Mario Blejer, Piroska Nagy-Mohacsi, 22 November 2017

Global politics of late has been marked by the rise of anti-elite political movements and anti-establishment leaders. This column analyses the tactics of such populists through the lens of the ‘time inconsistency’ problem – that what is considered a long-term optimal policy today may not be optimal when that future arrives. Populist leaders seek to gain and increase their power by undermining democratic institutions and conventional commitment devices. Several ‘second generation’ institutional commitment devices to counter this are proposed.

Hans Gersbach, 04 January 2014

Democratic governments tend to accumulate excessive debt. This column proposes a new rule – the ‘Catenarian Fiscal Discipline’ – which allows a fiscally disciplined incumbent to limit the debt-making of the next officeholder. This way, fiscal discipline today can lead to fiscal discipline in the future. Such a rule would require that we broaden our notion of representative democracy by recognising the fact that a current government already has various implicit ways of limiting what its elected successors can do.

Guillermo Calvo, 31 August 2009

This column introduces "triple time-inconsistent" episodes. First, a public institution is expected to cave in and offer a bailout to prevent a crisis. Then, in an attempt to regain credibility, it pulls back. Finally, it resumes bailing out the survivors of the wreckage caused by the policy surprise. This column characterises the 1998 Russian crisis and the current crisis as triple time-inconsistency episodes and says that a financial crisis may simply be a bad time to try to build credibility.

Events