Industrial organisation

[field_auth], 26 August 2016

Advertisers are deserting newspapers. Using the impact of television advertising on print media in 1968, this column argues that a reduction in advertising revenues will reduce the quality of newspapers. Ultimately, this may result in a less well-informed public.

[field_auth], 23 August 2016

Today’s labour market in the US has much in common with that of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Then, as now, there were few government protections for workers, fears over cheap immigrant labour, rapid technological change, and increasing market concentration. This column explores the lessons that can be drawn from the earlier ‘Gilded Age’. The findings suggests that even as markets play a greater role in allocating labour, legal and political institutions will continue to shape bargaining power between firms and workers.

[field_auth], 20 August 2016

Experiments have revealed that humans often suffer from overconfidence in the accuracy of their information, or ‘miscalibration’. This column uses data from surveys of CFOs to assess their ability to make financial predictions. The results suggest not only that CFOs are miscalibrated, but also that firms with miscalibrated executives appear to be more aggressive in their corporate policies. In other words, the overconfidence of the executive shows up in the company’s policies.

[field_auth], 07 August 2016

Open competition is regarded as a crucial ‘preventative tool’ that limits government discretion and abuse of power when awarding procurement contracts. However, various studies have identified numerous drawbacks to using open auctions when contracting is imperfect. This column discusses the effects of increased buyer discretion on public procurement in Italy. Increased discretion raises the number of repeated wins by contractors, suggesting long-term relationships between buyers and sellers. Furthermore, productive buyer-seller relationships appear to outnumber corrupt ones.

[field_auth], 05 August 2016

Lacklustre growth seems to be the new normal almost everywhere in the world except for one area – CEO pay. This column uses data on UK publicly listed firms to examine whether weak governance leads to pay rises for CEOs that are not justified by performance. CEO pay asymmetry – pay responding more to increases in firm performance than to decreases – appears to occur mainly in firms with a low share of institutional owners able to exert external control. CEOs at such firms are also more likely to be paid for ‘luck’, with pay rises rewarding random positive shocks unrelated to performance.

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