

# Throwing Sand in the Wheels: How Trade Distortions Slowed LDC Export-Led Growth

by Simon J. Evenett and Johannes Fritz



CEPR Press



Ministry for Foreign Affairs  
Sweden

GLOBAL  
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# **Throwing Sand in the Wheels: How Trade Distortions Slowed LDC Export-Led Growth**

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**CEPR Press**

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# Throwing Sand in the Wheels: How Trade Distortions Slowed LDC Export-Led Growth

A Report prepared for the Government of Sweden by  
Simon J. Evenett and Johannes Fritz

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# Preface

Trade is a forceful tool for creating economic growth, promoting employment and reducing poverty. Sweden is an illustrative case: trade played an important role in transforming this country from one of the poorest countries in Europe into the modern welfare state that Sweden is today.

Access to export markets is imperative to be able to harness the full potential that trade offers. While this is true for all countries, including Sweden, it is all the more important for poorer developing countries, especially the least developed countries. These economies often lack the necessary capacity and diversity to be able to quickly adjust to changes in market conditions. Protectionism, in terms of trade-restrictive measures, represents a government-induced change in market conditions for traders from other countries. It closes the door to trade and, thereby, to job creation, growth and poverty alleviation in the countries affected.

This study, commissioned by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, assesses how protectionism has increased globally since the financial crisis and how it has specifically affected the development prospects of the most weak and vulnerable of all countries. It shows how protectionism grew as the crisis erupted. Even more worrying is the fact that the number of new protectionist measures has remained at a high and constant level since the crisis. According to the study, the value of these countries' exports could have been as much as 31% higher if crisis-era protectionism had been avoided. As the study also reveals, contrary to the pledge made by the world's largest and most powerful economies, the G20 countries are responsible for the lion's share of the new protectionist measures adopted. Such protectionism has no doubt hurt everyone, including the G20 countries themselves. Most striking, however, is the detrimental effect that G20 protectionism has on the world's poor, living in the least developed countries.

This year marks an important year for policymakers around the world. A number of high-level conferences will be held to discuss how to achieve long-term sustainable development. In this regard, and as confirmed by this study, it is even more important for Sweden and other countries to continue to promote free and open trade. I believe that this study will contribute to the discussion on how global policies need to change to ensure that the world's poor can use trade as an effective tool to fight poverty. I would like to thank Professor Evenett and Doctor Fritz at the University of St. Gallen for their thought-provoking work on this topic.

Mikael Damberg  
Minister for Enterprise and Innovation, Sweden



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# Executive Summary

Employing data collected by Global Trade Alert, an independent trade policy monitoring initiative, on both trade-distorting and trade-liberalising measures implemented since November 2008, the purpose of this study is to summarise, discuss, and estimate the effects of crisis-era trade policy changes on the exports of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) over the five year period from 2009 to 2013.

The principal findings of this study are:

- Since the first G20 crisis-related summit in November 2008, 494 protectionist measures were implemented that harmed the commercial interests of the LDCs.
- Of the 494 protectionist measures imposed, the G20 countries were together responsible for 326 (or two-thirds) of them. India alone has implemented 102 measures that harmed LDC commercial interests. Taken together, the EU28 nations have enacted 64 measures that harmed LDCs. Argentina, Brazil, and China have taken 20 or more steps that harmed LDCs.
- Tariff increases, export incentives and state aids, and export tax hikes and other restrictions account for nearly 60% of the measures that have harmed the commercial interests of LDCs.
- Analysis of the determinants of the exports of 44 LDCs to 135 trading partners shows that the adverse impact of foreign trade distortions imposed during 2009 to 2013 was eight times that of foreign trade reforms.
- A conservative estimate of the total amount of forgone LDC exports caused by trade distortions implemented between 2009 and 2013 is US\$265 billion. This is equivalent to 31% of the total value of LDC exports during these five years.
- Export incentives offered by foreign governments to their firms that compete against LDC rivals in third markets were the principal source of lost LDC exports, not bailouts of local firms or traditional import barriers.
- Together, the G20 nations are responsible for 85.7% of LDC export losses.

- Foreign trade distortions reduced LDC export growth considerably since 2008. Without these distortions LDC exports would have grown 5.5% faster per year. Ultimately, crisis-era trade distortions have thrown sand into the LDC export growth engine.


The policy recommendations that follow from these findings are:

- While steps by the G20 to streamline customs procedures and more generally to promote trade by developing countries are welcome, attention should not shift away from the harm done by the leading trading nations to LDC exports.
- G20 members and member states of the European Union should develop a timetable for unwinding crisis-era trade distortions that have harmed LDCs.
- Regular monitoring of the imposition of new protectionism harming LDCs and the unwinding of existing protectionism should be undertaken and discussed openly and frankly in international fora, including the G20, UNCTAD, and the WTO.

# 1 Introduction

Improving the livelihoods of the 900 million people living in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) is a priority for the international development community and for the premier forum on international economic cooperation, the Group of 20 (G20) nations. While progress continues to be made, albeit unevenly,<sup>1</sup> on certain key indicators, rates of improvement have yet to recover to those seen before the onset of the global economic crisis. To take just one example, as Figure 1 shows, the rate of growth of per-capita incomes in LDCs is now half that seen during the years 2000 to 2008.

**Figure 1** LDC per capita growth is only half its pre-crisis rate



Source: World Development Indicators.

<sup>1</sup> For a summary of developments in this regard see UNCTAD (2014), Chapter 1.

Moreover, the fall-off in growth rates of per-capita income levels in the LDCs has been greater than in the Lower Middle Income Countries (LMICs) and Upper Middle Income Countries (UMICs), perhaps another indication of the lack of LDC resilience to global economic shocks.

It has long been recognised that international trade can play an important role in improving living standards in the 48 countries that are classified as LDCs.<sup>2</sup> The *Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2011-2020*, agreed upon at the Fourth United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries in Istanbul on 9-13 May 2011, declared that:

*“Trade has an important role in ensuring least developed countries’ sustainable economic development. Least developed countries’ collective share in international trade has nearly doubled over the past 10 years, but it remains very low, at just over 1 per cent of merchandise trade, and is highly concentrated on a few export products”* (UNCTAD, 2011, para. 61, p. 19).

To that end, the Programme identifies the following steps to be taken, along with promoting regional integration:

*“Least developed countries, with the support from their development partners, should address supply-side constraints by enhancing productive capacities and reducing constraints on the private sector, as well as building and diversifying their export base”* (para. 62).

*“It is essential to seriously work towards creating favourable market access conditions for all products originating in least developed countries, including through the reduction or elimination of arbitrary or unjustified non-tariff barriers and other trade-distorting measures”* (para. 63).

Traditionally, reference to improved market access conditions for LDCs has centred on implementing duty-free quota-free access as part of the Doha Round of multilateral trade talks. In the light of the global economic crisis, another concern arises – namely, that governments (and not just those of G20 nations) have sought to restrict access of foreign suppliers to their national markets, including exporters from the LDCs. One of the reasons limited attention has been given to this important matter is that official monitoring of crisis-era protectionism has been circumscribed. The admission by the WTO Director-General that only 37% of member governments supplied information on their trade policy changes to the WTO Secretariat in the most recent reporting round undermines the credibility of the findings of official reports on crisis-era protectionism.<sup>3</sup> Just

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2 African countries account for 34 of the LDC group, another 13 LDC members are located in Asia and the Pacific, and one Latin American country (Haiti) is designated an LDC.

3 Such under-reporting by WTO members is not new; the Director-General noted the response rate was only 35% in 2013 (see [http://www.wto.org/english/news\\_e/spra\\_e/spra44\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spra_e/spra44_e.htm)).

because many governments, including members of the G20, won't admit there is a protectionist problem doesn't mean that there isn't one.

However, it is not just the matter of under-reporting that should be of concern to the LDCs and the development community. Given that WTO obligations cover only a fraction of the beggar-thy-neighbour measures that governments can employ, and that over half of WTO members retain leeway to legally raise tariffs substantially, any proper assessment of the impact of crisis-era protectionism on the commercial interests of the LDCs needs to take account of the *many* ways in which governments can discriminate against foreign commercial interests.<sup>4</sup> Drawing upon an independent trade policy monitoring initiative, Global Trade Alert, that has collected data on both protectionism and liberalising measures taken since November 2008, the purpose of this report is to summarise, discuss, and estimate the effects of crisis-era trade policy changes on the exports of the Least Developed Countries over the five-year period from 2009 to 2013. In so doing, the report identifies which nations have taken action that harmed the commercial interests of the LDCs the most. Transparency and monitoring of protectionism affecting LDCs is also advanced by the inclusion in this report of an annex with data on the incidence of protectionism facing each LDC. Ultimately, the goal here is to establish the extent to which the export growth of LDCs, which had served these countries so well in the boom years of 2000 to 2008, has been compromised by crisis-era protectionism.

Perhaps due to data constraints, there have been remarkably few empirical analyses of the impact of protectionism in recent years. Analyses seeking to compare export performance before and after the crisis are, like Constantinescu et al. (2014), almost inevitably forced to restrict their analysis of the impact of protectionism to the resort to trade defence measures, for which data going back decades are available. In principle, such trade defence data could be complemented by data on average tariff levels, still the essential point remains that these are just two elements of the protectionist toolbox available to governments.

Other analysts have sought to use the more detailed Global Trade Alert data. For example, Henn and McDonald (2014) estimated, using disaggregated product-level data, the impact of crisis-era protectionism. They found that new border measures decreased trade by 5-8 percentage points. Evidence on the impact of behind-the-border measures was harder to establish in their study. There are two reasons why this particular IMF study is of limited relevance for our purposes. First, the study focused on the imports of members of the European Union and 14 other G20 members. That is, LDC trade was not the focus of the study. Second, the Global Trade Alert database has expanded considerably since the IMF study

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<sup>4</sup> In this respect it is noteworthy, and disappointing, that the above-mentioned Programme of Action only calls for resisting protectionism that is “inconsistent with multilateral obligations” and targets non-tariff barriers that “are not in conformity with the World Trade Organization rules” (UNCTAD, 2011, p. 20). Perhaps the longstanding discussion on “policy space” has misled many into believing that existing WTO rules are all-encompassing and far-reaching in scope. Recently, Aggarwal and Evenett (2014) picked apart the implicit assumptions underlying this misleading view of the scope of multilateral trade obligations.

was first drafted in 2011, implying that their findings may have been skewed by missing data. Consequently, the report presented here will add not just to the important matter of understanding the determinants of Least Developed Countries' exports, but also to the small literature on the impact of crisis-era protectionism.

The findings of this report could also be of interest in ongoing deliberations among the G20 nations. If the statements made at G20 Leaders Summits are anything to go by, the G20 has sought to enhance the trading prospects of the LDCs. For example, at the G20 Leaders Summit in Seoul, Korea, a *Multi-Year Action Plan on Development* was agreed. In the Plan, the section on international trade contains the following preamble:

*"No country has grown and reduced poverty without access to and the ability to trade. Recognizing both the capacity and access to trade as key elements in economic growth and poverty reduction, we are committed to facilitating trade with and between developing countries, in particular the LDCs."* (G20, 2010, p. 4).

The Plan included pledges to "make progress towards duty-free and quota-free market access for the least developed country products"<sup>5</sup> and maintain levels of financial support for the Aid for Trade initiative, amongst others. These pledges are in addition to pledges to eschew protectionism (that have been reiterated on several occasions since first being made at the November 2008 G20 Leaders Summit in Washington, DC). With the resolution of the dispute over the Bali deal on trade facilitation, considerable billing was given to its implementation at the 2014 Brisbane Summit of G20 Leaders. As will be discussed later, such implementation would be timely given the deterioration in recent years in LDC performance on key metrics relating to the costs of trading across national borders.

Looking forward, the Turkish Presidency of the G20 has said it will "focus on ways to make the G-20 more relevant to the rest of the world, including the low-income developing countries" (Government of Turkey, 2014). International trade is identified as one of Turkey's "Priorities for 2015". In this regard, specific mention is made of the need to better understand the recent slowdown in the growth of world trade, as well as the need to "follow up our commitment to resist protectionism" (Government of Turkey, 2014, p. 7). It remains to be seen what will be accomplished during the Turkish Presidency of the G20 and, with that in mind, Section 5 of this report contains some recommendations for action by policymakers at the G20 and elsewhere.

The remainder of this report is organised as follows. The export performance of the LDCs before and during the crisis era is described in Section 2. Following that, data on worldwide trends in protectionism and the incidence of protectionism and trade liberalisation potentially affecting LDC commercial interests are

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5 G20 (2010), p. 4.



presented and discussed in Section 3. The countries responsible for the largest number of protectionist hits to LDC commercial interests are also identified.

These two factual sections motivate a number of the design choices made in Section 4 of this report, where the impact of crisis-era trade policy choices on the bilateral exports of LDCs is estimated using widely recognised econometric methods. Annual estimates of the total amount of exports lost by the LDC group due to foreign trade distortions are also presented and are contrasted with estimates of the export gains by LDCs created by foreign trade reforms. Such empirical findings inform an overall assessment of the impact of crisis-era policy changes on the integration of LDCs into the world economy, at least as seen through the export channel. Recommendations for policymakers and officials in international organisations are developed in Section 5, and concluding remarks follow in Section 6.


At the end of this report can be found an Annex that reveals the frequency with which each LDC's commercial interests have been harmed by foreign protectionism, what percentage of that protectionism is still in force, and the number of state measures that, if implemented, would add to the protectionism faced by the LDC. Such statistics can be updated regularly and could add an important LDC dimension to the monitoring of crisis-era protectionism. Following that, a second Annex reports on the degree to which each LDC's exports have been exposed to foreign trade distortions and trade reforms during the years 2009-2013. These statistics too can be updated over time, strengthening the empirical base that can support discussions on this important subject.



## 2 LDC export performance since 2000

The purpose of this section is to describe the key features of LDC export performance, contrasting the record of these countries with countries at other stages of development and over time. In doing so, it will become clear just how unusually good the years before the global economic crisis struck were. Moreover, variation across types of LDC will be considered. This overview points to a number of factors that were taken into account in the econometric analysis of the determinants of exports by LDCs that is described in Section 4 of this report.

**Figure 2** Despite fast export growth since 2000, LDCs still account for just over 1% of world exports




Source: UN COMTRADE database.

While total LDC exports have tended to grow, there has been considerable volatility over time, as shown in Figure 2. Since the year 2000, total LDC exports have quintupled in real terms to approximately \$200 billion per year. Correspondingly, the share of LDC exports in world exports has now risen to

above 1%, which is still far below this group of nations' share of world population. Still, for those keen to see LDCs integrate their economies into world markets, the direction of change is welcome. Figure 2 also shows that the growth in total LDC exports has not been smooth over time, with falls in total exports witnessed during the early years of the global economic crisis.

**Figure 3** LDC export growth since 2000 has been faster than other countries



Note: Values of exports in 2000 set to a base level of 100.


Source: UN COMTRADE database.

