The current refugee crisis poses an enormous challenge not only to European countries, but to the fundaments and achievements of the EU as a whole. This column discusses how this latest crisis differs from the crisis in the early 1990s, and argues there is a drastic need for a new regulatory framework to replace dated coordination attempts. The framework should be based on two pillars: a coordinated policy that secures Europe’s outer borders and deals with asylum claims before refugees have (illegally) crossed into mainland Europe, and a more equitable allocation mechanism.
Christian Dustmann, Francesco Fasani, Tommaso Frattini, Luigi Minale, Uta Schӧnberg, 18 October 2016
Richard Tol, 27 September 2016
The UK may opt to leave the EU Emissions Trading System. This column argues that as the UK is a large importer of emission permits, this would make meeting its climate policy targets much harder and dearer, and would remove the legal standing of many permits circulating in the rest of the EU. Some non-EU countries do take part in the Emissions Trading System, and this appears to be the best option for the UK post-Brexit. If not, the UK Government will be forced into a major overhaul of its climate policy.
Pasquale D'Apice, 13 September 2016
There has been renewed interest in economic analysis of the EU budget following the Global Crisis. This column presents new calculations of cross-border flows operated through the EU budget and compares them with those estimated for the US. For each euro paid by an average net (EU member state) contributor, approximately 75 cents return through the EU budget, and 25 cents cross a border. At the margin, the US federal budget is less redistributive in normal times, with around 90 cents per dollar returning to the contributing state, but net cross-border fiscal flows in the US increased steeply in the wake of the Global Crisis, financed by federal borrowing.
Guglielmo Barone, Francesco David, Guido de Blasio, 10 September 2016
EU regional policies aim to lead regions onto a path of self-sustaining growth. Fully successful interventions should imply a higher growth rate, not only during the treatment (when the region benefits from the transfers), but also after the expiry of the programme (when the financing terminates). This column uses evidence from the Abruzzi region in Southern Italy to document that when the party is over and the funding ends, growth may slow down significantly.
Jan in 't Veld, 09 September 2016
The spillover effects of a fiscal stimulus in normal times are likely to be small, at best. This column argues, however, that when interest rates are stuck at the zero lower bound and monetary policy does not offset the expansion, public investment in surplus countries could have significant positive GDP spillovers to the rest of the Eurozone. Given current low borrowing costs, the increase in government debt for surplus countries would be modest, while debt ratios in the rest of the Eurozone could be improved.
Marco Buti, Muriel Lacoue-Labarthe, 07 September 2016
The Eurozone Crisis has taken a significant toll – both economic and political – on EU member states as well as the Union as a whole. This column identifies three elements that are key to a working solution for continued union: overcoming the intergovernmental method that has dominated EU decision‑making since the crisis, avoiding the seemingly easy route of blaming all evils on ‘Brussels’, and a more unified external representation in global economic governance.
Gylfi Zoega, 01 September 2016
Britain’s decision to leave the EU surprised many. This column examines the relationship between economic prosperity and voting behaviour in the referendum. The regions that have benefitted most from immigration and trade voted most strongly in favour of remaining, while the regions where people feel most threatened voted to leave. In other countries fearing a similar EU exit, economic policy should aim to ensure that the gains from trade and immigration are as widespread as possible.
Marco Buti, José Leandro, Plamen Nikolov, 25 August 2016
The fragmentation of financial systems along national borders was one of the main handicaps of the Eurozone both prior to and in the initial phase of the crisis, hindering the shock absorption capacity of individual member states. The EU has taken important steps towards the deeper integration of Eurozone financial markets, but this remains incomplete. This column argues that a fully-fledged financial union can be an efficient economic shock absorber. Compared to the US, there is significant potential in terms of private cross-border risk sharing through the financial channel, more so than through fiscal (i.e. public) means.
Lars Feld, Christoph Schmidt, Isabel Schnabel, Volker Wieland, 22 August 2016
It has been suggested that the vote for Brexit marks the first step of disintegration in Europe. This column argues that if the European integration process is pursued wisely, it still carries the promise of enduring peace and growing prosperity. But EU policymakers must devise a process of integration that strengthens Europe’s competitiveness to such an extent that the advantages of EU membership are clear to member states’ citizens.
