Michael Bordo, 23 April 2017

Beginning in 1944, the Bretton Woods system played a major role in shaping the global economy in the post-war period. This column describes how although it was successful in bringing about exemplary and stable economic performance in the 1950s and 1960s, familiar confidence and liquidity problems, as well as inflationary pressure and central bankers’ responses to it, ensured that Bretton Woods was short-lived. Nonetheless, legacies of the system, like the dollar standard, remain with us and will likely be with us for some time to come.

Eric Monnet, Damien Puy, 02 May 2016

Business cycles are generally viewed as having been less correlated during the Bretton Woods period, 1950-1971. This column discusses findings from a new database of quarterly industrial production for 21 countries from 1950 to 2014 based on IMF archival data. As it turns out, business cycle synchronisation was as strong before 1971 as it was after (up till the Global Crisis began in 2007). Moreover, deeper financial integration tends to de-synchronise national outputs from the world cycle, at least in non-crisis periods.

Stefano Micossi, 12 February 2016

As a monetary union based on a single currency, the Eurozone is supposed to be immune from problems characteristic to fixed-exchange rate regimes. This column argues that this is not the case. The Eurozone still faces some adjustment problems. It seems unable to generate sufficient growth and inflation to place excessive public debt on a credible reduction path. It does not have a functioning adjustment mechanism to reabsorb existing competitive imbalances. In the long run, the Eurozone should aim to achieve a full integration of labour and capital markets. This is only feasible with budgetary and structural reforms in its member states. 

Michael Bordo, 21 March 2014

Since 2007, there has been a buildup of TARGET imbalances within the Eurosystem – growing liabilities of national central banks in the periphery matched by growing claims of central banks in the core. This column argues that, rather than signalling the collapse of the monetary system – as was the case for Bretton Woods between 1968 and 1971 – these TARGET imbalances represent a successful institutional innovation that prevented a repeat of the US payments crisis of 1933.

Michael Bordo, Angela Redish, 20 June 2013

The Eurozone has been going through an existential crisis since 2010. The column discusses research that draws an analogy between the careful planning in the 1980s leading to the creation of the euro and the planning that led to the Bretton Woods system. The outcome for the Eurozone, as in the earlier creation of a man-made international system, may be similar – collapse or at least major reworking.

Harold James, 17 February 2013

Recent policy and academic debates have begun to influence Eurozone reform. But how sound is the advice we give out? This column argues that calls for a Eurozone or full-fledged EU superstate are overstated. Yes, developing an adequate system of European banking supervision is a matter of urgency if we hope to tackle the threat posed by an overdeveloped and opaque financial system. But calling for a superstate misunderstands the reasons politicians introduced the euro in the first place.

Martin Skala, 20 April 2011

With discontent at the current state of the international monetary system still lingering, is there an alternative to the decades-old discussions about gold, Bretton Woods Systems, and Special Drawing Rights? This column claims there is. It proposes a new IMF reserve currency with the creation of Special Transaction Rights.