Compared to other groups of countries, however, LDC export growth since 2000 has been nothing short of exceptional. Figure 3 compares the growth in total exports of the LDCs with the countries the World Bank classifies as LMICs and UMICs, with the OECD group of industrialised countries, and with the world as a whole. To facilitate comparisons, 2000 is taken as the base year for each series plotted. In the years 2000 to 2013, as LDCs quintupled their exports, the total exports of the other developing country groupings rose by around 300%, whereas total OECD exports increased by 125%. In the light of this impressive export performance, it is no exaggeration to refer to a 'LDC export machine', especially in the years up to 2008.

Pre-crisis export performance varies across the LDCs, as shown in Figure 4, where data is presented on three sub-groups of LDCs – an African group (plus Haiti), the Asian LDCs, and the small island economies that are also LDCs. The African LDCs experienced the fastest export growth since 2000, but were also set back the most by the retrenchment in trade associated with the global economic crisis. The Asian LDCs had the slowest rate of growth over this period. Overall, almost all LDC exports are accounted for by the African and Asian LDCs. The latter finding does not imply that the island LDCs are unimportant. Rather,

it could imply that these nations have considerable potential to expand their exports in the future.

**Figure 4** The African and Asian LDCs together account for almost all of total LDC exports




Source: UN COMTRADE database.

As Figure 5 shows, even though the middle income developing countries (which include powerhouses such as Brazil, China, and India) sourced more and more of their imports from other developing countries, the principal buyers of LDC goods exports remain the OECD group of industrialised nations. Resort to protectionism by trading partners may hold back the growth of LDC exports, and one goal of the econometric approach taken in this report was to estimate the impact of changes in trade policies undertaken by the major buyers of LDC products.

As noted in the Introduction, there is a growing concern that world trade dynamics have not returned to their pre-crisis tempo. One way to assess this is to compute the elasticity of export growth with respect to world GDP or, put another way: What is the average export growth observed when world GDP changes by one percent? Data going back to 1990 were assembled to provide a comparator for the period before as well as after the boom in global trade witnessed between 2000 and 2008. As Figure 6 shows, the years 2000-2008 saw very large estimated export elasticities for the LDCs and for other developing countries. Not surprisingly, those elasticities collapsed during the contraction of 2008-2010. However, subsequently these measures of export responsiveness have not risen back to their pre-crisis levels. Only the OECD countries have an export


elasticity since 2010 that is anywhere near close to the level that prevailed before the onset of the global economic crisis.

**Figure 5** Despite the growth of emerging markets, most LDC goods exports are still shipped to OECD nations



Source: UN COMTRADE database.

**Figure 6** The LDC average export elasticity has fallen sharply since the crisis




Source: UN COMTRADE database.

While much could be made of the fall in the value of these export elasticities after the global economic crisis, Figure 6 also highlights just how unusual the boom years of 2000-2008 were, in particular when compared with the decade that preceded them (1990-2000). Still, LDC export performance stands out, as its average export elasticity during 2000-2008 is almost as large as the decade prior.

Once account is taken of the differences in the variation in export prices across countries and over time, then the conclusions drawn change. As Figure 7 below shows, as many of the LDCs are commodity exporters, their average export prices rise sharply after the year 2000. This is particularly true of the African LDCs. Once export price changes are stripped out, the computed export elasticities (which are best thought of as here as representing the elasticity of the volume of a group of nations' exports with respect to world GDP) that are reported in Figure 8 differ considerably across sub-groups of LDCs and from those reported in Figure 6.


**Figure 7** Pre-crisis export performance of the LDCs was bolstered by sustained increases in average export prices, especially when compared to other groups of countries



Source: UNCTAD.

Correcting for export price changes (as shown in Figure 8) alters our previous findings in one important respect. The Asian LDCs appear to be the only group of LDCs whose export responsiveness returns to pre-crisis levels. The export responsiveness of the African LDCs falls markedly after 2008.

**Figure 8** Even after stripping out the effects of export price changes, only the Asian LDCs see their estimated export elasticity return to pre-crisis levels




Sources: UNCTAD export price deflators and COMTRADE database.

While much of the focus of this report will be on crisis-era trade policy changes that have been implemented by the trading partners of the LDCs, it is important to note that national export performance is also affected by a government's own policies. As shown in Figure 9, there has been a disconcerting increase in the cost of exporting (per container) from developing countries, and in the LDCs in particular. Since 2008, these costs in LDCs have risen by 19%, which surely reduces the profitability of exporting bulkier products in particular. This finding raises questions as to the factors determining the conditions of competition in the supply of shipping services between LDCs and their trading partners. The problems here may well be policy related, but rising containerisation rates could also reflect the impact of anti-competitive practices.

Further discouraging evidence concerns the administrative burdens placed on traders by customs regulations (see Figure 10). It appears that, on average, LDC customs procedures became less burdensome from 2008 to 2010. However, since then some of the gains have been reversed. Now that the Bali deal on trade facilitation has been agreed, LDCs may want to take advantage of the resources available to implement this WTO accord and streamline their customs procedures. Doing so could close the gap between the LDCs and other developing countries, which, according to Figure 10, is not that large. While the rest of this study focuses on trade policy developments affecting the LDCs, this is not to imply that only external factors determine LDC export performance.




**Figure 9** The cost of shipping out of LDCs has risen 19% since 2008



Source: World Development Indicators.

**Figure 10** LDC customs procedures have become more burdensome since 2010



Source: World Development Indicators.

In sum, since 2000 aggregate LDC export growth has been impressive. Certainly some of the observed growth in the total value of exports was driven by rising commodity prices and, in other cases, by the upgrading of manufactured goods, but volume growth was strong as well. Not surprisingly, LDC exports did not emerge unscathed from the global economic crisis in 2008 and 2009. Since then, LDC export growth experience has diverged with African LDCs doing markedly better than their Asian LDC counterparts and the island LDCs. This serves as an important reminder of the diversity among the LDC grouping.

Ultimately, what matters is whether policies at home and abroad are holding back further contributions of LDC exports to economic growth, employment, and poverty reduction. As the last two figures have shown, there are challenges that the LDCs face at home in this regard. Be that as it may, the focus shifts in the remainder of this study to the actions taken by the trading partners of the LDCs.

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## 3 Crisis-era trade policy developments affecting LDC commercial interests

Once financial markets froze in the second half of 2008 and it became apparent that the initial effects of what was to become the global economic crisis could not be contained, fears arose that governments might be tempted to shift the burden of economic adjustment on to trading partners through the resort to protectionism. Widespread beggar-thy-neighbour activity would have limited the gains from export-led development strategies, which had been pursued successfully by a number of developing countries in the past. Maintaining open borders, then, was not just a matter of fealty to the spirit (if not necessarily the letter) of multilateral trade rules, but a matter of preserving the opportunity to climb up the development ladder. So much for fear and noble purpose, what happened in practice? The purpose of this section is to describe the crisis-era trade policy developments that affected the commercial interests of the LDCs, bearing in mind that exportation is not the only way in which LDCs can participate in the global economy.

### 3.1 Data sources on beggar-thy-neighbour activity

Before the global economic crisis, data on only a few trade policy instruments was collected on a regular basis by international organisations such as the World Bank and the WTO. The available data referred either to instruments whose use has been progressively negotiated away over time (e.g. tariffs on imports) or to instruments that tend to be applied surgically and cover little trade (e.g. trade defence measures, such as an antidumping). It turns out that only following changes in these state measures would have provided an unrepresentative account of changes in overall policy stance since the onset of the global economic crisis. As a result of these data deficiencies, one official monitoring initiative was set up (led in large part by the WTO, but with contributions from the OECD and UNCTAD) which was complemented by another, independent initiative, Global Trade Alert (GTA). In the interests of full disclosure, we should make it clear that we have been associated with the latter initiative.

This is not the place to undertake a comparison of the official and GTA monitoring initiatives (see Chapter 4 of Evenett, 2014, for pertinent information in this regard). Rather, here we summarise the main features of GTA's approach, as its data is used in Section 4 of this report to estimate the impact of trade policy

changes on the export of goods by LDCs. GTA has sought to collect information on policy changes introduced since the first G20 crisis summit in November 2008 that affect the relative treatment of domestic commercial interests vis-à-vis their relevant foreign rivals. As such, GTA does not employ an instrument-based definition of protectionism (such as “only tariffs and import quotas count as protectionism”). One advantage of this approach is that if governments change the manner in which they discriminate against foreign commercial interests, any new means of discrimination will not fall outside of the scope of the GTA’s monitoring. This approach is also neutral in the sense that improvements in the treatment of foreign commercial interests are recorded by the GTA, not just discrimination against such interests; the latter being referred to here as “protectionism”.

Figure 11 describes the process through which a measure is identified, investigated, evaluated, and potentially published on the GTA website ([www.globaltradealert.org](http://www.globaltradealert.org)). For our purposes a measure – the central unit of analysis – is an announcement by a government of an actual or intended policy change. A measure could be a government decree that alters the tariff rate on a single product, or it could be a government budget that involves hundreds of policy changes that (if implemented) affect foreign commercial interests.

For each measure, where possible, an official source is sought to verify the policy changes (there is a strong preference for using official sources in GTA, even if the initial lead came from a non-official source). The policy instruments involved in a measure are recorded and products and sectors affected by the measure identified, as are the trading partners that may be affected by the implementation of the measure.<sup>6</sup> Each measure has a short write-up prepared for it that includes the date the measure came into force and whether the measure is temporary (and if so, for how long.)


Furthermore, a traffic light system is used to categorise each measure: a measure is assigned a *red* light if it almost certainly discriminates against a foreign commercial interest; an *amber* light if its implementation is likely to discriminate against foreign commercial interests or if the measure hasn’t been implemented yet but, should that happen, it would almost certainly be discriminatory; and a *green* light if the measure either improves the transparency of the national trade policy regime, or it improves or has no effect on the relative treatment of foreign versus domestic commercial interests. As new information becomes available, a measure is updated and its colour classification may change. For example, an

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<sup>6</sup> A number of procedures have been established to identify conservatively the affected trading partner. For example, in the case of a tariff increase on butter by, say, Pakistan, the GTA team would use UN COMTRADE data to identify those trading partners of Pakistan that export more than a *de minimis* level of butter to Pakistan in the year when the measure was announced. In such cases the *de minimis* level of trade was taken to be US\$1 million of shipments in a year. As other trade policy instruments operate in different ways, other techniques have been developed to identify the likely affected trading partners. More details are available upon request from the authors.

antidumping investigation that results in preliminary duties being applied would switch from being coded amber to red.

**Figure 11** The process used by the Global Trade Alert to investigate trade policy changes



### 3.2 Three phases of crisis-era protectionism at the global level


As of this writing, GTA has published reports on 6,004 measures announced by governments worldwide since November 2008, the month when the G20 nations met for the first time in crisis mode and pledged to eschew protectionism. Another 666 measures are in the process of preparation and evaluation. Since the St. Petersburg G20 Summit, the GTA team has added over 2,300 measures to the database, which, as will become clear below, has markedly altered the protectionist record. A brief summary of key global developments is provided next (for more information, see the chapters of Evenett, 2014). That summary is followed by an account of trade policy developments that benefit and harm the commercial interests of the LDCs.

One important implication of the substantial expansion of the GTA's database since the St. Petersburg G20 Summit is that the argument that protectionism peaked early in 2009 but was contained subsequently can be set aside. Figure 12 shows the quarter-by-quarter worldwide resort to *new* protectionist measures<sup>7</sup> that the GTA team has documented before the four most recent G20 Summits. Until the St. Petersburg Summit, it was possible to argue that protectionism

<sup>7</sup> Here, protectionist measures are taken to be red measures and amber measures that have been implemented.


surged in Q1 2009 and then fell back, at least if one was prepared to overlook the awkward fact that documenting certain types of protectionism can take time (not least because some governments are very good at burying their interventions in official websites).

**Figure 12** Worldwide protectionist numbers have been revised upwards in recent months – putting to rest the “single peak” theory of crisis-era protectionism



Source: Evenett (2014), specifically Figure 1.1 of the latest GTA report.

By the end of 2014, however, three phases of crisis-era protectionism can be discerned. There was indeed a spike in Q1 2009 followed by a progressive reduction in the quarterly totals for new protectionism through to the end of 2009. As global economic prospects improved in 2010 and 2011, the number of new protectionist measures implemented per quarter stabilised at around 140, still above the level observed in Q4 2008. Once the global economic growth faltered from 2012 onwards, the quarterly resort to protectionism grew steadily reaching approximately 200 in Q4 2012 and Q1 2013. The subsequent falling-off of quarterly totals reflects reporting lags (and, if prior form is anything to go by, these totals will rise sharply in the next 12 months). The third phase of protectionism has seen the annual total for the number of protectionist measures implemented in 2013 now equal the total for 2009, even though there has been much more time to collect information on trade policy changes during 2009. Far from being contained, protectionist pressures are building again within the world trading system. Data such as this – plus an appreciation of the extent of reporting lags and the resort to non-traditional forms of protectionism – has led the GTA to take a more negative view of protectionist developments than found in the reports by the WTO Secretariat.

**Figure 13** GTA finds 44% more G20 trade restrictions than the WTO Secretariat

Source: Evenett (2014), specifically Figure 1.6 of latest GTA report.

The fact that GTA eschews an instrument-based definition of protectionism (preferring instead a relative treatment test) is one reason why the totals for protectionism found by GTA often exceed those found by the WTO Secretariat. Another reason is that GTA continues to update its database concerning newly found protectionism that was implemented during earlier reporting cycles, whereas the WTO does not. These differences in approach may have confused some analysts and officials.


To facilitate the cleanest possible apples-for-apples comparison, it is possible to compare – using the WTO’s chosen reporting cycles, the same countries (in this case the G20), and the same policy instruments – the totals found in the GTA database with those found by the WTO Secretariat. Chapter 4 of Evenett (2014) goes through all of the details and undertakes a number of comparisons. The headline finding is that, had GTA adopted the official choices in reporting method, then GTA would have found 44% more trade restrictions than the WTO Secretariat (see Figure 13). Moreover, GTA has found that G20 countries have liberalised trade twice as many times as the WTO Secretariat report. Such findings lay bare the extent of official under-reporting of both crisis-era protectionism and trade liberalisation. Given this systemic under-reporting, the question arises as to whether the LDCs, which have few resources to devote to monitoring trade policy developments abroad, can rely only on official reporting?

### 3.3 Incidence of protectionism affecting the LDCs

Using the information available in the GTA database, the remainder of this section is devoted to summarising the form and frequency of policy changes that likely affected the commercial interests of the LDCs. Annual totals for the number of implemented measures harming and benefiting LDCs are summarised in Figure 14. Unlike the worldwide totals, there is no upward spike in protectionism

affecting LDCs in 2009, and this is because the 2009 total is similar to the annualised 2008 total. The annual number of hits to LDC commercial interests peaks at 100 in 2010, then falls back before increasing again. Given reporting lags, it would be surprising if the finalised 2013 total were less than its 2010 counterpart, suggesting the dip in the resort to new protectionism in 2011 was temporary. As the dotted line below the upper solid line in Figure 13 shows, much of the protectionism harming LDC commercial interests is still in effect. Little of the protectionism applied to LDCs has proven to be temporary.

