Ed Balls, Anna Stansbury, 01 May 2017

Until recently, the independence granted to the Bank of England 20 years ago had gone unchallenged. But the financial crisis has raised questions over whether central bank independence is necessary, feasible, and democratic. This column revisits the relationship between inflation and the operational and political independence of the central bank in advanced economies. The findings support the Bank of England model of monetary policy independence: fully operationally independent, but somewhat politically dependent. To make operational independence work, however, further reforms are needed to the model in both monetary–fiscal coordination and macroprudential policy.

Domenico Lombardi, Pierre Siklos, 11 April 2017

Macroprudential policies increasingly lie at the heart of how central banks jointly manage of price and financial stability. However, consensus over best practice has yet to emerge. This column presents an improved indicator to measure individual economies’ macroprudential policy capacity. Improvements include incorporating the shadow banking sector, and distinguishing the types of institutions that wield authority. Results suggest that improvements continue to be made with respect to the development of an international financial system with improved resilience to shocks. 

Aida Caldera, Alain de Serres, Filippo Gori, Oliver Röhn, 28 March 2017

Severe recessions have been frequent among OECD countries over the past four decades. This column explores the implications of various broad types of policy to minimise the risk and frequency of such episodes for the trade-off for the growth-fragility nexus. Product and labour market policies improve growth but are essentially neutral with regards to economic risks, while better quality institutions increase both growth and economic stability. Macroprudential and financial market policies, on the other hand, entail a trade-off between growth and risk.

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The conference will last for a day and a half and we envisage that it will consist of twelve papers with discussants. We are looking for high quality research papers in macroeconomics that may help to guide macroeconomic and/or macroprudential policy. We are particularly interested in models that explore the role of behavioural economics and models of multiple equilibrium. Papers may be theoretical or empirical and preference will be given to papers that are imaginative and in an early stage of development. 

Keynote speakers: James Bullard (President, St Louis Federal Reserve), Andy Haldane (Bank of England) and Michael Woodford (Columbia)

The deadline for paper submissions is 31 March 2017

Lars E.O. Svensson, 24 January 2017

The IMF and the Federal Open Market Committee have both suggested that the costs of ‘leaning against the wind’ exceed the benefits. This column responds to claims that the results of the author's research backing up this conclusion could be overturned. It argues that the alternative assumptions necessary to overturn the result are unrealistic, and that the finding that the costs of the policy exceed the benefits therefore seems to be robust.

Claudia Buch, Matthieu Bussière, Linda Goldberg, 09 December 2016

The Global Crisis has triggered substantive policy responses, but assessing the impacts of these and the effects on the real economy is a challenging task. This column discusses the work of the International Banking Research Network in examining international spillovers of prudential instruments through credit provision by banks. It finds that prudential instruments sometimes spill over across borders through bank lending, and that international spillovers vary across prudential instruments and are heterogeneous across banks. There appears to be no one channel or even direction of transmission that dominates spillovers.

Xavier Vives, 06 December 2016

As with previous systemic crises, the 2007-2009 crisis has created regulatory reform, but is it adequate? This column argues that prudential regulation should consider interactions between conduct – capital, liquidity, disclosure requirements, macroprudential ratios – and structural instruments, and also coordinate with competition policy. Though recent reforms are a welcome response to the latest crisis, we do not know how effective they will be in future.

Domenico Lombardi, Pierre Siklos, 07 November 2016

After the 2008 Global Crisis, there has been progress towards a system-wide regulatory architecture that includes a national macroprudential authority. This column describes a ‘capacity indicator’ that measures the state of macroprudential policies worldwide, including the features policymakers believe constitute a successful macroprudential policy regime. Eventually this index may be used to establish whether these macroprudential policy innovations have been successful.

Paul Tucker, 28 September 2016

The objective of financial stability policy is unclear. Is it the resilience of the financial system, avoiding the costs of systemic collapse, or managing the credit cycle, containing the costs of resource misallocation and over-indebtedness? This column argues that the answers have serious implications for what can decently be delegated to independent ‘macroprudential authorities’, but have barely been debated in those terms.

Gaston Gelos, Nico Valckx, 27 July 2016

In recent years, the life insurance sector has become more systemically important across advanced economies. This increase is largely due to growing common exposures and to insurers’ rising interest rate sensitivity. This column analyses the evolution of the insurance sector’s contribution to systemic risk. Overall, life insurers do not seem to have markedly changed their asset portfolios toward riskier assets, although smaller and weaker insurers in some countries have taken on more risk. The findings suggest that supervisors and regulators should take a more macroprudential approach to the sector.

