The Eurozone crisis started as a sudden stop to cross-border capital inflows. This chapter suggests that countries with current-account surpluses did not endure lasting financial stress. The balance of payments crisis then became a public debt crisis, where the public debt which mattered was that owed to foreigners. Overall, the crisis proved much more difficult to deal with given the predominance of bank financing, thinly capitalised banks, the absence of a common mechanism to deal with failing banks, and the absence of a common lender of last resort.
Daniel Gros, 07 September 2015
Anusha Chari, Peter Blair Henry, 06 March 2015
In the wake of the Great Recession, a contentious debate has erupted over whether austerity is helpful or harmful for economic growth. This column compares the experiences of the East Asian countries – whose leaders responded to the East Asian financial crisis with expansionary fiscal policy – with those of the European periphery countries during the Great Recession. The authors argue that it was a mistake for the European periphery countries to pivot from fiscal expansion to consolidation before their economies had recovered.
Pınar Yeşin, 21 February 2015
Safe haven inflows to Switzerland during global turmoil have been mentioned numerous times by the financial press and international organisations. However, recent research cannot find evidence for surges of capital inflows to Switzerland. In fact, this column argues that private capital inflows to and outflows from Switzerland have become exceptionally muted and less volatile since the Crisis. By contrast, net private capital flows have shown significantly higher volatility since the Crisis, frequently registering extreme movements. However, these extreme movements in net flows are not driven by surges of inflows.
Michael Burda, 17 May 2012
The EZ crisis reveals critical flaws in the Eurozone’s design. This column argues that failing to abolish national central banks left the door open for national interests to interfere with the natural workings of the financial system and Hume’s adjustment mechanism. This flaw – and the omission of a European Banking Authority with real teeth – will come back to haunt Europe in the months and years to come.
Pietro Alessandrini, Andrew Hughes Hallett, Andrea Presbitero , Michele Fratianni, 16 May 2012
Unsustainable debt along Europe’s periphery is bringing the euro to breaking point. But this column argues that this is not simply the result of fiscal ill-discipline. After 2010, the Eurozone crisis went from a fiscal crisis to a balance-of-payments crisis – with different prescriptions for policy.
Jean Pisani-Ferry, Silvia Merler, 02 April 2012
Many analysts and observers have put forward that the euro crisis is a balance-of-payments crisis at least as much as a fiscal crisis. This column provides evidence of capital-flow reversals in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy. It argues that the fostering of a pan-European banking industry and the creation of a banking union with centralised supervision and access to resources to recapitalise weak financial institutions should feature high on the policy agenda.