Tobias Adrian, Michael J. Fleming, Or Shachar, 14 September 2017

The potential adverse effects of regulation on market liquidity in the post-crisis period continue to receive significant attention. This column shows that dealer balance sheets have continued to stagnate and that various measures point to less abundant funding liquidity. Nonetheless, there is little evidence of a wide-spread deterioration in market liquidity. Liquidity remained resilient even during stress events like the 2013 ‘temper tantrum’.

Stephen Cecchetti, Kim Schoenholtz, 29 August 2017

There is still a notable lack of consensus over when exactly the 2007-09 financial crisis started. This column argues that the crisis began on 9 August 2007, when BNP Paribas announced they were suspending redemptions. In 2007, the US and European financial systems lacked two key shock absorbers: adequate capital to meet falls in asset values, and adequate holdings of high-quality liquid assets to meet temporary liquidity shortfalls. Lacking these, the financial system was vulnerable to even relatively small disturbances, like the BNP Paribas announcement.

Jacques Bughin, Jan Mischke, 04 August 2017

The economic narrative of the EU since the Global Crisis has focused on successive debt crises and persistent stagnation. This column addresses the accompanying, but less well studied, investment slump that occurred over the last decade, using evidence from an extensive survey of business decisionmakers across Europe. Business sentiment towards increased investment is affected not just by historic cash flows and expected future demand, but also the growth of digital economies as well as political concerns such as anti-Europe sentiment.

Peter Bofinger, Mathias Ries, 29 July 2017

There is a broad consensus that the global decline in real interest rates can be explained with a higher propensity to save, above all due to demographic reasons. This column argues that this view relies on a commodity theory of finance, which is inadequate for analysis of real world phenomena. In a monetary theory of finance, household saving does not release funds for investment, it simply redistributes existing funds. In addition, the column shows that at the global level, the gross household saving rate has declined since the 1980s, as well as net saving rates.

Joshua Aizenman, Yothin Jinjarak, Gemma Estrada, Shu Tian, 19 July 2017

The impact of the Global Crisis of 2008 played out differently in middle-income countries compared to developed countries. This column argues that the associations of growth level, growth volatility, shocks, institutions, and macroeconomic fundamentals have changed in important ways after the crisis. Educational attainment, share of manufacturing output in GDP, and exchange rate stability appear to increase the level of economic growth. Exchange rate flexibility, education attainment, and lack of political polarisation reduce the volatility of economic growth.

Glenn Hoggarth, Carsten Jung, Dennis Reinhardt, 07 July 2017

Partly as a result of the Global Crisis, assessments of capital inflows and their impact on market efficiency and technology transfer have begun to take into account their association with financial crises. This column argues that the riskiness of inflows depends on the type of lender and its currency denomination. It finds that equity flows are more stable than debt flows, non-banks more stable than banks, and local currency more stable than foreign. Macroprudential policies can support the stabilisation of inflows.

Jean-Charles Bricongne, Alessandro Turrini, 22 June 2017

Since 2011, EU macroeconomic surveillance has aimed at preventing or correcting the type of imbalances that were responsible for the Global Crisis. Surveillance under the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure implies regular reports and policy recommendations monitored by the Commission, and the possible activation of economic sanctions. This column shows that, despite the procedure not having been used to its full extent so far and the sanctions stage not having been reached yet, the surveillance and recommendations have had an impact on policies in the first years of implementation. 

Laura Alfaro, Gonzalo Asis, Anusha Chari, Ugo Panizza, 13 June 2017

Leverage levels in emerging market firms rose dramatically in the aftermath of Global Crisis. This column examines whether concerns of a repeat of the Asian financial crisis, which was largely attributed to corporate financial roots, are justified. While firm financial fragility is more widespread, it is less severe than in the period preceding the Asian Financial Crisis. However, certain large firms with high levels of foreign currency leverage are a potential key source of vulnerability in the transmission of adverse shocks such as exchange rate depreciations. 

Franziska Ohnsorge, Shu Yu, 16 May 2017

Since the Global Crisis, private credit has risen sharply in several emerging market and developing economies as well as advanced economies. This column examines the role of investment alongside these credit booms, and how output growth has been affected. These booms have been unusually ‘investment-less’ in comparison to previous episodes, which were accompanied by investment surges. The absence of investment surges during credit booms is accompanied by lower growth, especially once the credit boom unwinds.

Mélika Ben Salem, Bárbara Castelletti, 15 May 2017

In the aftermath of the Global Crisis, sovereign yield differentials have increasingly widened among European developed countries. Financial markets seem to discriminate among peripheral economies requiring a higher risk premium than is justified by fiscal factors only. This column discusses the causes of this phenomenon. In peripheral countries, it is not due simply to the lack of fiscal discipline, but to a combination of both internal and external imbalances.