Vítor Constâncio, 25 April 2016

Since the Crisis, macroprudential policy has become a necessary complement to monetary policy. The ECB is striving to be a major contributor to the growing body of thought about the role and instruments of this new policy area. In this column, Vice-President Vítor Constâncio introduces the new bi-annual ECB Macroprudential Bulletin aimed at widening awareness about the Bank's macroprudential policy mandate, enhancing transparency, and informing about current ECB discussions and approaches in the field.

Jon Danielsson, Andreas Tsanakas, 18 March 2016

Macroprudential policy has become increasingly popular in the aftermath of the Global Crisis, but it remains controversial. This column argues that vigorous disagreement is both inevitable and healthy, reflecting differing fundamental views of how the financial system really works. By embracing the divergence of views instead of seeing it as problematic, macroprudential policymaking will be made easier and more effective.  

Thomas Hintermaier, Winfried Koeniger, 09 January 2016

Crises of confidence turn booms into busts. Bloated household balance sheets and high debt offer the right ingredients for a confidence-driven housing bust. This column develops an analytic framework that accommodates the potential role of confidence fluctuations as a source of uncertainty in the economy. Current debt levels are shown to determine the exposure to crises of confidence. The results point to a clear role for macroprudential policy in the prevention of such crises. 

Xavier Freixas, Luc Laeven, José-Luis Peydró, 05 August 2015

There has been much talk about using macroprudential policy to manage systemic risk and reduce negative spillovers, but there is little agreement on how it could be operationalised. This column highlights the findings of a new book on the topic and offers a framework for operationalising macroprudential policy. Macroprudential measures, together with higher capital requirements, could be used to tame the build-up of leverage and credit booms in order to prevent financial crises.

Jon Danielsson, Jean-Pierre Zigrand, 05 August 2015

Some financial authorities have proposed designating asset managers as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). This column argues that this would be premature and probably ill conceived. The motivation for such a step comes from an inappropriate application of macroprudential thought from banking, rather than the underlying externalities that might cause asset managers to contribute to systemic risk. Further, policy authorities are silent on the question of what SIFI designation should mean in practice, despite the inherent link between identification and remedy.

Niklas Gadatsch, Tobias Körner, Isabel Schnabel, Benjamin Weigert, 03 June 2015

There is a broad consensus that financial supervision ought to include a macroprudential perspective that focuses on the stability of the entire financial system. This column presents and critically evaluates the newly-created macroprudential framework in the Eurozone, with a particular focus on Germany. It argues that, while based on the right principles, the EU framework grants supervisors a high degree of discretion that entails the risk of limited commitment and excessive fine-tuning. Further, monetary policy should not ignore financial stability considerations and expect macroprudential policy to do the job alone.

Benjamin Nelson, Gabor Pinter, Konstantinos Theodoridis, 16 March 2015

There has been an extensive debate over whether central banks should raise interest rates to ‘lean against’ the build-up of leverage in the financial system. This column reports on empirical evidence showing that, in contrast to the conventional view, surprise monetary contractions have tended to increase shadow bank asset growth, rather than reduce it in the US. Monetary policy had the opposite effect on commercial bank asset growth. These findings cast some doubt on the idea that monetary policy could be used to “get in all the cracks” of the financial system in a uniform way.

Daniel Hardy, Philipp Hochreiter, 26 February 2015

A minor adverse shock to financial markets can be propagated by liquidity strains, leading to a major crisis. This column suggests a novel measure to address systemic liquidity risk – a Macroprudential Liquidity Buffer, which would require financial institutions to hold systemically liquid assets in proportion to their liabilities less regulatory capital. This proportion varies positively with growth in system-wide funding needs, so the liquidity buffer increases when non-equity funding is growing.

Stephen Cecchetti, 17 December 2014

Regulators forced up capital requirements after the Global Crisis – triggering fears in the banking industry of dire effects. This column – by former BIS Chief Economist Steve Cecchetti – introduces a new CEPR Policy Insight that argues that the capital increases had little impact on anything but bank profitability. Lending spreads and interest margins are nearly unchanged, while credit growth remains robust everywhere but in Europe. Perhaps the requirements should be raised further. 

Stephen Cecchetti, 17 December 2014

Regulators forced up capital requirements up after the Global Crisis – triggering fears in the industry of dire effects. CEPR Policy Insight 76 – by former BIS Chief Economist Steve Cecchetti – argues that the capital increases had little impact on anything but bank profitability. Lending spreads and interest margins are nearly unchanged, while credit growth remains robust everywhere but in Europe. Perhaps the requirements should be raised further. 

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