**Figure 14** Crisis-era trade policy changes affecting the commercial interests of LDCs, by year




Note: \*denotes an annualised total based on data from November and December 2008.

Source: Global Trade Alert website, data extracted 28 December 2014.

Figure 14 also indicates the number of measures implemented by trading partners that were either beneficial to the LDCs or involved no change in relative treatment. As is immediately apparent, the number of harmful measures exceeds the number of benign or beneficial measures every single year. Plus, like some of the harmful measures, not all of the neutral or beneficial measures are permanent. Of course, counts of the number of measures need not provide a reliable guide to the amount of trade affected or harm (or benefit) to LDCs, a matter taken up in Section 3.4 below.



**Figure 15:** Comparing LDC and worldwide incidence of protectionism, by year




Source: Global Trade Alert website, data extracted 28 December 2014. Note: \*denotes an annualised total based on data from November and December 2008.

Figure 15 presents a comparison between worldwide annual totals for protectionism and the comparable totals for those measures harming the LDCs. With the exception of 2011, the percentage of measures implemented each year that harm at least one LDC is in the range of 10% to 14%, pretty much in line with the LDC’s share of world population, but ten times the share of LDC’s exports in world exports. Before concluding that such statistics demonstrate that LDC exports are being disproportionately targeted, it is worth bearing in mind that a protectionist measure can harm more than one country. Still, claims that crisis-era protectionism left LDCs unscathed can probably be set aside.


There are interesting differences in the foreign state measures that have benefited and harmed LDC commercial interests, as summarised by Figures 16 and 17. Reductions in import tariffs and export taxes, and relaxations of other export restrictions account for nearly 60% of all measures that have benefited LDCs. Relaxations of migration restrictions account for another 9% of beneficial or neutral measures. Expansions or abolitions of import quotas and reductions or eliminations of other non-tariff barriers account for 7% each of the total. Other than the relaxation of migration restrictions, over 70% of the foreign measures that are benign or beneficial to LDCs involve barriers to trade in goods.

**Figure 16** Foreign liberalisation benefiting or neutral towards LDC commercial interests, by type of policy instrument



Source: Global Trade Alert website, data extracted 28 December 2014.

**Figure 17** Foreign protectionism harming LDC commercial interests, by type of policy instrument




Source: Global Trade Alert website, data extracted 28 December 2014.

Steps implemented by trading partners since November 2008 that harm LDC commercial interests are concentrated in a relatively small number of mainly trade-related policy instruments as well. Subsidies to keep businesses afloat, which delay the process of consolidation and tend to depress prices on markets, are responsible for 15% of the measures harming LDCs. Meanwhile, tariff increases, export restrictions, and local content requirements together account over 40% of the measures harming LDCs.

Since the focus in Section 4 will be on the exports of LDCs to third parties, it is worth examining the intertemporal variation in the resort to leading trade restrictions likely to have affected these countries' commercial interests. Figure 18 presents the totals of the numbers of export tax increases, local content requirements, and tariff increases that have been imposed and are likely to have affected more than one LDC's commercial interests. Approximately 20 tariff increases per year harm LDC commercial interests (bear in mind that a single tariff increase can affect numerous LDCs). The number of export restrictions affecting LDC commercial interests appears to have peaked in 2010 and 2011. Between five and ten new local content requirements harm LDC commercial interests every year.

**Figure 18** Annual report to three leading types of trade restriction that harm the exports of LDCs



Note: \*denotes an annualised total based on data from November and December 2008.

Source: Global Trade Alert website, data extracted 28 December 2014.

### 3.4 Exposure of LDC exports to foreign trade reforms and trade distortions

Counts of protectionist measures reveal the frequency with which a nation's commercial interests are harmed. However, such counts don't shed light on the scale of international commerce affected. With this in mind, analysts have frequently computed the proportion of trade covered by protectionism. Such trade coverage ratios are typically constructed so that higher ratios imply that more of a nation's exports are affected by foreign trade distortions. Here our goal is different as we shall compute the degree to which an LDC's exports may have benefited from foreign liberalisation as well. To facilitate comparisons across policy instruments on the same scale, we computed for each bilateral trading relationship in our sample the share of exports that are in product lines where the importing nation has liberalised policy and the share of exports that are in product lines that are *not* affected by a foreign trade distortion. The former is referred to as the share of exports benefiting from foreign state acts, the latter to the share of exports *unimpeded* by harmful foreign state acts. Higher values on both metrics can be interpreted as being more beneficial to the commercial interests of an exporting LDC.

Moreover, in any bilateral trading relationship between an exporter  $i$  and importer  $j$ , trade restrictions by  $j$  and bailouts by  $j$  of firms in tradable goods sectors might harm exporters from  $i$ . In addition, an exporter of a product from nation  $i$  may face additional competition in  $j$ 's markets because a third party government  $k$  has subsidised exports in the same product line. Thus, there are three means by which exporters from  $i$  of a given product may find their commercial prospects harmed by foreign policies. Moreover, since inception and implementation dates are reported for policy measures in this database, it was possible to identify, for each year during the period 2009-2013, which policies were still in effect and, crucially, to calculate changes in LDC export exposure to foreign liberalisation and foreign trade distortions from a common starting point (taken here to be 2008), revealing the cumulative changes in export exposure during the crisis era.

With these considerations in mind, using four-digit product line data from the UN COMTRADE database, we computed each bilateral trading relationship<sup>8</sup> between LDC exporter  $i$  and importer  $j$  the following measures, where each product line was weighted by the percentage of its trade between these two countries during the years 2005—2013:<sup>9</sup>

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
8 The sample only includes trading partners to whom at least one LDC shipped at least US\$1 million worth of exports on the HS 4-digit level in at least one year during the observation period 2009-2013. For more details of the sample of data collected see the next section of this report.

9 The choice of such a long time interval to generate the weights is to reduce the likely endogeneity of the weights used to a policy intervention taken since 2008.

- The share of LDC *i*'s exports to *j* benefiting from *j*'s trade reforms.
- The share of LDC *i*'s exports to *j* unaffected by *j*'s import restrictions.
- The share of LDC *i*'s exports to *j* unaffected by *j*'s bailouts to firms in traded goods sectors.<sup>10</sup>
- The share of LDC *i*'s exports to *j* unaffected by third party governments' export incentives.<sup>11</sup>

Having computed these four measures for 6,323 bilateral trading relationships, all of which include LDCs as exporters, overall averages for the class of LDC countries were computed, again in a trade-weighted manner. The purpose of reporting these LDC-wide averages is that they reveal the degree to which LDCs have been exposed to beneficial and harmful policy changes by trading partners since 2008. The changes in those LDC-wide averages over time are portrayed in Figure 19. Recall that higher shares are potentially better news for LDC exporters.

**Figure 19** Trade coverage ratios affecting LDC exports vary markedly across classes of trade policy instrument



Source: Computed from Global Trade Alert reports and trade weighted using 4-digit trade flow data obtained from the UN COMTRADE database.

<sup>10</sup> Bailouts to firms in non-traded sectors were not included in this analysis.

<sup>11</sup> These include not just traditional export subsidies but also incentives supplied to exporters through national tax systems. Examples include the various VAT rebates offered to Chinese exports (see Evenett et al. 2012) and the 2014 tax refund offered by the Brazilian government to manufacturing firms that export (for details see <http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/brazil-tax-refund-all-companies-exporting-manufactured-goods>).

As this figure makes clear, the share of LDC exports in product lines that have benefited from foreign trade liberalisation increased from less than 0.1 in 2009 to more than 0.4 in 2013. In contrast, the share of LDC exports unaffected by foreign import restrictions fell from 0.87 in 2009 to 0.59 in 2013. Together, these imply a mixed picture for traditional LDC access to foreign markets.<sup>12</sup>

More striking findings relate to the exposure of LDC exporters to subsidised rivals. First, there is very limited exposure of LDC exporters to products where the importing nation bailed out or subsidised local producers. But, LDC export exposure to competitors in overseas markets subsidised by third parties (that is, not by the government of the importing nation) is sizeable. In no year from 2009 to 2013 was the percentage of LDC exports that competed freely against unsubsidised rivals ever greater than 15%. Put another way, on average, far fewer LDC exports were at a competitive disadvantage from traditional trade barriers erected by importers than from subsidised rival sellers of the same products shipped from other countries.

### **3.5 Trading partners responsible for distorting LDC exports**

Information on the countries that most often harm LDC commercial interests is given in Figure 20. Of the 494 measures in the GTA database that harm LDCs, two-thirds were implemented by the G20 countries, the very countries that have time and again stated that they would refrain from protectionism and would advance the integration of the LDCs into the world economy. Only 12 of the nearly 500 harmful measures were implemented by LDCs, whereby one LDC harms another LDC.

Of the G20 countries, India stands out. Despite its frequent claims to represent the interests of developing countries at the WTO, India alone is responsible for over 20% of the worldwide total of measures harming the LDCs. The 28 members of the European Union, when acting individually or collectively through the European Commission, are responsible for 64 measures that have harmed the commercial interests of LDCs. Argentina, Brazil, and China are each responsible for 20 or more measures harming LDCs. Japan and the US are responsible for few measures that harm the commercial interests of the LDCs, each implementing no more than ten such measures since November 2008.


These findings highlight the considerable cross-country resort to trade distortions that threaten LDC exports and their integration into world markets. That variation, plus the variation over time and across exporters, will be exploited in the next section of this report to estimate the impact of crisis-era trade distortions on the total value of LDC exports. In this manner, we can complement

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<sup>12</sup> Angola accounted for 34% of LDC exports between 2009 and 2013. To check whether the statistics reported in Figure 19 were unduly influenced by the inclusion of Angola, the trade coverage ratios in this figure were recomputed without information on Angola. The principal qualitative findings remain unchanged. A version of Figure 19 without Angola's exports included is available upon request from the authors.

our discussion on the counts of resort to protectionism and potential trade coverage with quantitative estimates of the impact of such protectionism on a group of countries widely regarded as the most vulnerable to economic shocks.

**Figure 20** The G20 nations are responsible for harming LDC commercial interests most often



Source: Global Trade Alert website, data extracted 28 December 2014.





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## 4 The effect of foreign commercial policy changes on LDC exports during the crisis era

The purpose of this section is to describe the method used to quantify the impact of crisis-era policy choices on LDC exports. The magnitude of the estimated export impact is also discussed as well as its policy significance.

### 4.1 Empirical strategy and data sample collected

To isolate the impact of crisis-era commercial policy changes on the exports of the LDCs, we employed econometric techniques that control for the other determinants of bilateral trade flows. We used the so-called gravity equation approach, which has been described as the workhorse of empirical research into international trade. Specifically, we estimated the determinants of the total value of bilateral exports between each of 44 LDCs<sup>13</sup> and 135 trading partners for the five years from 2009 to 2013. Our sample refers to developments from 2009, as that is the first complete year of data on trade policy changes available in the GTA database.<sup>14</sup> Since a complete dataset of bilateral trade flows in 2014 is not yet available from the United Nations, our sample contains information through to 2013. Consequently, our empirical analysis covers most of the crisis-era, and all three phases of crisis-era protectionism identified in Section 3.

GTA documents policy-related changes in the relative treatment of foreign commercial interests that deviate from the pre-crisis status quo, taken to be the policy landscape in place at the beginning of November 2008.<sup>15</sup> Using the date a measure came into force and (where relevant) lapsed, for each year from 2009 to 2013 it is possible to identify which policy measures were in force that might affect bilateral trade between two trading jurisdictions. Consequently, all of the variables employed are time-differenced from their 2008 values. Thus, the goal

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13 Due to a lack of data, Myanmar, Somalia, and Tuvalu had to be excluded from the study. Given the division of Sudan during our sample period, this jurisdiction was excluded as well.

14 The Global Trade Alert data are continuously extended and updated. The data used in this estimation include all submissions before 22 December 2014.

15 Global Trade Alert collected data on policy changes (announced and implemented) from this month on so as to monitor adherence of the G20 leaders to their pledges to eschew protectionism during the crisis.

is to obtain evidence on the relative importance of factors responsible for the changes in LDC exports since 2008.

Our sample is confined to bilateral trading relationships where there is at least US\$1 million of trade by a LDC exporter in at least one four-digit product line. While it is true that some LDCs may not meet this threshold with every potential trading partner, our sample covers 91.3% of all LDC exports reported by the United Nations during 2009-2013.<sup>16</sup> Restricting our sample to bilateral trading relations where observed exports are positive is also consistent with the conservative manner in which GTA identifies the trading partners potentially affected by a trade policy measure (which is on the basis of observed trade flows, not some notion of 'potential competition'.) Focusing on bilateral trading relationship with positive levels of trade has another advantage, namely, that it permits the use of time-differenced versions of the gravity equation, which are particularly parsimonious (Harrigan 1996, Head and Reis 2013). Time-differencing the data eliminates all of the time-invariant effects typically included in gravity equations, such as distance (thought to be related to transportation costs or informational barriers affecting market entry), and linguistic and historical ties. Computationally intensive specifications, e.g. those including country-pair-specific fixed effects, are thus unnecessary in this setup.

## 4.2 Base econometric specification and construction of policy-related independent variables

In this study, the base econometric specification used was:

$$\Delta x_{ij,t} = \beta_1 \Delta mass_{ij,t} + \beta_2 \ln(GTA)_{ij,t} + \varepsilon_{ij,t} \quad (1)$$

where  $\Delta x_{ij,t} = \ln(X_{ij,t}) - \ln(X_{ij,2008})$  is the difference in the logarithmic value of exports from LDC  $i$  to trading partner  $j$  between the observation year  $t$  and 2008. Likewise,  $\Delta mass_{ij,t} = \ln(MASS_{ij,t}) - \ln(MASS_{ij,2008})$  is the difference in the logarithmic product of nominal GDPs of the trading partners between the observation year  $t$  and 2008. What follows is an explanation of the elements of the vector of trade policy-related independent variables,  $GTA_{ij,t}$ .

There are several possible approaches to constructing trade policy variables in gravity equations. One approach, indeed the approach taken by us in the first draft of this report, was to include *counts* of the number of times LDC  $i$ 's exports to country  $j$  benefited from or were harmed by policies implemented in the destination country. Such counts provide an indication of the incidence of protectionism, but not the scale of exports potentially affected or the height of the trade barriers. Nor did such counts, at least as they were constructed in

<sup>16</sup> Still, it should be noted that, in principle, our approach may miss some of the impact of commercial policy changes, in particular, cases where bilateral trade in a product starts or stops because of the implementation of a policy change.

the first version of this report, capture the potential effect of third party export incentives.

A second approach is to include *dummy* variables in gravity equations to account for changes in trade policy (such as the coming into force of a regional trade agreement). In principle, this approach could have been followed here using the GTA database. However, the dummy variable approach does not take account of the scale of exports affected by a policy measure. Many antidumping measures are surgical in nature, affecting tiny amounts of trade, whereas a fiscal stimulus package could include 'buy national' provisions covering hundreds of product categories. Again, the scale of exports affected is not well captured by this second approach, to say nothing of the height of the trade barrier.