Georg Graetz, Guy Michaels, 13 May 2017

Recoveries from recessions in the US used to involve rapid job generation, but job growth has failed to match GDP recovery after recent US recessions. This column examines the role of technology in this and asks whether jobless recoveries are a wider problem outside of the US. In the US, industries that are more prone to technological change experienced slower job growth during recent recoveries, but it appears unlikely that modern technologies are causing jobless recoveries outside of the US. This poses a puzzle as to the nature of recent jobless US recoveries. 

Henrike Michaelis, Volker Wieland, 12 May 2017

In recent speeches, Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen and ECB President Mario Draghi have attributed the Fed’s and the ECB’s low interest rate environment to low equilibrium rates rather than to Fed or ECB policies. This column argues that estimates of these equilibrium rates are extremely uncertain and sensitive to technical assumptions, and thus should not be used as key determinants of the policy stance. But if used nevertheless, a consistent application together with associated output estimates call for a tightening of the policy stance. 

Keiichiro Kobayashi, 02 May 2017

There is concern about the persistent slowdown of economic growth in the aftermath of financial crises. This column presents a framework which shows that excessive debt accumulated by firms and households during a crisis can cause persistent stagnation. Relief from excessive debt has a direct impact on economic growth, whereas unconventional monetary and fiscal policies cannot directly solve the fundamental debt problem.

Robert Kollmann, Beatrice Pataracchia, Rafal Raciborski, Marco Ratto, Werner Roeger, Lukas Vogel, 27 April 2017

The Global Crisis led to a sharp contraction and long-lasting slump in both Eurozone and US real activity, but the post-crisis adjustment in the Eurozone and the US shows striking differences. This column argues that financial shocks were key determinants of the 2008-09 Great Recession, for both the Eurozone and the US. The post-2009 slump in the Eurozone mainly reflects a combination of adverse aggregate demand and supply shocks, in particular lower productivity growth, and persistent adverse shocks to capital investment linked to the poor health of the Eurozone financial system. Mono-causal explanations of the persistent slump are thus insufficient. Adverse financial shocks were less persistent for the US.

Jorge Abad, Marco D'Errico, Neill Killeen, Vera Luz, Tuomas Peltonen, Richard Portes, Teresa Urbano, 25 April 2017

The Global Crisis highlighted how linkages between banks and shadow banking entities can lead to the amplification of shocks across borders and sectors, prompting policymakers to seek to improve the monitoring framework for assessing the interconnectedness of the shadow banking system. This column documents the cross-sector and cross-border exposures of EU banks to globally domiciled shadow banking entities. Among the findings are that 60% of these exposures are to shadow banking entities domiciled outside the EU and hence outside its supervisory powers,  and that approximately 65% of the exposures are to non-money market fund investment funds, finance companies, and securitisation entities. 

Thorsten Beck, 24 April 2017

Nine years after the onset of the Global Crisis, the problem of non-performing assets is still acute in the Eurozone. This column takes stock of the different proposals to deal with the issue. It argues that a Eurozone-level asset management company can resolve bank fragility and spur economic recovery, but warns that lack of political will and legal barriers can impede the creation of such an agency. 

Dan Andrews, Chiara Criscuolo, Peter Gal, 27 March 2017

Even before the Global Crisis, productivity growth had slowed in many OECD countries. This column argues that the global slowdown at the aggregate level masks a deterioration in both productivity growth within firms and a process of creative destruction. Using a cross-country firm-level database for 24 countries, the authors reveal an increasing productivity gap between the global frontier and laggard firms, fewer exits by weak firms, and a decline in entry. These problems have been compounded by the failure of policy to encourage the diffusion of best practices in OECD countries.

Emine Boz, Luis Cubeddu, Maurice Obstfeld, 09 March 2017

After intensifying through the 2000s until the Global Crisis, the ‘uphill’ flow of capital from poor to rich countries decelerated and has recently reversed. This column documents that saving shifts by China, commodity-exporting emerging and developing economies, and advanced economies played key roles in accounting for the apparently puzzling pattern in the pre-crisis decade. Ongoing policy uncertainties in advanced economies mean large and persistent downhill flows of capital are unlikely in the near term. Going forward, capital flows to emerging and developing economies will need to be supported by policies that enhance the benefits of inflows, temper capital flow volatility, and improve the resilience and depth of domestic financial markets.

Jakob de Haan, Sylvester Eijffinger, 27 January 2017

It has been observed that since the start of the Global Crisis, central banks in most advanced economies have become more powerful and political, but they have not become more accountable. This column discusses why central bank independence matters, and looks at whether it has changed since the crisis. 

Morten Ravn, Vincent Sterk, 11 January 2017

Recent economic events cast doubt on the standard macroeconomic models. This column looks at new economic models built on the idea that inequality and income risk matter for the business cycle and long-run outcomes. While still in their infancy, these models show promise in addressing the concerns about the old New Keynesian models, and in bringing about a shift in the way that macroeconomists think about aggregate fluctuations and stabilisation policy.