Financial regulation and banking

Jorge Abad, Marco D'Errico, Neill Killeen, Vera Luz, Tuomas Peltonen, Richard Portes, Teresa Urbano, 25 April 2017

The Global Crisis highlighted how linkages between banks and shadow banking entities can lead to the amplification of shocks across borders and sectors, prompting policymakers to seek to improve the monitoring framework for assessing the interconnectedness of the shadow banking system. This column documents the cross-sector and cross-border exposures of EU banks to globally domiciled shadow banking entities. Among the findings are that 60% of these exposures are to shadow banking entities domiciled outside the EU and hence outside its supervisory powers,  and that approximately 65% of the exposures are to non-money market fund investment funds, finance companies, and securitisation entities. 

Thorsten Beck, 24 April 2017

Nine years after the onset of the Global Crisis, the problem of non-performing assets is still acute in the Eurozone. This column takes stock of the different proposals to deal with the issue. It argues that a Eurozone-level asset management company can resolve bank fragility and spur economic recovery, but warns that lack of political will and legal barriers can impede the creation of such an agency. 

Thomas Gehrig, Maria Chiara Iannino, 21 April 2017

The first Basel Accord initiated what has become a three decade-long process of regulatory convergence of the international banking system. This column argues that by trying to regulate minimal capital standards, the Basel process itself contributed to an ever-increasing shortfall in aggregate bank capital. Consequently, European banks have become increasingly exposed to systemic risk, suggesting that expansive monetary policy could adversely affect the resiliency of banks. 

Òscar Jordà, Björn Richter, Moritz Schularick, Alan Taylor, 07 April 2017

Higher capital ratios are unlikely to prevent a financial crisis. This is empirically true both for the entire history of advanced economies from 1870 to 2013 and for the post-WW2 period, and holds both within and between countries. The authors of this column reach this conclusion using newly collected data on the liability side of banks’ balance sheets in 17 countries.  However, higher capital buffers have social benefits in terms of macro-stability: recoveries from financial crisis recessions are much quicker with higher bank capital. 

Thomas Philippon, Aude Salord, 22 March 2017

Failed financial firms should not be bailed out by the taxpayers. Europe, unfortunately, has a weak track record of following this principle of good governance and sound economic policy. The banking union, with its new approach to supervision and resolution, is meant to improve this matter. This column introduces a new Geneva Special Report on the World Economy which reviews the resolution side of the banking union. 

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