The approach taken here goes beyond both the counts and dummy variable approaches to include bilateral measures of the exposure of an LDC exporter to policy changes affecting markets in a destination jurisdiction, bearing in mind that the former's exports to the latter can be influenced by measures taken by governments in other countries as well. The latter measures include, for example, the provision of export incentives. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to employ bilateral trade exposure shares to control separately for the resort to crisis-era protectionism and trade liberalisation. It would be fair to say that the approach to constructing trade policy variables employed here does more to capture the scale of exports at risk from foreign trade distortions than the height of those distortions.

Based on data from Global Trade Alert, we constructed three trade policy variables measuring the shares of export from LDC  $i$  that were *unimpeded* by foreign trade-distorting policies introduced during the crisis era.<sup>17</sup> In particular, we were interested in examining whether increases in the share of LDC  $i$ 's exports that were unimpeded by foreign trade distortions were associated with increases in bilateral exports between  $i$  and  $j$ , implying that the expected sign for these elements of vector  $\beta_2$  is positive.

The first computed share relates to the policy interventions in the destination country  $j$  that *directly* reduce imports.<sup>18</sup> Entries in the GTA database on import bans, local content requirements, measures taken by state-owned enterprises and state-controlled companies, public procurement discrimination in favour of domestically produced goods, import quotas (including tariff-rate quotas sometimes used in agriculture), tariff increases, and trade defence measures (including safeguard actions) were used to compute the share of LDC  $i$ 's exports that do not face an import restriction imposed by the government in the destination country  $j$ .

The second share referred to an LDC's exports to market  $j$  that competed with a domestic producer in importer  $j$  which had benefited from crisis-era

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17 The affected tariff lines are identified using all of the implemented interventions evaluated either "amber" or "red" in the Global Trade Alert database that relate to the bilateral pair  $(i,j)$ .

18 Therefore, information in the GTA database on migration restrictions, for example, was not used in the empirical analysis presented here; nor was information on export taxes and restrictions used by an importing country, as these policies are unlikely to have a direct effect on the exports of LDCs.

bailout or other form of non-export-related state financial incentive. Again, here we computed, using four-digit product level, the share of  $i$ 's exports to  $j$  that are not affected by  $j$ 's bailouts in traded goods sectors.<sup>19</sup> The third share was constructed from information on export incentives<sup>20</sup> granted by governments of third countries which compete with exporters from LDC  $i$  in the market of trading partner  $j$ . Specifically, again using four-digit product level information, we computed the share of  $i$ 's exports to  $j$  that do not compete directly with any rival subsidised by a third party government.

We also constructed two aggregate measures from these three bilateral measures of LDC export exposure to foreign trade distortions. The first aggregate is the LDC's total bilateral exposure to all classes of harmful foreign intervention and was deliberately constructed to avoid double-counting (namely, a product may be affected by more than one policy intervention.) In the same manner, the second aggregate is the LDC's total bilateral exposure to trade affected by policy instruments controlled by country  $j$  (here interventions targeting imports plus bailouts and state aids).

Finally, our estimations included an independent variable that sought to control for foreign trade liberalisation. Specifically, we computed the share of an LDC  $i$ 's exports that are in product lines where trading partner  $j$  has not undertaken some form of import liberalisation. It will be interesting to see the extent to which increases in this share are associated with lower LDC exports, implying that the sign of the estimated coefficient for the associated independent variable should be negative.

Taken together, then, the vector  $GTA_{ij,t}$  is:

$$GTA_{ij,t} = \begin{bmatrix} all\_harmful\_interventions_{ij,t} \\ all\_liberalising\_interventions_{ij,t} \\ all\_harmful\_interventions\_by\_j_{ij,t} \\ all\_harmful\_import\_restrictions_{ij,t} \\ all\_harmful\_bailouts_{ij,t} \\ all\_harmful\_export\_subsidies_{ij,t} \end{bmatrix} \quad (2)$$

Table 1 summarises the method used to construct the dependent and independent variables as well as the data sources used in our empirical analysis.

<sup>19</sup> Note that bailouts by  $j$  that relate to non-traded services, such as banks, did not enter into this computation.

<sup>20</sup> This includes not just direct export subsidies, but also incentives provided through the tax system to export.

**Table 1** Description and sources of the data employed

Variable	Description	Data sources
Share of unimpeded exports (computed for each type of foreign trade distortion)	<p>Calculated as 1 minus the share of tariff lines affected at least once by a harmful intervention in the export destination.</p> <p>The shares are weighted by the importance of the product in total exports from <i>i</i> to <i>j</i> between 2005 and 2013.</p> <p>These weighted shares have been calculated separately for instruments affecting imports, bailouts and export incentives.</p>	Global Trade Alert (for policy instruments) and UN COMTRADE (for trade data)
Share of exports benefiting from liberalisation	<p>Calculated as the share of tariff lines benefitting at least once from a liberalising intervention in the export destination.</p> <p>Trade weighted as described above.</p>	Global Trade Alert (for policy instruments) and UN COMTRADE (for trade data)
Difference in exports <i>i</i> to <i>j</i> , present year vs. 2008	<p>Difference of the log of exports in the observation year and the log of exports observed in 2008 shipped from country <i>i</i> to country <i>j</i>.</p> <p>Calculations based on the aggregation of product level data (HS 4 digit) as reported by importers.</p> <p>Only product lines exceeding US\$1 million in exports have been included in the calculations:  <math>\log(\text{Exports}_{ij_t}) - \log(\text{Exports}_{ij_{08}})</math></p>	UN COMTRADE
Difference in economic mass, present year vs. 2008	<p>Difference in the sum of the logs of the trading partners GDPs in the observation year and the sum of the logs of the trading partners' GDPs in 2008:  <math>[\log(\text{GDP}_{i_t}) + \log(\text{GDP}_{j_t})] - [\log(\text{GDP}_{i_{08}}) + \log(\text{GDP}_{j_{08}})]</math></p>	World Bank's World Development Indicators

Note: Index *i* refers to an LDC exporter. Index *j* refers to the destination country.

The summary statistics of the data assembled for this analysis are presented in the Table 2. There is considerable variation in the dependent variable (DV) across the 6,323 observations in the sample. Moreover, the mean levels of unimpeded trade vary considerably across policy instruments, in line with the findings in Figure 19 above. The coefficients of variation differ a lot across the trade policy-related independent variables, with the smallest variation in export exposure to bailouts.

**Table 2** Summary statistics of the sample collected

Variable no.	Variable content	Number of observations	Mean	Std. dev.	Min	Max
1	Share of unimpeded exports of $i$ , all foreign instruments	6,323	0.44	0.41	0	1
2	Share of unimpeded exports of $i$ , instruments controlled by $j$	6,323	0.89	0.26	0	1
3	Share of unimpeded exports of $i$ , import restrictions of $j$	6,323	0.91	0.25	0	1
4	Share of unimpeded exports of $i$ , third party export subsidies	6,323	0.45	0.41	0	1
5	Share of unimpeded exports of $i$ , bailouts of $j$	6,323	0.98	0.11	0	1
6	Share of $i$ 's exports that have not benefited from $j$ 's liberalisation	6,323	0.91	0.24	0	1
DV	Difference in exports $i$ to $j$ , present year vs. 2008	6,323	0.82	1.87	-4.67	15.03
7	Difference in economic mass, present year vs. 2008	6,323	0.3	0.33	-0.77	1.64

Note: Index  $i$  refers to an LDC exporter. Index  $j$  refers to the destination country. Third party refers to an action by neither  $i$  nor  $j$ .

### 4.3 Econometric approach taken and results

As indicated in Table 2, our sample includes negative values (as trade has decreased between some country pairs since the base year 2008) and so the use of the popular Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator is ruled out.<sup>21</sup> Ordinary least squares methods were used instead on time-differenced data. To control for heteroskedasticity in the error term, a White correction for standard errors was undertaken. Given our sample was time-differenced, the model is estimated without a constant.

We estimated three variants of our base specification, moving from a more aggregated to more granular treatment of the trade policy-related, independent variables. All of the latter variables enter into the econometric specification in logarithmic form, making elasticity interpretations of the estimated coefficient

<sup>21</sup> The first version of this report used the PPML estimator, introduced by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and discussed in the survey of gravity equation research by Head and Reis (2013).

possible.<sup>22</sup> All of the following three specifications include an independent variable capturing how much of an LDC's exports are in product lines where the destination country has undertaken import liberalisation.<sup>23</sup>

Specification [1] also includes an independent variable<sup>24</sup> capturing the exposure of an exporter to all trade distortions affecting shipments to the destination country (including those trade distortions created by third parties). Specification [2] replaces the latter independent variable with two others: the exporter's exposure to harmful policies taken by the importing nation, and the exporter's exposure to third party export incentives or subsidies.<sup>25</sup> In specification [3], three independent variables<sup>26</sup> covering the exporter's exposure to the destination country's import restrictions, to third party subsidies affecting shipments to the destination country, and to the destination's country's bailouts in traded goods sectors are included to capture the effects of foreign trade distortions. With the independent variable capturing exposure to foreign trade reforms, our third specification allows for the distinct contributions of four different types of crisis-era policy change on LDC exports to be estimated.

We performed various robustness checks to assess the stability of the estimated parameter coefficients. First, in the gravity equation literature there is a widely held view that the postulated determinants of bilateral may not fit data for small island economies that well. To see whether the findings from specification [3] were unduly affected by the inclusion of the island economies, we excluded them and then re-estimated the model. As further robustness checks, we excluded several sets of outliers (namely the top 1% of absolute prediction errors as well as extreme values in the dependent variable). The parameters estimated in all of these specifications are reported in Table 3.<sup>27</sup>

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22 In a small number of observations minor adjustments were made to the underlying sample to ensure that the logarithm of these shares was defined. Such adjustments are objectionable if bilateral trading relationships where every single product exported by LDC *i* is adversely affected by some form of foreign trade distortion.

23 This independent variable is the logarithm of variable number 6 in Table 2.

24 This independent variable is the logarithm of variable number 1 in Table 2.

25 These independent variables are the logarithms of variable numbers 2 and 4 in Table 2, respectively.

26 These independent variables are the logarithms of variable numbers 3,4 and 5 in Table 2, respectively.

27 Other robustness checks were conducted as well to assess whether the findings reported in Table 3 are materially affected by (i) the inclusion in the sample of some LDCs that were heavily dependent on commodity exports; (ii) poor infrastructure in an LDC that raises the time to export; (iii) changes in membership of regional trade agreements and GSP regimes and (iv) the inclusion of Angola, the largest LDC exporter. The qualitative findings reported in the main text were found to be unaffected by these matters. Further details of the robustness checks performed are available from the authors upon request.

Table 3 Econometric estimates for each specification

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	Robustness checks for (3)		
	OLS	OLS – trade policy variables grouped by implementing jurisdiction	OLS – trade policy variables grouped by type of policy instrument	OLS - without 1% outliers	OLS - without outliers 1% defined on dependent variable	OLS - without outliers 5% defined on dependent variable
Share of unimpeded exports of <i>i</i> , all foreign instruments	0.104*** (0.00739)					
Share of unimpeded exports of <i>i</i> , all instruments controlled by <i>j</i>		0.00658 (0.0185)				
Share of unimpeded exports of <i>i</i> , import restrictions of <i>j</i>			-0.0281 (0.0192)	-0.0350* (0.0190)	-0.0353* (0.0190)	-0.0411*** (0.0150)
Share of unimpeded exports of <i>i</i> , third party export incentives		0.108*** (0.00811)	0.109*** (0.00809)	0.102*** (0.00765)	0.0976*** (0.00764)	0.0754*** (0.00636)
Share of unimpeded exports of <i>i</i> , bailouts of <i>j</i>			0.142*** (0.0428)	0.135*** (0.0430)	0.135*** (0.0431)	0.111*** (0.0427)
Share of <i>i</i> 's exports not benefiting from <i>j</i> 's liberalisation	-0.130*** (0.0243)	-0.134*** (0.0240)	-0.131*** (0.0239)	-0.140*** (0.0237)	-0.142*** (0.0237)	-0.111*** (0.0184)
Difference in economic mass from 2008	1.985*** (0.0670)	1.987*** (0.0667)	1.987*** (0.0667)	1.828*** (0.0593)	1.776*** (0.0572)	1.348*** (0.0452)
Observations	6323	6323	6323	6261	6261	6014
R-squared	0.165	0.166	0.167	0.185	0.175	0.174
Adj. R-squared	0.165	0.166	0.166	0.184	0.174	0.173
Degrees of freedom	6320	6319	6318	6256	6256	6009

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .



Consistent patterns emerge in the estimated parameter coefficients. The estimated parameters for changes in economic mass, for lack of LDC export exposure to trade liberalisation, for LDC export exposure in sectors where firms have received bailouts, and for LDC exposure to third party export incentives all have the correct sign in each of the seven specifications. In fact, the estimated magnitude of these parameters is remarkably stable. This is in contrast to the unstable pattern of estimated parameters on LDC exposure to foreign import restrictions. Only when bilateral trade pairs with exceptionally large export growth since 2008 or exceptionally large export contractions are removed from the sample is the estimated coefficient on foreign import restrictions statistically significant and has the wrong sign.

As is the norm in such studies, while all but one of our independent variables has the right sign, the performance of the underlying econometric model is far from perfect. After all, around a sixth of the variation in dependent variable is explained by changes in economic mass and by the four types of public policy change studied here. Had we had information on the height of trade barriers, perhaps the explanatory power would have increased. Moreover, correcting for exchange rate changes from 2008 to 2013 could well have added value. Still, our attempt to proxy for the exposure of LDC exporters to foreign policy changes has been reasonably successful and this approach may be of interest to other researchers.

That an estimated parameter has the right sign and is statistically significant does not necessarily imply that it is economically significant, in the sense that the impact of changes in the underlying trade policy variables have had much effect on LDC exports, the dependent variable of interest here. To explore this matter further, using the estimated parameters we computed the total impact of foreign trade distortions and foreign trade reform between 2008 and 2013 on each bilateral trading relationship in our sample. This computation revealed the relative importance of foreign trade reforms versus trade distortions. To err on the side of caution, a conservative approach was taken. The computations were undertaken using the regression parameters that generated the smallest LDC export losses (in this case, from the sample where 5% of the dependent variable had been removed) and where, given the standard errors on each parameter, the smallest (in absolute value) likely value of the parameter was used.<sup>28</sup> Estimates of the overall LDC export losses due to foreign trade distortions and overall LDC export gains due to foreign trade reform are presented for each year 2009 to 2013 in Table 4.

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<sup>28</sup> That is, for any given trade policy term, the estimate used in these export gain (loss) computations was the relevant point estimate in the last column of Table 3 minus 1.96 times the respective standard deviation (the latter reflecting a two-sided 95% confidence interval.)

