Is it possible that the global financial cycle is driven by US monetary policy? In this video, Hélène Rey explains how US monetary policies affect global financial cycles. This video was recorded at the ASSA Meetings in San Francisco in January 2016.
Hélène Rey, 25 August 2016
Gaston Gelos, Jay Surti, 19 August 2016
International financial spillovers from emerging markets have increased significantly over the last 20 years. This column argues that growing financial integration of emerging economies is more important than their rising share in global trade in driving this trend, that firms with lower liquidity and higher borrowing are more subject to spillovers, and that mutual funds are amplifying spillover effects. Policymakers in developed economies should pay increased attention to future spillovers from emerging markets, particularly from China.
Tobias Adrian, Nellie Liang, 14 August 2016
Recent research into how monetary policy frameworks incorporate risks to financial stability has shown that policy affects both financial conditions and financial vulnerabilities that amplify negative shocks. This column argues that looser monetary policy improves financial conditions, but can in some situations worsen vulnerabilities through incentives for financial sector risk-taking and non-financial sector borrowing. Policymakers face an intertemporal trade-off between financial conditions and vulnerabilities which may impact a cost-benefit analysis of monetary policy.
Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Luc Laeven, Gustavo Suarez, 02 August 2016
The Global Crisis has renewed debate about the relationship between short-term interest rates and bank risk taking. Theory offers ambiguous and conflicting predictions. This column explores the relationship using confidential bank-level data from the US. Bank risk taking is found to be negatively associated with short-term interest rates, and this is more pronounced for highly capitalised banks. These findings can help inform the design of monetary policy.
Marco Di Maggio, Marcin Kacperczyk, 19 July 2016
The zero lower bound policy for nominal interest rates was implemented to stimulate sluggish economic growth and boost employment. This column explores whether this policy had unintended effects on the money market fund industry. Traditionally enjoying relatively low and safe returns, money market funds could respond to the low interest rate environment by either exiting the market or changing product offerings and accepting higher portfolio risk. The results show evidence of both, and point to an important but neglected channel for monetary policy transmission.
Alisdair McKay, Ricardo Reis, 14 July 2016
Brexit has raised the possibility of a recession on both sides of the Atlantic. Unable to use traditional remedies like monetary or fiscal policy stimulus, policymakers may consider automatic fiscal stabilisers. This column examines the impact of automatic stabilisers through social insurance on the business cycle, and how its impact can be used to mitigate recession. Unemployment insurance or food stamps would be better than progressive taxes at stimulating aggregate demand. The main economic channels policymakers must consider are those related to risk and precautionary savings.
Biagio Bossone, Stefano Labini, 01 July 2016
Despite facing many of the same challenges, Germany’s current macroeconomic policy is substantially different to those of other countries, in part due to the economy legacy of Walter Eucken. This column considers the economic policy of Hjalmar Schacht, whose ‘MEFO-bills’ monetary solution ended the years of economic struggle caused by the Treaty of Versailles’ reparations commitments. By tying the bills to output, Schacht was able to stimulate output, and eliminate unemployment. This historical implication has clear modern-day implications, with parallels to ‘helicopter money’ policy and Italy’s recent ‘fiscal money’ proposal.
The global financial crisis has had a profound impact on output and productivity in advanced and emerging economies. In response, policymakers around the world have acted boldly with monetary policy, macro-prudential policy and regulation.
Is productivity being held back by financial factors - such as the lack of long term finance for long term investment - or is productivity being held back by real economy factors, such as globalisation and demographics? The recent crisis has also spurred a reassessment of the relationship between the level (and type) of finance and growth. Could weak productivity growth owe in part to wasteful investment spending or an undersupply of financial services? How does the mix of early and late stage financing drive investment and productivity? This conference aims to bring together perspectives on these big questions, as they will provide important guidance for future policy actions.
The objective of this course is to present empirical applications (as well as the research methodologies) of relevant questions for both banking theory and policy, mainly related to Systemic Risk, Crises, Monetary Policy and Risk taking behaviour. An important objective is to understand scientific papers in empirical banking; to accomplish this objective, emphasis is placed on illustrating research methodologies used in empirical banking and learning the application of these methodologies to selected topics, such as:
- Securities and credit registers; large datasets
- Fire sales, runs, market and funding liquidity, systemic risk
- Risk-taking and credit channels of monetary policy
- Moral hazard vs. behavioral based risk-taking
- Secular stagnation, banking and debt crises
- Interbank globalization, contagion, emerging markets, policy
Mark Cliffe, 19 May 2016
The idea that the global economy has entered a low-growth equilibrium appears to have gained acceptance. This column argues that this ‘New Normal’ never was, isn’t, and should be replaced by the ‘New Abnormal’. Far from being an equilibrium, the low growth recorded in the West since the nadir of the financial crisis in 2009 has only been achieved by progressively more aggressive and unprecedented monetary policy actions in response to a series of panic attacks in the financial markets. The aftershocks of the crisis are colliding with a series of structural changes which leave the global economy in a state of latent instability.
