaucratic independence as the key engine behind state capacity-building engendered by the prospect of EU membership.

Marco Buti, Björn Döhring, 09 November 2017

The Eurozone economy is growing at its fastest rate in a decade, but the recovery remains incomplete. This column presents the European Commission’s autumn forecast, and derives some policy considerations. Accommodative macroeconomic policies are still appropriate for now. The column also highlights the need for structural policies to increase the potential for growth and help to share the benefits more fairly.

Wilhelm Kohler, Gernot Müller, 08 November 2017

The EU’s position in the Brexit negotiations is based on the premise that the four freedoms of the single market – goods, capital, services, and labour – are indivisible. This column argues that this indivisibility claim has no economic foundations, and that negotiating on this premise risks unnecessary harm. Reintroducing trade barriers will inflict damage on both sides of the Channel. The possibility that abandoning indivisibility may cause harm through cherry picking, or through potential further exits, doesn’t justify a hard Brexit scenario.

Thomas Sampson, 19 October 2017

While we can estimate the economic impact of Brexit, we do not yet understand what made people vote for it. This column argues that political pro-Brexit rhetoric conflates two distinct hypotheses that have different policy implications. If voters wanted to reclaim sovereignty from the EU, they may view a negative economic impact as a price worth paying. But, if 'left-behind' voters blamed the EU for their economic and social problems, post-Brexit policy should focus on the underlying causes of discontent.

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