**Table 4** Conservative estimates of total annual LDC gains and losses from foreign policies imposed since 2009

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total for 2009-2013
Estimated LDC trade benefit due to foreign liberalisation (US\$ billion)	0.33	1.91	2.75	4.54	20.6	30.12
(as a % of total observed LDC exports)	0.28%	1.27%	1.43%	2.43%	10.56%	3.58%
Estimated LDC trade loss due to foreign trade distortions (US\$ billion)	37.02	46.84	57.87	61.56	61.73	265.03
(as a % of total observed LDC exports)	31.86%	31.18%	30.13%	32.99%	31.63%	31.54%
Ratio of LDC trade loss to trade benefit	113.41	24.58	21.07	13.57	3.00	8.80

Our conservative estimates imply that crisis-era foreign trade reforms increased LDC exports by an amount equal to an eighth of the export loss due to foreign trade distortions, implying that the former was meagre compensation for the latter. Moreover, on the basis of these estimates, LDC exports would have been 31.5% higher during the crisis era had trading partners refrained from imposing new trade distortions. Since the exposure of LDC exports to third party export incentives is considerably larger than exposure to other foreign trade distortions (as indicated in Figure 19 and Table 2), and given the magnitude of the estimated parameter on the third party incentive terms (reported in all of the specifications in Table 3), export incentives contributed by far the largest proportion to the estimated LDC export losses during the crisis era. Moreover, further examination of our data sample revealed that the G20 export incentives were responsible for 86.5% of the harm done to LDC exports by such incentives globally.

To further appreciate the importance of these findings, consider that during the boom years of 2000-2008, LDC exports grew on average in nominal terms by 20.6% per year. During the crisis era, 2008-2013, that nominal export growth rate fell to 5.7% per year. Our estimates imply that, had foreign governments – in particular, G20 governments – refrained from introducing trade distortions after 2008, then the average annual export growth rate of the LDCs would have risen by 11.2% per year. It is in this sense that foreign trade distortions have thrown sand into the LDC export growth engine.

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## 5 Implications for policymakers

In drawing out the implications for policymakers of our empirical findings, it is worth recalling the development context in which discussions of the impact of protectionism on the LDCs take place. In Section 2, data on the impressive export growth of the LDCs before the global economic crisis was presented. Having both the capabilities to sell to, and have access to, foreign markets represented an important contributor to economic growth of the LDCs. And grow they did. On average, GDP per capita in the LDCs rose 4% per year during the years 2000 to 2008. That source of growth was threatened not just by the global economic shock of 2008 and 2009, but also by governments stepping back from commitments to keep borders open.

Certainly, other factors determine LDC exports and it is right that the G20 and others emphasise the positive contribution that streamlined customs procedures and financial support for initiatives, such as Aid for Trade and the Enhanced Integrated Framework, can make. Moreover, to the extent that countries have liberalised their trade regimes during the crisis era – and some (such as Mexico) have – then this could benefit LDCs as well. However, these considerations should not be allowed to obscure one of the most important findings of this study – namely, that during the crisis era almost all of the forgone LDC export growth was due to trade distortions imposed by G20 countries.

In the light of the findings of this study, G20 members and the Turkish Presidency should consider the following steps:

- The G20 pledges against protectionism should not be demoted by attempts to raise other trade-related matters on the G20 agenda. This is not to imply that protectionism is the only salient trade policy matter, rather that other trade policy initiatives must not be allowed to crowd out the protectionism pledge. In particular, aid pledges and other supportive measures by G20 members towards developing countries should not be allowed to become de facto compensation for violations of the protectionism pledge.
- Regular monitoring of the imposition of new protectionism harming LDCs and the unwinding of existing protectionism should be undertaken and discussed openly and frankly in international fora, including at the G20, UNCTAD, and the WTO. Ideally, such monitoring should be undertaken by official international institutions. To the extent that such monitoring is compromised by a lack of cooperation from G20 countries, then cooperating countries should be encouraged

to make public their submissions to the WTO Secretariat and other monitoring bodies.

- G20 members should develop a timetable for unwinding crisis-era protectionism that has harmed LDCs; so should those member states of the European Union whose domestic policy initiatives have had adverse knock-on effects on LDCs. The all-too-convenient line that only the European Commission undertakes policies affecting trading partners should be set to one side and development imperatives relating to the LDCs should take priority.
- Steps should be taken to streamline customs procedures in LDCs and elsewhere and, where necessary, funds made available to pay for such improvements in developing countries. More generally, the new WTO accord on trade facilitation should be ratified on time by G20 members, and other nations should be encouraged to do so.
- Further analyses should be undertaken of the effects of protectionism, its unwinding, and the effects of improvements in customs procedures and the like on LDC commercial interests, and their results disseminated and discussed.

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## 6 Concluding remarks

From 2000 to 2008 – before the global economic crisis hit – LDCs enjoyed a sustained spurt of export-led growth. Many social and economic indicators improved. While LDCs remain under-represented in global trade flows, the degree of marginalisation fell as their share of world exports doubled. Since the onset of the global economic crisis, however, LDC export growth started growing again from 2010 on, but the responsiveness of such exports to world GDP has fallen. Indications of rising costs of exporting containers from LDCs, along with reversals of some of the procedural improvements in customs houses, may well be contributing factors and, with the new WTO accord on trade facilitation, there may well be a renewed impetus to reform such matters. However different factors, namely commercially significant policy changes by trading partners, took centre stage in this report.

Taking advantage of the largest publicly available dataset on trade-related policy changes undertaken during the crisis era, in this report the resort to protectionism against LDC commercial interests, as well as trade reforms benefiting those interests, were summarised and then discussed, and their effects on LDC exports estimated. Our approach was not confined to examining traditional trade barriers, such as tariffs and quotas, and this reflects the fact that during the crisis era governments have resorted to a wide range of measures that potentially discriminate against foreign commercial interests. Still, the difficulties and lags involved in documenting protectionism imply that not every impediment facing LDC exporters may have been detected.<sup>29</sup> It is quite likely, then, that we may not have taken account of every relevant trade distortion and that the export loss to LDCs reported here is an underestimate.

Still, given this conservative approach taken, the empirical findings are quite surprising. During the five years from 2009 to 2013, LDC exports would have been 31.5% higher in the absence of trade distortions imposed around the world. Of the harm done, much of it was done by various government measures to boost exports to third markets. Given the G20 group of leading nations are responsible

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<sup>29</sup> The potentially important matter of the effects of private standards on exports from LDCs was not taken account of. This is not because we dismiss such effects out of hand, but rather that the dataset used focuses on actions taken by governments.

for most of those export-related measures, this casts their commitment to improving the trade prospects of developing countries in a different light.

The argument that some of the G20 countries have also liberalised their trade regimes and, in other cases, funded improvements in trade-related infrastructures will no doubt be advanced, perhaps on the grounds of appearing to present a balanced picture. However, two comments are in order here. First, our statistical analysis implies that the trade-liberalising measures taken by trading partners that benefit LDCs offset only an eighth of the export loss due to foreign trade distortions imposed during the crisis era. Second, with this argument there is a risk that trade reforms and aid by G20 nations will become *de facto* – and almost certainly partial – compensation for repeated violations of the G20 pledges on protectionism.

We hope that this study encourages more officials, analysts, and third parties interested in sustainable development to examine the cross-border consequences of crisis-era policy choice on foreign commercial interests, in particular for those countries that are not as well represented in leading international fora, such as the Least Developed Countries. We went to considerable lengths here to compute bilateral measures of the exposure of LDC exports to policy changes taken abroad, and this approach may be of interest to other analysts as they refine their approaches to studying bilateral trade flows.

More generally, in recent years a considerable amount of information has been collected by the Global Trade Alert team (of which we are members), and by others, on crisis-era policy interventions. There is probably much more to be gained from thinking through the potential contribution of openness to development and the role that international trade agreements and associated international collective action could constructively play in the aftermath of acute economic stress, when pressures intensify on policymakers to limit cross-border commerce and turn inward.

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## **Annex 1**

# **Summary statistics on the foreign state measures affecting each Least Developed Country**



# Afghanistan

**Table A.1.** Foreign state measures affecting Afghanistan's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Afghanistan's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Afghanistan's commercial interests	120	119
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Afghanistan's commercial interests	24	24
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Afghanistan's interests	6	6
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Afghanistan's commercial interests	20	20
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Afghanistan's interests	70	69
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Afghanistan's commercial interests	20	20.2
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Afghanistan's commercial interests	75	74.8
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Afghanistan's commercial interests	89	89
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Afghanistan's commercial interests	67	67
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Afghanistan's commercial interests	51	51
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Afghanistan's commercial interests	75.3	75.3
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Afghanistan's commercial interests	6	6
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Afghanistan's commercial interests	6	6
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Afghanistan's commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Afghanistan's commercial interests and are no longer in force	25	24
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Afghanistan's interests which are no longer in force	23	22
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Afghanistan's commercial interests which are no longer in force	19	18
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Afghanistan's commercial interests which have been unwound	25.6	24.7
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Afghanistan's commercial interests	49	49

# Angola

**Table A.2.** Foreign state measures affecting Angola's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Angola's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Angola's commercial interests	147	146
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Angola's commercial interests	38	37
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Angola's interests	10	10
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Angola's commercial interests	33	33
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Angola's interests	66	66
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Angola's commercial interests	25.9	25.3
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Angola's commercial interests	67.3	67.8
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Angola's commercial interests	106	105
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Angola's commercial interests	76	76
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Angola's commercial interests	49	49
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Angola's commercial interests	71.7	72.4
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Angola's commercial interests	11	11
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Angola's commercial interests	10	10
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Angola's commercial interests	90.9	90.9
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Angola's commercial interests and are no longer in force	30	30
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Angola's interests which are no longer in force	23	23
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Angola's commercial interests which are no longer in force	17	17
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Angola's commercial interests which have been unwound	23.2	23.2
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Angola's commercial interests	53	53

# Bangladesh

**Table A.3.** Foreign state measures affecting Bangladesh's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Bangladesh's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Bangladesh's commercial interests	337	333
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Bangladesh's commercial interests	95	93
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Bangladesh' interests	18	17
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Bangladesh's commercial interests	61	61
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Bangladesh's interests	163	162
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Bangladesh's commercial interests	28.2	27.9
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Bangladesh's commercial interests	66.5	67
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Bangladesh's commercial interests	242	239
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Bangladesh's commercial interests	171	170
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Bangladesh's commercial interests	119	118
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Bangladesh's commercial interests	70.7	71.1
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Bangladesh's commercial interests	24	23
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Bangladesh's commercial interests	18	17
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Bangladesh's commercial interests	75	73.9
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Bangladesh's commercial interests and are no longer in force	69	69
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Bangladesh's interests which are no longer in force	51	51
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Bangladesh's commercial interests which are no longer in force	43	43
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Bangladesh's commercial interests which have been unwound	22.8	22.9
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Bangladesh's commercial interests	71	71

# Benin

**Table A.4.** Foreign state measures affecting Benin's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Benin's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Benin's commercial interests	108	106
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Benin's commercial interests	27	26
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Benin's interests	8	7
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Benin's commercial interests	17	17
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Benin's interests	56	56
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Benin's commercial interests	25	24.5
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Benin's commercial interests	67.6	68.9
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Benin's commercial interests	78	77
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Benin's commercial interests	56	56
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Benin's commercial interests	40	40
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Benin's commercial interests	71.8	72.7
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Benin's commercial interests	9	8
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Benin's commercial interests	8	7
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Benin's commercial interests	88.9	87.5
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Benin's commercial interests and are no longer in force	21	21
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Benin's interests which are no longer in force	17	17
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Benin's commercial interests which are no longer in force	16	16
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Benin's commercial interests which have been unwound	23.3	23.3
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Benin's commercial interests	44	44

# Bhutan

**Table A.5.** Foreign state measures affecting Bhutan's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Bhutan's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Bhutan's commercial interests	45	44
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Bhutan's commercial interests	18	18
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Bhutan's interests	5	4
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Bhutan's commercial interests	8	8
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Bhutan's interests	14	14
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Bhutan's commercial interests	40	40.9
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Bhutan's commercial interests	48.9	50
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Bhutan's commercial interests	33	33
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Bhutan's commercial interests	18	18
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Bhutan's commercial interests	10	10
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Bhutan's commercial interests	54.5	54.5
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Bhutan's commercial interests	5	4
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Bhutan's commercial interests	5	4
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Bhutan's commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Bhutan's commercial interests and are no longer in force	7	7
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Bhutan's interests which are no longer in force	4	4
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Bhutan's commercial interests which are no longer in force	4	4
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Bhutan's commercial interests which have been unwound	18.2	18.2
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Bhutan's commercial interests	34	34

# Burkina Faso

**Table A.6.** Foreign state measures affecting Burkina Faso's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Burkina Faso's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Burkina Faso's commercial interests	55	54
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Burkina Faso's commercial interests	11	10
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Burkina Faso's interests	6	6
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Burkina Faso's commercial interests	10	10
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Burkina Faso's interests	28	28
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Burkina Faso's commercial interests	20	18.5
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Burkina Faso's commercial interests	69.1	70.4
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Burkina Faso's commercial interests	35	34
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Burkina Faso's commercial interests	28	28
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Burkina Faso's commercial interests	20	20
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Burkina Faso's commercial interests	80	82.4
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Burkina Faso's commercial interests	7	7
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Burkina Faso's commercial interests	6	6
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Burkina Faso's commercial interests	85.7	85.7
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Burkina Faso's commercial interests and are no longer in force	13	13
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Burkina Faso's interests which are no longer in force	10	10
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Burkina Faso's commercial interests which are no longer in force	8	8
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Burkina Faso's commercial interests which have been unwound	26.3	26.3
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Burkina Faso's commercial interests	42	42



# Burundi

**Table A.7.** Foreign state measures affecting Burundi's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Burundi's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Burundi's commercial interests	33	32
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Burundi's commercial interests	7	6
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Burundi's interests	6	6
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Burundi's commercial interests	5	5
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Burundi's interests	15	15
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Burundi's commercial interests	21.2	18.8
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Burundi's commercial interests	60.6	62.5
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Burundi's commercial interests	19	18
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Burundi's commercial interests	14	14
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Burundi's commercial interests	10	10
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Burundi's commercial interests	73.7	77.8
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Burundi's commercial interests	6	6
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Burundi's commercial interests	6	6
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Burundi's commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Burundi's commercial interests and are no longer in force	8	8
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Burundi's interests which are no longer in force	6	6
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Burundi's commercial interests which are no longer in force	5	5
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Burundi's commercial interests which have been unwound	30	30
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Burundi's commercial interests	40	40