Barry Eichengreen, Poonam Gupta, 13 May 2016
The recent reversal of capital flows to emerging markets has pointed to the continuing relevance of the sudden stop problem. This column analyses the sudden stops in capital flows to emerging markets since 1991. It shows that the frequency and duration of sudden stops have remained largely unchanged, but that global factors have become more important in their incidence. Stronger macroeconomic and financial frameworks have allowed policymakers to respond more flexibly, but these more flexible responses have not guaranteed insulation or significantly mitigated the impact.
Alex Cukierman, 16 April 2016
Both the US and the Eurozone reacted to the Global Crisis by injecting liquidity and loosening monetary policy. This column argues that despite the similarities in the behaviour of bank credit, the behaviour of bank reserves has been quite different. In particular, while US bank reserves have been on an uninterrupted upward trend since Lehman’s collapse, EZ bank reserves have fluctuated markedly in both directions. At the source, this is due to differences in the liquidity injections procedures between the Eurozone and the Fed.
Richard Baldwin, 13 April 2016
Helicopter money is frequently in the headlines but frequently misunderstood. This column reviews the VoxEU columns that have – since 2010 – provided research-based policy analysis of this ‘beyond unconventional’ policy.
Carlos Vegh, Guillermo Vuletin, 24 February 2016
By the end of 2013, growth in Latin America had begun to decelerate. The ensuing policy responses to this have differed across countries. This column uses data from the past 40 years to analyse policy responses to economic distress in the region. On average, countercyclical policy responses to crises have been more common over the last 15 years than previously. Latin America thus appears to have graduated in terms of monetary and fiscal responses to crises. But there is still a great deal of heterogeneity across countries in the region, and they must continue to build sound and credible fiscal and monetary institutions.
Biagio Bossone, Stefano Labini, 19 February 2016
The ECB’s response to the Crisis – not providing stimulus to the Eurozone economy when it needed it, and allowing it to slip into a low inflation trap – is a reflection of the monetary union’s faulty architecture. This column recalls a 1998 manifesto from several distinguished scholars that warned EZ policymakers of the potential consequences of a misguided policy framework. Two sets of issues need to be critically addressed by current EZ policymakers: its objectives and instruments.
Tommaso Monacelli, 12 February 2016
The boom-bust cycle in the Eurozone between 2000 and 2008 is essentially a story of cyclical asymmetries between the Core and the Periphery. While stressing the importance of addressing these asymmetries – especially via fiscal policy – the ECB has failed to take them explicitly into account in its own policy-setting. This essay argues that these asymmetries may persist precisely because they are not a central target of stabilisation policy – both fiscal and monetary.
Giancarlo Corsetti, Matthew Higgins, Paolo Pesenti, 12 February 2016
James Tobin’s classic ‘funnel’ theory questioned how best to calibrate the overall stance of macroeconomic policy in an economic region. This column revisits key questions that emerged out of the EZ crisis through the lens of Tobin’s theory. A key insight is that monetary policy cannot achieve stabilisation objectives without stronger mechanisms for fiscal burden-sharing and risk-pooling. Although short-run solutions are possible under the existing circumstances, long-run stability will require a policy mix that convincingly deals with the issue of fiscal risk-sharing.
Barry Eichengreen, Charles Wyplosz, 14 March 2016
The Eurozone crisis has shown that monetary union entails more than just sharing monetary policies. This column, first published on 12 February 2016, identifies four minimal conditions for solidifying the monetary union. In the case of fiscal policy, this means a decentralised solution. In the case of financial supervision and monetary policy, centralisation is unambiguously the appropriate response. In the case of a fourth condition, debt restructuring, either approach is possible, but the authors prefer a solution that involves centrally restructuring debts while allocating costs at national level.
Kristin Forbes, Ida Hjortso, Tsvetelina Nenova, 12 February 2016
A major challenge for monetary policy is predicting how exchange rate movements will impact inflation. This column explains why rules of thumb could be misleading and proposes a new approach that incorporates the source of exchange rate movements when evaluating how they pass through to import prices and inflation.
Yin-Wong Cheung , Sven Steinkamp, Frank Westermann, 27 January 2016
Since the beginning of the Global Crisis, illicit capital flows out of China have been in decline. This column argues that a key factor behind this is the relative money supply between China and the US. China’s rapidly increasing money supply, combined with the Fed’s expansionary monetary policy, prompted investors to reallocate their portfolios between the two countries. Another contributing factor is China’s gradual process of capital account liberalisation. The Fed’s interest rate hike in December may see a resurgence in China’s capital flight.