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Thomas Philippon, Dimitri Vayanos, 05 August 2016
The Greek crisis is one of the worst in history, even in the context of recorded ‘trifecta’ crises – the combination of a sudden stop with output collapse, a sovereign debt crisis, and a lending boom/bust. This column quantifies the role of each of these factors to better understand the crisis and formulate appropriate policy responses. While fiscal consolidation was important in driving the drop in output, it accounted for only for half of that drop. Much of the remainder can be explained by the higher funding costs of the government and private sectors due to the sudden stop.
Angus Armstrong, 02 August 2016
The EU is the UK’s biggest trade partner; in this video Angus Armstrong discusses the impact of Brexit on the UK’s trade patterns. This video is part of the “Econ after Brexit” series organised by CEPR and was recorded on 14 July 2016.
Giacomo Calzolari, Jean-Edouard Colliard, Gyöngyi Lóránth, 30 July 2016
The presence of multiple national authorities in the EU poses substantial coordination problems for the supervision of multinational banks. The Single Supervisory Mechanism aims to solve the resulting coordination failures. This column explores how banks could strategically react to the introduction of a supranational supervisor. The banking system is likely to endogenously react by reverting to an organisational form for which supranational supervision is actually less essential.
Gabriel Felbermayr, Rahel Aichele, Erdal Yalcin, 23 July 2016
New EU trade agreements could adversely affect Turkey as a non-EU member. This column presents new findings of an economic analysis in which different trade policy scenarios are considered. The results point to a clear policy recommendation – Turkey and the EU should mutually deepen their customs union by including the agriculture and service sectors as soon as possible.
Jochen Andritzky, Lars Feld, Christoph Schmidt, Isabel Schnabel, Volker Wieland, 21 July 2016
To make the no-bailout clause credible and to enhance the effectiveness of crisis assistance, private creditors should contribute to crisis resolution in the Eurozone. This column proposes a mechanism to allow for orderly restructuring of sovereign debt as part of ESM programmes. If debt exceeds certain thresholds, the mechanism triggers an immediate maturity extension. In a second stage, a deeper debt restructuring could follow, depending on the solvency of a country. The mechanism could be easily implemented by amending ESM guidelines.
Paul Hünermund, Georg Licht, 08 July 2016
European countries are increasingly coordinating their national research and development policies. However, supra-national R&D programmes entail problems from a governance standpoint. This column discusses the problem of cross-subsidisation between participating countries. European joint programming initiatives are usually designed to avoid international transfer payments. Empirical evidence suggests that doing so comes at the price of decreased efficiency.
Jon Danielsson, Robert Macrae, Jean-Pierre Zigrand, 24 June 2016
Brexit creates new opportunities and new risks for the British and EU financial markets. Both could benefit, but a more likely outcome is a fall in the quality of financial regulations, more inefficiency, more protectionism, and more systemic risk.
Anatole Kaletsky, 22 June 2016
If the UK leaves the EU, what will happen to the UK economy? In this video, Anatole Kaletsky argues that Brexit would be economic suicide, or at least self-harm. A trade agreement that grants access to the Single Market implies conceding political sovereignty, contributing to the EU budget, and free movement of labour. This video was recorded during the “Economics of the UK’s EU Membership” conference organised by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research in February 2016 and held in London.
Karl Whelan, 20 June 2016
A large amount of business done in the City is linked to the UK’s membership of the EU. In this video, Karl Whelan discusses the impact of Brexit for the UK’s financial sector. He also argues that leaving the EU would take away the UK’s voice in shaping future legislation, which it would nonetheless have to follow in order to retain access to the Single Market. This video was recorded during the “Economics of the UK’s EU Membership” conference organised by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research in February 2016 and held in London.
Nicholas Crafts, 15 June 2016
If the UK leaves the EU, what's next for the economy? In this video, Nicholas Crafts of the University of Warwick discusses the impact of EU membership on the British economy. The type of agreement the UK would reach outside the EU is most important, and the risks outweigh the potential gains. This video was shot during the “Economics of the UK’s EU Membership” conference organised by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) on 23 February 2016 and held in London.
Stefano Micossi, Ginevra Bruzzone, Miriam Cassella, 06 June 2016
Following the financial crisis, the EU banking system is still plagued by widespread fragilities. This column considers the tools and legal provisions available to EU policymakers to address moral hazard and incentives encouraging excessive risk-taking by bankers. It argues that the new discipline of state aid and the restructuring of banks provide a solid framework towards these ends. However, the application of new rules should not lose sight of the aggregate policy needs of the banking system.