# Cambodia

**Table A.8.** Foreign state measures affecting Cambodia's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Cambodia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Cambodia's commercial interests	165	163
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Cambodia's commercial interests	38	37
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Cambodia's interests	18	17
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Cambodia's commercial interests	27	27
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Cambodia's interests	82	82
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Cambodia's commercial interests	23	22.7
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Cambodia's commercial interests	66.1	66.9
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Cambodia's commercial interests	112	111
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Cambodia's commercial interests	82	82
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Cambodia's commercial interests	62	62
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Cambodia's commercial interests	73.2	73.9
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Cambodia's commercial interests	20	19
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Cambodia's commercial interests	18	17
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Cambodia's commercial interests	90	89.5
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Cambodia's commercial interests and are no longer in force	31	31
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Cambodia's interests which are no longer in force	25	25
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Cambodia's commercial interests which are no longer in force	19	19
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Cambodia's commercial interests which have been unwound	22.9	22.9
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Cambodia's commercial interests	51	51

# Central African Republic (CAR)

**Table A.9.** Foreign state measures affecting CAR's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting CAR's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting CAR's commercial interests	31	30
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, CAR's commercial interests	4	3
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm CAR's interests	6	6
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm CAR's commercial interests	4	4
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against CAR's interests	17	17
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards CAR's commercial interests	12.9	10
Percentage of foreign measures that harm CAR's commercial interests	67.7	70
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting CAR's commercial interests	21	20
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed CAR's commercial interests	18	18
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed CAR's commercial interests	14	14
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm CAR's commercial interests	85.7	90
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect CAR's commercial interests	6	6
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm CAR's commercial interests	6	6
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten CAR's commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected CAR's commercial interests and are no longer in force	4	4
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed CAR's interests which are no longer in force	3	3
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed CAR's commercial interests which are no longer in force	3	3
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed CAR's commercial interests which have been unwound	14.3	14.3
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm CAR's commercial interests	36	36

# Chad

**Table A.10.** Foreign state measures affecting Chad's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Chad's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Chad's commercial interests	48	47
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Chad's commercial interests	12	11
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Chad's interests	7	7
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Chad's commercial interests	9	9
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Chad's interests	20	20
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Chad's commercial interests	25	23.4
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Chad's commercial interests	60.4	61.7
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Chad's commercial interests	26	25
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Chad's commercial interests	20	20
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Chad's commercial interests	14	14
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Chad's commercial interests	76.9	80
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Chad's commercial interests	8	8
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Chad's commercial interests	7	7
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Chad's commercial interests	87.5	87.5
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Chad's commercial interests and are no longer in force	14	14
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Chad's interests which are no longer in force	9	9
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Chad's commercial interests which are no longer in force	6	6
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Chad's commercial interests which have been unwound	31	31
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Chad's commercial interests	40	40

# Comoros

**Table A.11.** Foreign state measures affecting Comoros's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Comoros's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Comoros's commercial interests	28	28
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Comoros's commercial interests	7	7
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Comoros' interests	5	5
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Comoros's commercial interests	3	3
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Comoros's interests	13	13
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Comoros's commercial interests	25	25
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Comoros's commercial interests	57.1	57.1
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Comoros's commercial interests	19	19
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Comoros's commercial interests	14	14
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Comoros's commercial interests	11	11
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Comoros's commercial interests	73.7	73.7
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Comoros's commercial interests	5	5
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Comoros's commercial interests	5	5
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Comoros's commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Comoros's commercial interests and are no longer in force	4	4
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Comoros's interests which are no longer in force	2	2
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Comoros's commercial interests which are no longer in force	2	2
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Comoros's commercial interests which have been unwound	12.5	12.5
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Comoros's commercial interests	37	37

# Congo

**Table A.12.** Foreign state measures affecting Congo's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Congo's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Congo's commercial interests	115	114
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Congo's commercial interests	25	24
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Congo's interests	9	9
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Congo's commercial interests	25	25
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Congo's interests	56	56
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Congo's commercial interests	21.7	21.1
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Congo's commercial interests	70.4	71.1
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Congo's commercial interests	79	78
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Congo's commercial interests	59	59
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Congo's commercial interests	40	40
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Congo's commercial interests	74.7	75.6
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Congo's commercial interests	9	9
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Congo's commercial interests	9	9
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Congo's commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Congo's commercial interests and are no longer in force	27	27
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Congo's interests which are no longer in force	22	22
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Congo's commercial interests which are no longer in force	16	16
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Congo's commercial interests which have been unwound	27.2	27.2
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Congo's commercial interests	48	48

# Djibouti

**Table A.13.** Foreign state measures affecting Djibouti's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Djibouti's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Djibouti's commercial interests	82	81
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Djibouti's commercial interests	20	19
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Djibouti's interests	5	5
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Djibouti's commercial interests	15	15
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Djibouti's interests	42	42
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Djibouti's commercial interests	24.4	23.5
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Djibouti's commercial interests	69.5	70.4
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Djibouti's commercial interests	56	55
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Djibouti's commercial interests	39	39
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Djibouti's commercial interests	27	27
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Djibouti's commercial interests	69.6	70.9
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Djibouti's commercial interests	5	5
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Djibouti's commercial interests	5	5
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Djibouti's commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Djibouti's commercial interests and are no longer in force	21	21
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Djibouti's interests which are no longer in force	18	18
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Djibouti's commercial interests which are no longer in force	15	15
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Djibouti's commercial interests which have been unwound	31.6	31.6
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Djibouti's commercial interests	49	49

# Equatorial Guinea

**Table A.14.** Foreign state measures affecting Equatorial Guinea's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Equatorial Guinea's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Equatorial Guinea's commercial interests	71	71
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Equatorial Guinea's commercial interests	10	10
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Equatorial Guinea's interests	13	13
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Equatorial Guinea's commercial interests	17	17
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Equatorial Guinea's interests	31	31
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Equatorial Guinea's commercial interests	14.1	14.1
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Equatorial Guinea's commercial interests	67.6	67.6
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Equatorial Guinea's commercial interests	40	40
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Equatorial Guinea's commercial interests	34	34
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Equatorial Guinea's commercial interests	21	21
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Equatorial Guinea's commercial interests	85	85
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Equatorial Guinea's commercial interests	13	13
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Equatorial Guinea's commercial interests	13	13
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Equatorial Guinea's commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Equatorial Guinea's commercial interests and are no longer in force	16	16
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Equatorial Guinea's interests which are no longer in force	12	12
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Equatorial Guinea's commercial interests which are no longer in force	9	9
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Equatorial Guinea's commercial interests which have been unwound	25	25
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Equatorial Guinea's commercial interests	41	41



# Eritrea

**Table A.15.** Foreign state measures affecting Eritrea's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Eritrea's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Eritrea's commercial interests	50	50
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Eritrea's commercial interests	13	13
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Eritrea's interests	6	6
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Eritrea's commercial interests	7	7
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Eritrea's interests	24	24
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Eritrea's commercial interests	26	26
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Eritrea's commercial interests	62	62
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Eritrea's commercial interests	33	33
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Eritrea's commercial interests	22	22
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Eritrea's commercial interests	15	15
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Eritrea's commercial interests	66.7	66.7
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Eritrea's commercial interests	6	6
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Eritrea's commercial interests	6	6
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Eritrea's commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Eritrea's commercial interests and are no longer in force	11	11
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Eritrea's interests which are no longer in force	9	9
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Eritrea's commercial interests which are no longer in force	9	9
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Eritrea's commercial interests which have been unwound	29	29
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Eritrea's commercial interests	40	40

# Ethiopia

**Table A.16.** Foreign state measures affecting Ethiopia's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Ethiopia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Ethiopia's commercial interests	133	133
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Ethiopia's commercial interests	26	26
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Ethiopia's interests	12	12
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Ethiopia's commercial interests	24	24
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Ethiopia's interests	71	71
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Ethiopia's commercial interests	19.5	19.5
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Ethiopia's commercial interests	71.4	71.4
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Ethiopia's commercial interests	88	88
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Ethiopia's commercial interests	69	69
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Ethiopia's commercial interests	50	50
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Ethiopia's commercial interests	78.4	78.4
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Ethiopia's commercial interests	13	13
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Ethiopia's commercial interests	12	12
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Ethiopia's commercial interests	92.3	92.3
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Ethiopia's commercial interests and are no longer in force	32	32
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Ethiopia's interests which are no longer in force	26	26
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Ethiopia's commercial interests which are no longer in force	21	21
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Ethiopia's commercial interests which have been unwound	27.4	27.4
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Ethiopia's commercial interests	51	51

# Gambia

**Table A.17.** Foreign state measures affecting Gambia's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Gambia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Gambia's commercial interests	61	60
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Gambia's commercial interests	13	12
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Gambia's interests	6	6
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Gambia's commercial interests	9	9
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Gambia's interests	33	33
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Gambia's commercial interests	21.3	20
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Gambia's commercial interests	68.9	70
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Gambia's commercial interests	37	36
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Gambia's commercial interests	28	28
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Gambia's commercial interests	21	21
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Gambia's commercial interests	75.7	77.8
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Gambia's commercial interests	8	8
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Gambia's commercial interests	6	6
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Gambia's commercial interests	75	75
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Gambia's commercial interests and are no longer in force	16	16
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Gambia's interests which are no longer in force	14	14
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Gambia's commercial interests which are no longer in force	12	12
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Gambia's commercial interests which have been unwound	33.3	33.3
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Gambia's commercial interests	39	39

# Guinea

**Table A.18.** Foreign state measures affecting Guinea's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Guinea's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Guinea's commercial interests	90	89
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Guinea's commercial interests	22	21
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Guinea's interests	7	7
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Guinea's commercial interests	16	16
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Guinea's interests	45	45
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Guinea's commercial interests	24.4	23.6
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Guinea's commercial interests	67.8	68.5
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Guinea's commercial interests	60	59
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Guinea's commercial interests	42	42
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Guinea's commercial interests	28	28
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Guinea's commercial interests	70	71.2
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Guinea's commercial interests	7	7
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Guinea's commercial interests	7	7
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Guinea's commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Guinea's commercial interests and are no longer in force	23	23
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Guinea's interests which are no longer in force	19	19
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Guinea's commercial interests which are no longer in force	17	17
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Guinea's commercial interests which have been unwound	31.1	31.1
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Guinea's commercial interests	48	48

# Guinea-Bissau

**Table A.19.** Foreign state measures affecting Guinea-Bissau's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Guinea-Bissau's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Guinea-Bissau's commercial interests	38	37
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Guinea-Bissau's commercial interests	9	8
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Guinea-Bissau's interests	6	6
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Guinea-Bissau's commercial interests	8	8
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Guinea-Bissau's interests	15	15
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Guinea-Bissau's commercial interests	23.7	21.6
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Guinea-Bissau's commercial interests	60.5	62.2
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Guinea-Bissau's commercial interests	25	24
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Guinea-Bissau's commercial interests	18	18
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Guinea-Bissau's commercial interests	10	10
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Guinea-Bissau's commercial interests	72	75
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Guinea-Bissau's commercial interests	6	6
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Guinea-Bissau's commercial interests	6	6
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Guinea-Bissau's commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Guinea-Bissau's commercial interests and are no longer in force	7	7
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Guinea-Bissau's interests which are no longer in force	5	5
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Guinea-Bissau's commercial interests which are no longer in force	5	5
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Guinea-Bissau's commercial interests which have been unwound	21.7	21.7
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Guinea-Bissau's commercial interests	39	39

# Haiti

**Table A.20.** Foreign state measures affecting Haiti's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Haiti's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Haiti's commercial interests	89	88
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Haiti's commercial interests	22	21
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Haiti's interests	18	18
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Haiti's commercial interests	12	12
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Haiti's interests	37	37
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Haiti's commercial interests	24.7	23.9
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Haiti's commercial interests	55.1	55.7
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Haiti's commercial interests	56	55
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Haiti's commercial interests	38	38
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Haiti's commercial interests	27	27
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Haiti's commercial interests	67.9	69.1
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Haiti's commercial interests	20	20
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Haiti's commercial interests	18	18
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Haiti's commercial interests	90	90
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Haiti's commercial interests and are no longer in force	12	12
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Haiti's interests which are no longer in force	10	10
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Haiti's commercial interests which are no longer in force	9	9
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Haiti's commercial interests which have been unwound	20.4	20.4
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Haiti's commercial interests	49	49

# Kiribati

**Table A.21.** Foreign state measures affecting Kiribati's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Kiribati's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Kiribati's commercial interests	13	13
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Kiribati's commercial interests	2	2
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Kiribati's interests	3	3
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Kiribati's commercial interests	3	3
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Kiribati's interests	5	5
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Kiribati's commercial interests	15.4	15.4
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Kiribati's commercial interests	61.5	61.5
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Kiribati's commercial interests	8	8
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Kiribati's commercial interests	7	7
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Kiribati's commercial interests	5	5
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Kiribati's commercial interests	87.5	87.5
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Kiribati's commercial interests	3	3
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Kiribati's commercial interests	3	3
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Kiribati's commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Kiribati's commercial interests and are no longer in force	2	2
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Kiribati's interests which are no longer in force	1	1
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Kiribati's commercial interests which are no longer in force	0	0
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Kiribati's commercial interests which have been unwound	12.5	12.5
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Kiribati's commercial interests	34	34

# Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR)

**Table A.22.** Foreign state measures affecting LPDR's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting LPDR's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting LPDR's commercial interests	77	77
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, LPDR's commercial interests	21	21
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm LPDR's interests	10	10
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm LPDR's commercial interests	15	15
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against LPDR's interests	31	31
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards LPDR's commercial interests	27.3	27.3
Percentage of foreign measures that harm LPDR's commercial interests	59.7	59.7
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting LPDR's commercial interests	54	54
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed LPDR's commercial interests	38	38
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed LPDR's commercial interests	27	27
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm LPDR's commercial interests	70.4	70.4
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect LPDR's commercial interests	10	10
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm LPDR's commercial interests	10	10
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten LPDR's commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected LPDR's commercial interests and are no longer in force	12	12
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed LPDR's interests which are no longer in force	7	7
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed LPDR's commercial interests which are no longer in force	4	4
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed LPDR's commercial interests which have been unwound	15.2	15.2
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm LPDR's commercial interests	44	44



# Lesotho

**Table A.23.** Foreign state measures affecting Lesotho's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Lesotho's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Lesotho's commercial interests	42	41
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Lesotho's commercial interests	8	7
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Lesotho's interests	7	7
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Lesotho's commercial interests	5	5
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Lesotho's interests	22	22
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Lesotho's commercial interests	19	17.1
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Lesotho's commercial interests	64.3	65.9
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Lesotho's commercial interests	29	28
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Lesotho's commercial interests	23	23
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Lesotho's commercial interests	18	18
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Lesotho's commercial interests	79.3	82.1
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Lesotho's commercial interests	8	8
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Lesotho's commercial interests	7	7
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Lesotho's commercial interests	87.5	87.5
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Lesotho's commercial interests and are no longer in force	5	5
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Lesotho's interests which are no longer in force	4	4
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Lesotho's commercial interests which are no longer in force	4	4
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Lesotho's commercial interests which have been unwound	14.8	14.8
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Lesotho's commercial interests	38	38

# Liberia

**Table A.24.** Foreign state measures affecting Liberia's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Liberia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Liberia's commercial interests	80	80
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Liberia's commercial interests	21	21
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Liberia's interests	5	5
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Liberia's commercial interests	13	13
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Liberia's interests	41	41
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Liberia's commercial interests	26.2	26.2
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Liberia's commercial interests	67.5	67.5
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Liberia's commercial interests	60	60
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Liberia's commercial interests	43	43
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Liberia's commercial interests	31	31
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Liberia's commercial interests	71.7	71.7
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Liberia's commercial interests	6	6
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Liberia's commercial interests	5	5
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Liberia's commercial interests	83.3	83.3
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Liberia's commercial interests and are no longer in force	14	14
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Liberia's interests which are no longer in force	11	11
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Liberia's commercial interests which are no longer in force	10	10
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Liberia's commercial interests which have been unwound	20.4	20.4
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Liberia's commercial interests	47	47

# Madagascar

**Table A.25.** Foreign state measures affecting Madagascar's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Madagascar's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Madagascar's commercial interests	126	125
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Madagascar's commercial interests	33	32
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Madagascar's interests	9	9
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Madagascar's commercial interests	22	22
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Madagascar's interests	62	62
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Madagascar's commercial interests	26.2	25.6
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Madagascar's commercial interests	66.7	67.2
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Madagascar's commercial interests	88	87
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Madagascar's commercial interests	62	62
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Madagascar's commercial interests	44	44
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Madagascar's commercial interests	70.5	71.3
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Madagascar's commercial interests	10	10
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Madagascar's commercial interests	9	9
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Madagascar's commercial interests	90	90
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Madagascar's commercial interests and are no longer in force	28	28
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Madagascar's interests which are no longer in force	22	22
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Madagascar's commercial interests which are no longer in force	18	18
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Madagascar's commercial interests which have been unwound	26.2	26.2
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Madagascar's commercial interests	43	43

# Malawi

**Table A.26.** Foreign state measures affecting Malawi's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Malawi's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Malawi's commercial interests	90	89
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Malawi's commercial interests	17	16
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Malawi's interests	10	10
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Malawi's commercial interests	16	16
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Malawi's interests	47	47
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Malawi's commercial interests	18.9	18
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Malawi's commercial interests	70	70.8
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Malawi's commercial interests	59	58
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Malawi's commercial interests	50	50
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Malawi's commercial interests	35	35
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Malawi's commercial interests	84.7	86.2
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Malawi's commercial interests	12	12
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Malawi's commercial interests	10	10
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Malawi's commercial interests	83.3	83.3
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Malawi's commercial interests and are no longer in force	19	19
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Malawi's interests which are no longer in force	13	13
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Malawi's commercial interests which are no longer in force	12	12
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Malawi's commercial interests which have been unwound	20.6	20.6
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Malawi's commercial interests	46	46

# Mali

**Table A.27.** Foreign state measures affecting Mali's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Mali's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Mali's commercial interests	78	77
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Mali's commercial interests	13	12
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Mali's interests	7	7
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Mali's commercial interests	14	14
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Mali's interests	44	44
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Mali's commercial interests	16.7	15.6
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Mali's commercial interests	74.4	75.3
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Mali's commercial interests	50	49
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Mali's commercial interests	42	42
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Mali's commercial interests	31	31
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Mali's commercial interests	84	85.7
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Mali's commercial interests	8	8
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Mali's commercial interests	7	7
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Mali's commercial interests	87.5	87.5
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Mali's commercial interests and are no longer in force	20	20
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Mali's interests which are no longer in force	16	16
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Mali's commercial interests which are no longer in force	13	13
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Mali's commercial interests which have been unwound	27.6	27.6
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Mali's commercial interests	46	46

# Mauritania

**Table A.28.** Foreign state measures affecting Mauritania's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Mauritania's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Mauritania's commercial interests	91	90
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Mauritania's commercial interests	15	14
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Mauritania's interests	7	7
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Mauritania's commercial interests	20	20
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Mauritania's interests	49	49
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Mauritania's commercial interests	16.5	15.6
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Mauritania's commercial interests	75.8	76.7
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Mauritania's commercial interests	55	54
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Mauritania's commercial interests	46	46
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Mauritania's commercial interests	31	31
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Mauritania's commercial interests	83.6	85.2
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Mauritania's commercial interests	7	7
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Mauritania's commercial interests	7	7
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Mauritania's commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Mauritania's commercial interests and are no longer in force	29	29
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Mauritania's interests which are no longer in force	23	23
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Mauritania's commercial interests which are no longer in force	18	18
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Mauritania's commercial interests which have been unwound	33.3	33.3
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Mauritania's commercial interests	46	46

# Mozambique

**Table A.29.** Foreign state measures affecting Mozambique's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Mozambique's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Mozambique's commercial interests	146	145
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Mozambique's commercial interests	30	29
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Mozambique's interests	14	14
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Mozambique's commercial interests	29	29
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Mozambique's interests	73	73
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Mozambique's commercial interests	20.5	20
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Mozambique's commercial interests	69.9	70.3
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Mozambique's commercial interests	97	96
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Mozambique's commercial interests	76	76
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Mozambique's commercial interests	53	53
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Mozambique's commercial interests	78.4	79.2
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Mozambique's commercial interests	15	15
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Mozambique's commercial interests	14	14
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Mozambique's commercial interests	93.3	93.3
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Mozambique's commercial interests and are no longer in force	33	33
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Mozambique's interests which are no longer in force	25	25
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Mozambique's commercial interests which are no longer in force	20	20
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Mozambique's commercial interests which have been unwound	24.5	24.5
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Mozambique's commercial interests	47	47

# Myanmar

**Table A.30.** Foreign state measures affecting Myanmar's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Myanmar's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Myanmar's commercial interests	145	141
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Myanmar's commercial interests	40	39
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Myanmar's interests	4	4
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Myanmar's commercial interests	28	27
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Myanmar's interests	73	71
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Myanmar's commercial interests	27.6	27.7
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Myanmar's commercial interests	69.7	69.5
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Myanmar's commercial interests	112	108
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Myanmar's commercial interests	81	78
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Myanmar's commercial interests	58	56
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Myanmar's commercial interests	72.3	72.2
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Myanmar's commercial interests	5	5
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Myanmar's commercial interests	4	4
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Myanmar's commercial interests	80	80
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Myanmar's commercial interests and are no longer in force	27	27
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Myanmar's interests which are no longer in force	19	19
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Myanmar's commercial interests which are no longer in force	14	14
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Myanmar's commercial interests which have been unwound	18.8	19.4
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Myanmar's commercial interests	50	50



# Nepal

**Table A.31.** Foreign state measures affecting Nepal's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Nepal's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Nepal's commercial interests	124	118
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Nepal's commercial interests	51	49
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Nepal's interests	11	8
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Nepal's commercial interests	18	18
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Nepal's interests	44	43
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Nepal's commercial interests	41.1	41.5
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Nepal's commercial interests	50	51.7
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Nepal's commercial interests	86	84
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Nepal's commercial interests	49	49
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Nepal's commercial interests	32	32
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Nepal's commercial interests	57	58.3
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Nepal's commercial interests	12	9
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Nepal's commercial interests	11	8
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Nepal's commercial interests	91.7	88.9
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Nepal's commercial interests and are no longer in force	26	25
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Nepal's interests which are no longer in force	13	12
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Nepal's commercial interests which are no longer in force	12	11
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Nepal's commercial interests which have been unwound	21	19.7
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Nepal's commercial interests	40	40

# Niger

**Table A.32.** Foreign state measures affecting Niger's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Niger's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Niger's commercial interests	79	78
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Niger's commercial interests	17	16
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Niger's interests	7	7
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Niger's commercial interests	15	15
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Niger's interests	40	40
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Niger's commercial interests	21.5	20.5
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Niger's commercial interests	69.6	70.5
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Niger's commercial interests	48	47
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Niger's commercial interests	37	37
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Niger's commercial interests	26	26
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Niger's commercial interests	77.1	78.7
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Niger's commercial interests	7	7
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Niger's commercial interests	7	7
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Niger's commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Niger's commercial interests and are no longer in force	24	24
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Niger's interests which are no longer in force	18	18
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Niger's commercial interests which are no longer in force	14	14
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Niger's commercial interests which have been unwound	32.7	32.7
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Niger's commercial interests	46	46

# Rwanda

**Table A.33.** Foreign state measures affecting Rwanda's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Rwanda's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Rwanda's commercial interests	49	48
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Rwanda's commercial interests	10	9
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Rwanda's interests	5	5
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Rwanda's commercial interests	7	7
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Rwanda's interests	27	27
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Rwanda's commercial interests	20.4	18.8
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Rwanda's commercial interests	69.4	70.8
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Rwanda's commercial interests	33	32
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Rwanda's commercial interests	26	26
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Rwanda's commercial interests	20	20
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Rwanda's commercial interests	78.8	81.2
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Rwanda's commercial interests	7	7
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Rwanda's commercial interests	5	5
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Rwanda's commercial interests	71.4	71.4
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Rwanda's commercial interests and are no longer in force	9	9
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Rwanda's interests which are no longer in force	8	8
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Rwanda's commercial interests which are no longer in force	7	7
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Rwanda's commercial interests which have been unwound	23.5	23.5
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Rwanda's commercial interests	45	45

# Samoa

**Table A.34.** Foreign state measures affecting Samoa's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Samoa's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Samoa's commercial interests	36	36
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Samoa's commercial interests	11	11
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Samoa's interests	4	4
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Samoa's commercial interests	7	7
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Samoa's interests	14	14
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Samoa's commercial interests	30.6	30.6
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Samoa's commercial interests	58.3	58.3
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Samoa's commercial interests	24	24
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Samoa's commercial interests	16	16
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Samoa's commercial interests	11	11
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Samoa's commercial interests	66.7	66.7
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Samoa's commercial interests	5	5
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Samoa's commercial interests	4	4
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Samoa's commercial interests	80	80
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Samoa's commercial interests and are no longer in force	7	7
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Samoa's interests which are no longer in force	5	5
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Samoa's commercial interests which are no longer in force	3	3
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Samoa's commercial interests which have been unwound	23.8	23.8
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Samoa's commercial interests	37	37

# Sao Tome and Principe

**Table A.35.** Foreign state measures affecting Sao Tome & Principe's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Sao Tome & Principe's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Sao Tome & Principe's commercial interests	12	12
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Sao Tome & Principe's commercial interests	3	3
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Sao Tome & Principe' interests	3	3
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Sao Tome & Principe's commercial interests	2	2
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Sao Tome & Principe's interests	4	4
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Sao Tome & Principe's commercial interests	25	25
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Sao Tome & Principe's commercial interests	50	50
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Sao Tome & Principe's commercial interests	6	6
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Sao Tome & Principe's commercial interests	4	4
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Sao Tome & Principe's commercial interests	3	3
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Sao Tome & Principe's commercial interests	66.7	66.7
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Sao Tome & Principe's commercial interests	3	3
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Sao Tome & Principe's commercial interests	3	3
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Sao Tome & Principe's commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Sao Tome & Principe's commercial interests and are no longer in force	3	3
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Sao Tome & Principe's interests which are no longer in force	2	2
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Sao Tome & Principe's commercial interests which are no longer in force	1	1
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Sao Tome & Principe's commercial interests which have been unwound	33.3	33.3
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Sao Tome & Principe's commercial interests	30	30

# Senegal

**Table A.36.** Foreign state measures affecting Senegal's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Senegal's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Senegal's commercial interests	161	159
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Senegal's commercial interests	33	32
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Senegal's interests	13	12
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Senegal's commercial interests	31	31
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Senegal's interests	84	84
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Senegal's commercial interests	20.5	20.1
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Senegal's commercial interests	71.4	72.3
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Senegal's commercial interests	106	105
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Senegal's commercial interests	84	84
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Senegal's commercial interests	62	62
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Senegal's commercial interests	79.2	80
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Senegal's commercial interests	14	13
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Senegal's commercial interests	13	12
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Senegal's commercial interests	92.9	92.3
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Senegal's commercial interests and are no longer in force	41	41
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Senegal's interests which are no longer in force	31	31
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Senegal's commercial interests which are no longer in force	22	22
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Senegal's commercial interests which have been unwound	27	27
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Senegal's commercial interests	50	50

# Sierra Leone

**Table A.37.** Foreign state measures affecting Sierra Leone's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Sierra Leone's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Sierra Leone's commercial interests	80	79
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Sierra Leone's commercial interests	23	22
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Sierra Leone's interests	6	6
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Sierra Leone's commercial interests	13	13
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Sierra Leone's interests	38	38
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Sierra Leone's commercial interests	28.8	27.8
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Sierra Leone's commercial interests	63.8	64.6
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Sierra Leone's commercial interests	60	59
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Sierra Leone's commercial interests	42	42
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Sierra Leone's commercial interests	30	30
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Sierra Leone's commercial interests	70	71.2
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Sierra Leone's commercial interests	7	7
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Sierra Leone's commercial interests	6	6
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Sierra Leone's commercial interests	85.7	85.7
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Sierra Leone's commercial interests and are no longer in force	13	13
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Sierra Leone's interests which are no longer in force	9	9
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Sierra Leone's commercial interests which are no longer in force	8	8
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Sierra Leone's commercial interests which have been unwound	17.6	17.6
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Sierra Leone's commercial interests	44	44

# Solomon Islands

**Table A.38.** Foreign state measures affecting Solomon Islands's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Solomon Islands' commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Solomon Islands' commercial interests	24	24
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Solomon Islands' commercial interests	5	5
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Solomon Islands' interests	2	2
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Solomon Islands' commercial interests	6	6
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Solomon Islands' interests	11	11
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Solomon Islands' commercial interests	20.8	20.8
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Solomon Islands' commercial interests	70.8	70.8
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Solomon Islands' commercial interests	19	19
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Solomon Islands' commercial interests	15	15
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Solomon Islands' commercial interests	10	10
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Solomon Islands' commercial interests	78.9	78.9
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Solomon Islands' commercial interests	2	2
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Solomon Islands' commercial interests	2	2
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Solomon Islands' commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Solomon Islands' commercial interests and are no longer in force	3	3
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Solomon Islands' interests which are no longer in force	2	2
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Solomon Islands' commercial interests which are no longer in force	1	1
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Solomon Islands' commercial interests which have been unwound	11.8	11.8
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Solomon Islands' commercial interests	36	36



# Somalia

**Table A.39.** Foreign state measures affecting Somalia's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Somalia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Somalia's commercial interests	82	82
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Somalia's commercial interests	36	36
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Somalia's interests	6	6
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Somalia's commercial interests	10	10
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Somalia's interests	30	30
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Somalia's commercial interests	43.9	43.9
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Somalia's commercial interests	48.8	48.8
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Somalia's commercial interests	58	58
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Somalia's commercial interests	32	32
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Somalia's commercial interests	22	22
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Somalia's commercial interests	55.2	55.2
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Somalia's commercial interests	6	6
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Somalia's commercial interests	6	6
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Somalia's commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Somalia's commercial interests and are no longer in force	18	18
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Somalia's interests which are no longer in force	8	8
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Somalia's commercial interests which are no longer in force	8	8
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Somalia's commercial interests which have been unwound	20	20
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Somalia's commercial interests	42	42

# Sudan

**Table A.40.** Foreign state measures affecting Sudan's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Sudan's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Sudan's commercial interests	151	150
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Sudan's commercial interests	33	33
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Sudan's interests	9	8
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Sudan's commercial interests	27	27
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Sudan's interests	82	82
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Sudan's commercial interests	21.9	22
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Sudan's commercial interests	72.2	72.7
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Sudan's commercial interests	103	103
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Sudan's commercial interests	79	79
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Sudan's commercial interests	58	58
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Sudan's commercial interests	76.7	76.7
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Sudan's commercial interests	9	8
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Sudan's commercial interests	9	8
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Sudan's commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Sudan's commercial interests and are no longer in force	38	38
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Sudan's interests which are no longer in force	29	29
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Sudan's commercial interests which are no longer in force	24	24
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Sudan's commercial interests which have been unwound	26.6	26.6
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Sudan's commercial interests	55	55

# Timor-Leste

**Table A.41.** Foreign state measures affecting Timor-Leste's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Timor-Leste's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Timor-Leste's commercial interests	32	32
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Timor-Leste's commercial interests	8	8
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Timor-Leste's interests	5	5
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Timor-Leste's commercial interests	4	4
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Timor-Leste's interests	15	15
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Timor-Leste's commercial interests	25	25
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Timor-Leste's commercial interests	59.4	59.4
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Timor-Leste's commercial interests	22	22
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Timor-Leste's commercial interests	16	16
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Timor-Leste's commercial interests	12	12
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Timor-Leste's commercial interests	72.7	72.7
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Timor-Leste's commercial interests	5	5
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Timor-Leste's commercial interests	5	5
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Timor-Leste's commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Timor-Leste's commercial interests and are no longer in force	5	5
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Timor-Leste's interests which are no longer in force	3	3
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Timor-Leste's commercial interests which are no longer in force	3	3
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Timor-Leste's commercial interests which have been unwound	15.8	15.8
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Timor-Leste's commercial interests	36	36

# Togo

**Table A.42.** Foreign state measures affecting Togo's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Togo's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Togo's commercial interests	110	109
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Togo's commercial interests	24	23
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Togo' interests	8	8
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Togo's commercial interests	18	18
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Togo's interests	60	60
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Togo's commercial interests	21.8	21.1
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Togo's commercial interests	70.9	71.6
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Togo's commercial interests	83	82
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Togo's commercial interests	62	62
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Togo's commercial interests	47	47
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Togo's commercial interests	74.7	75.6
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Togo's commercial interests	8	8
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Togo's commercial interests	8	8
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Togo's commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Togo's commercial interests and are no longer in force	19	19
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Togo's interests which are no longer in force	16	16
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Togo's commercial interests which are no longer in force	13	13
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Togo's commercial interests which have been unwound	20.5	20.5
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Togo's commercial interests	47	47

# Tuvalu

**Table A.43.** Foreign state measures affecting Tuvalu's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Tuvalu's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Tuvalu's commercial interests	13	13
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Tuvalu's commercial interests	1	1
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Tuvalu's interests	4	4
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Tuvalu's commercial interests	1	1
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Tuvalu's interests	7	7
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Tuvalu's commercial interests	7.7	7.7
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Tuvalu's commercial interests	61.5	61.5
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Tuvalu's commercial interests	9	9
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Tuvalu's commercial interests	8	8
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Tuvalu's commercial interests	7	7
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Tuvalu's commercial interests	88.9	88.9
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Tuvalu's commercial interests	4	4
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Tuvalu's commercial interests	4	4
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Tuvalu's commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Tuvalu's commercial interests and are no longer in force	0	0
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Tuvalu's interests which are no longer in force	0	0
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Tuvalu's commercial interests which are no longer in force	0	0
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Tuvalu's commercial interests which have been unwound	0	0
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Tuvalu's commercial interests	33	33

# Uganda

**Table A.44.** Foreign state measures affecting Uganda's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Uganda's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Uganda's commercial interests	123	122
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Uganda's commercial interests	32	31
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Uganda's interests	10	10
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Uganda's commercial interests	15	15
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Uganda's interests	66	66
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Uganda's commercial interests	26	25.4
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Uganda's commercial interests	65.9	66.4
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Uganda's commercial interests	81	80
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Uganda's commercial interests	57	57
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Uganda's commercial interests	45	45
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Uganda's commercial interests	70.4	71.2
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Uganda's commercial interests	13	13
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Uganda's commercial interests	10	10
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Uganda's commercial interests	76.9	76.9
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Uganda's commercial interests and are no longer in force	29	29
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Uganda's interests which are no longer in force	24	24
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Uganda's commercial interests which are no longer in force	21	21
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Uganda's commercial interests which have been unwound	29.6	29.6
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Uganda's commercial interests	55	55

# United Republic of Tanzania

**Table A.45.** Foreign state measures affecting Tanzania's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Tanzania's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Tanzania's commercial interests	157	156
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Tanzania's commercial interests	37	36
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Tanzania's interests	11	11
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Tanzania's commercial interests	31	31
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Tanzania's interests	78	78
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Tanzania's commercial interests	23.6	23.1
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Tanzania's commercial interests	69.4	69.9
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Tanzania's commercial interests	108	107
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Tanzania's commercial interests	78	78
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Tanzania's commercial interests	52	52
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Tanzania's commercial interests	72.2	72.9
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Tanzania's commercial interests	12	12
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Tanzania's commercial interests	11	11
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Tanzania's commercial interests	91.7	91.7
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Tanzania's commercial interests and are no longer in force	37	37
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Tanzania's interests which are no longer in force	31	31
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Tanzania's commercial interests which are no longer in force	26	26
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Tanzania's commercial interests which have been unwound	28.4	28.4
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Tanzania's commercial interests	56	56

# Vanuatu

**Table A.46.** Foreign state measures affecting Vanuatu's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Vanuatu's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Vanuatu's commercial interests	24	24
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Vanuatu's commercial interests	6	6
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Vanuatu's interests	4	4
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Vanuatu's commercial interests	3	3
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Vanuatu's interests	11	11
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Vanuatu's commercial interests	25	25
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Vanuatu's commercial interests	58.3	58.3
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Vanuatu's commercial interests	14	14
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Vanuatu's commercial interests	11	11
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Vanuatu's commercial interests	9	9
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Vanuatu's commercial interests	78.6	78.6
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Vanuatu's commercial interests	4	4
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Vanuatu's commercial interests	4	4
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Vanuatu's commercial interests	100	100
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Vanuatu's commercial interests and are no longer in force	6	6
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Vanuatu's interests which are no longer in force	3	3
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Vanuatu's commercial interests which are no longer in force	2	2
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Vanuatu's commercial interests which have been unwound	21.4	21.4
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Vanuatu's commercial interests	34	34



# Yemen

**Table A.47.** Foreign state measures affecting Yemen's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Yemen's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Yemen's commercial interests	168	167
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Yemen's commercial interests	43	43
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Yemen's interests	9	8
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Yemen's commercial interests	32	32
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Yemen's interests	84	84
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Yemen's commercial interests	25.6	25.7
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Yemen's commercial interests	69	69.5
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Yemen's commercial interests	124	124
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Yemen's commercial interests	88	88
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Yemen's commercial interests	61	61
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Yemen's commercial interests	71	71
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Yemen's commercial interests	10	9
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Yemen's commercial interests	9	8
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Yemen's commercial interests	90	88.9
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Yemen's commercial interests and are no longer in force	33	33
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Yemen's interests which are no longer in force	27	27
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Yemen's commercial interests which are no longer in force	23	23
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Yemen's commercial interests which have been unwound	23.3	23.3
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Yemen's commercial interests	59	59

# Zambia

**Table A.48.** Foreign state measures affecting Zambia's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Zambia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safeguard actions
<b>ALL MEASURES</b>		
Total number of measures affecting Zambia's commercial interests	121	120
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit, or involve no change in the treatment of, Zambia's commercial interests	32	31
Total number of announced, currently unimplemented foreign measures that would almost certainly harm Zambia's interests	8	8
Total number of foreign implemented measures that likely harm Zambia's commercial interests	27	27
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Zambia's interests	54	54
Percentage of foreign measures that benefited or were neutral towards Zambia's commercial interests	26.4	25.8
Percentage of foreign measures that harm Zambia's commercial interests	66.9	67.5
<b>MEASURES STILL IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented foreign measures still affecting Zambia's commercial interests	83	82
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Zambia's commercial interests	61	61
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Zambia's commercial interests	39	39
Percentage of foreign measures still in force that harm Zambia's commercial interests	73.5	74.4
<b>PENDING MEASURES</b>		
Total number of pending measures that might affect Zambia's commercial interests	9	9
Total number of pending measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Zambia's commercial interests	8	8
Percentage of pending foreign measures that threaten Zambia's commercial interests	88.9	88.9
<b>MEASURES NO LONGER IN FORCE</b>		
Total number of implemented measures that affected Zambia's commercial interests and are no longer in force	29	29
Total number of implemented measures that likely harmed or almost certainly harmed Zambia's interests which are no longer in force	20	20
Total number of implemented measures that almost certainly harmed Zambia's commercial interests which are no longer in force	15	15
Percentage of crisis-era foreign measures that harmed Zambia's commercial interests which have been unwound	24.7	24.7
<b>TRADING PARTNERS RESPONSIBLE</b>		
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that are currently in force and that harm Zambia's commercial interests	52	52

## Annex 2. Shares of bilateral exports benefiting from foreign liberalisation and unimpeded by foreign trade restrictions, by LDC, for years 2009-2013

LDC	Bilateral exports share benefiting from foreign liberalisation, trade-weighted					Bilateral exports share unimpeded by any foreign trade distortion, trade-weighted				
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Afghanistan	0.00	0.07	0.17	0.21	0.29	0.60	0.36	0.30	0.32	0.26
Angola	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.48	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.05
Bangladesh	0.02	0.23	0.23	0.54	0.55	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.02
Benin	0.00	0.01	0.16	0.25	0.32	0.17	0.18	0.28	0.24	0.23
Bhutan	0.00	0.00	0.34	0.36	0.46	0.07	0.12	0.14	0.13	0.07
Burkina Faso	0.00	0.04	0.46	0.43	0.63	0.18	0.26	0.28	0.41	0.22
Burundi	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.13	0.11	0.17	0.23	0.25	0.27
Cambodia	0.01	0.41	0.36	0.44	0.42	0.13	0.10	0.11	0.10	0.10
Central African Republic	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.07	0.15	0.12	0.16	0.14	0.12	0.07
Chad	0.00	0.00	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.04
Comoros	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.15	0.18	0.40	0.52	0.42	0.50	0.52
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.11	0.38	0.31	0.36	0.40	0.42	0.27
Equatorial Guinea	0.10	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.18	0.10	0.12	0.15	0.09	0.30
Eritrea	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.64	0.29	0.95	0.98	0.97
Ethiopia	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.13	0.15	0.22	0.16	0.23	0.22	0.22
Djibouti	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.32	0.64	0.68	0.39	0.41
Gambia	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.14	0.30	0.44	0.56	0.16	0.09

LDC	Bilateral exports share benefiting from foreign liberalisation, trade-weighted					Bilateral exports share unimpeded by any foreign trade distortion, trade-weighted				
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Kiribati	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.21	0.00	0.16	0.10
Guinea	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.10	0.18	0.10	0.11	0.22
Guinea-Bissau	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.13
Haiti	0.02	0.79	0.80	0.83	0.84	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.04
Lao People's Dem. Rep.	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.12	0.26	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.14	0.16
Lesotho	0.00	0.36	0.35	0.33	0.39	0.02	0.36	0.29	0.10	0.07
Liberia	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.11	0.36	0.42	0.40	0.39	0.28
Madagascar	0.00	0.08	0.16	0.30	0.37	0.16	0.16	0.28	0.18	0.23
Malawi	0.00	0.30	0.31	0.26	0.31	0.22	0.24	0.32	0.32	0.28
Mali	0.00	0.00	0.29	0.72	0.68	0.20	0.07	0.08	0.12	0.11
Mauritania	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.60	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03
Mozambique	0.00	0.03	0.07	0.37	0.41	0.25	0.18	0.19	0.21	0.20
Nepal	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.09	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.16	0.14
Niger	0.00	0.00	0.33	0.08	0.10	0.98	0.99	0.97	0.99	0.99
Rwanda	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.32	0.15	0.19	0.14	0.17	0.12
Samoa	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.35	0.28	0.15	0.17	0.26	0.63
Sao Tome and Principe	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.17	0.00	0.14	0.36	0.36
Senegal	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.12	0.22	0.19	0.15	0.14	0.13	0.24
Sierra Leone	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.74	0.36	0.43	0.52	0.65	0.82
Solomon Islands	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.07	0.06	0.11	0.10	0.23	0.27	0.23
Timor-Leste	0.38	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.51	0.35	0.70	0.62	0.00
Togo	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.24	0.22	0.24	0.39	0.26

LDC	Bilateral exports share benefiting from foreign liberalisation, trade-weighted					Bilateral exports share unimpeded by any foreign trade distortion, trade-weighted				
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Uganda	0.00	0.04	0.17	0.19	0.20	0.27	0.22	0.29	0.33	0.27
United Rep. of Tanzania	0.00	0.04	0.14	0.18	0.28	0.25	0.21	0.23	0.29	0.26
Vanuatu	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.23	0.61	0.42	0.41	0.07
Yemen	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.34	0.13	0.21	0.32	0.21	0.27
Zambia	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.23	0.55	0.13	0.12	0.14	0.15	0.10

Before the global economic crisis the poorest nations on Earth – the Least Developed Countries (LDC) – experienced a massive export boom that raised living standards and helped reduce poverty among the 900 million people who live in them. These outcomes, plus the greater integration of the LDCs into the world economy, were in line with well-established development priorities.

Having grown on average by more than 20% per year during 2000 to 2008, these countries' exports fell 16% in 2009 as the global economic crisis hit. Recent years have seen annual export growth of only 5.7%. The LDC export machine has slowed down markedly, and this study shows that foreign trade distortions implemented since the crisis began have reduced LDC export growth on average by 5.5% per year.

The study, commissioned by the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, breaks new ground by separating out the effects on LDC exports of foreign import restrictions, bailouts to foreign firms, foreign export incentives, and trade liberalisation by trading partners. Detailed product-level data were used to track changes in policy over time and well-established empirical methods were used to estimate the determinants of LDC exports. Unlike the 1930s, higher trade barriers played little role, as did bailouts. However, state inducements to export have markedly reduced LDC exports to third markets.

Overall, the study finds that foreign trade distortions reduced LDC exports by 31% during 2009-2013, a substantial amount. Foreign trade reforms boosted LDC trade by an eighth of this amount. Crisis-era trade distortions have played a significant role in harming the development prospects of the Least Developed Countries. The study includes policy recommendations for the Group of 20 (G20) nations, for the World Trade Organization, and for the members of the European Union.

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