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Instructors: Christos Gortsos (National and Kapodistrian University of Athens and EUI – Fernand Braudel Senior Fellow), Seraina Grünewald (University of Zurich)
Area: Bank Regulation, Supervision and Resolution
Level: Introductory/Intermediate

This course introduces the concept of bank resolution and its main attributes. Then, it presents the EU framework governing resolution of credit institutions, the provisions on the Single Resolution Fund under the SRM Regulation and the related Intergovernmental Agreement.

At the end of this course, which is open to non-economists, participants will have acquired thorough knowledge on:
- The main elements of the international and the EU regulatory framework on resolution.
- The sale of business, bridge institution, asset separation, bail-in.
- The conditions for resolution.
- The alternative forms of permissible state aid under the new framework.

Yener Altunbaş, Simone Manganelli, David Marques-Ibanez, 14 November 2017

Prudential supervision of banks has increasingly relied on capital requirements. But bank capital played a relatively minor role in predicting bank solvency during the Global Crisis, except for scarcely capitalised banks. This column argues that while capital is a helpful tool to support bank financial stability, it is complex for supervisors to calibrate it precisely. Macroprudential authorities should be able to complement capital-based tools with additional, borrower-based prudential instruments.

Tobias Adrian, Michael J. Fleming, Or Shachar, 14 September 2017

The potential adverse effects of regulation on market liquidity in the post-crisis period continue to receive significant attention. This column shows that dealer balance sheets have continued to stagnate and that various measures point to less abundant funding liquidity. Nonetheless, there is little evidence of a wide-spread deterioration in market liquidity. Liquidity remained resilient even during stress events like the 2013 ‘temper tantrum’.

Myrvin L. Anthony, Narcissa Balta, Tom Best, Sanaa Nadeem, Eriko Togo, 06 June 2017

The case for state-contingent debt instruments, linking contractual debt to a pre-defined variable, has been theorised but not developed. This column gives a historical perspective of the issuance of these instruments to alleviate liquidity and/or solvency pressures on the sovereign in ‘normal times’ and during restructurings. It also discusses the valuable lessons that inflation-linked bonds provide for development of the state-contingent debt instrument market.

Thomas Huertas, 21 April 2017

Central banks helped contain the Global Crisis using a policy of 'eligibility easing'. The policy expanded the collateral that could be used to access liquidity facilities and the range of counterparties that could request liquidity. This column argues that although eligibility easing successfully reduced the need for central banks to act as lender of last resort or to provide emergency liquidity assistance, the time has come to determine its future role as a macro-prudential tool.

Ulrich Bindseil, Luc Laeven, 13 January 2017

The scale and scope of central bank lender of last resort operations during the Global Crisis raised concerns that central banks may be taking excessive risks and supporting moral hazard. This column argues that criticism of such operations is misguided. In the crisis, central banks did not make financial losses when acting as lender of last resort, which shows that they have applied their frameworks with prudence. 

Matthieu Chavaz, Marc Flandreau, 01 December 2016

Between 1870 and 1914, 68 countries – both sovereign and British colonies – used the London Stock Exchange to issue bonds. This column argues that bond prices and spreads in this period show that the colonies’ semi-sovereignty lowered credit risk at the price of higher illiquidity risk, and further worsened liquidity by attracting investors that rarely traded. Parallels between Eurozone and colonial bonds suggest that the pricing of liquidity and credit in government bond markets is an institutional phenomenon.

Jean-Pierre Landau, 24 November 2016

The objectives of maximising growth and reducing external imbalances may not be fully compatible in a financially integrated and asymmetric world. This column argues that countries have two choices: they can contain global imbalances and gross financial flows through permanent capital controls, or they can pursue financial integration, managing growing imbalances and external exposures by creating more global safe assets. This implies debt contracts would be either state-contingent, with easy restructuring, or built to be ‘safe’, with a high level of commitment by the issuer.

Thorsten Beck, Elena Carletti, Itay Goldstein, 22 November 2016

The Global Crisis has led to a new wave of regulation. This column argues that improved capital requirements, liquidity requirements, bank resolution and cross-border regulatory cooperation are welcome, but that unresolved problems remain. Specifically, regulation may become too complex, focus too little on macroprudential risks, be inadequate to deal with crises in global financial institutions, or fail to cope with financial innovation.

Yi Huang, Jianjun Miao, Pengfei Wang, 08 November 2016

The Chinese Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index dropped by a third in mid-2015, wiping out billions in share value. One of the responses of the Chinese government was to directly participate in the stock market. This column assesses the costs and benefits of this intervention, finding that the resulting gains amounted to about 5% of Chinese GDP. The value was created not just from increased equity and investor confidence, but also from increased liquidity and reduced probability of default for listed firms.

Federico Cingano, Francesco Manaresi, Enrico Sette, 24 June 2016

Negative shocks to bank balance sheets are problematic not just for financial markets, but for employment and economic growth more widely. This column uses evidence on a bank liquidity shock in Italy in 2007-10 to show the impact on firms’ production, investment, and employment. Firms borrowing from banks with a high exposure to the shock experienced a more intense fall both in credit flows and in investment expenditure. While the credit cut has been homogeneous across borrowers, firms with easier access to external finance were able to contain the negative consequences of the drop in credit for investment.

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The objective of this course is to present empirical applications (as well as the research methodologies) of relevant questions for both banking theory and policy, mainly related to Systemic Risk, Crises, Monetary Policy and Risk taking behaviour. An important objective is to understand scientific papers in empirical banking; to accomplish this objective, emphasis is placed on illustrating research methodologies used in empirical banking and learning the application of these methodologies to selected topics, such as:

- Securities and credit registers; large datasets

- Fire sales, runs, market and funding liquidity, systemic risk

- Risk-taking and credit channels of monetary policy

- Moral hazard vs. behavioral based risk-taking

- Secular stagnation, banking and debt crises

- Interbank globalization, contagion, emerging markets, policy

Liangliang Jiang, Ross Levine, Chen Lin, 20 May 2016

By creating liquidity, banks improve the allocation of capital and accelerate economic growth. This column uses evidence from US banks between 1984 and 2006 to evaluate the impact of competition amongst banks on their liquidity creation. It finds that an intensification of competition in the banking industry materially reduces liquidity creation. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that more profitable banks experience a smaller reduction in liquidity creation because of their ability to better absorb risk. Similarly, an intensification of competition reduces liquidity creation more among small banks, who are more engaged in relationship lending.

Luis Marques, Gaston Gelos, 18 January 2016

Concerns about both the level of bond market liquidity and its fragility have risen lately, prompted partly by events such as the October 2014 Treasury bond flash rally in the US, or the April 2015 Bund tantrum in Europe. This column assesses current market liquidity and resilience, discerning several key policy recommendations from the evidence.

Nina Karnaukh, Angelo Ranaldo, Paul Söderlind, 10 September 2015

Understanding foreign exchange markets is key to understanding the global financial system. Yet, a clear understanding of why and how foreign exchange illiquidity materialises is still missing. This column suggests that foreign exchange liquidity can be impaired in times of flight to quality and higher global risk, and that commonality increases in distressed markets.

Antonio Acconcia, Giancarlo Corsetti, Saverio Simonelli, 14 August 2015

Fiscal transfers are successful in stimulating aggregate demand to the extent that they reach households with a high marginal propensity to consume. Using micro evidence from Italian earthquakes, this column argues that a well-designed programme of temporary transfers, targeted to relatively wealthy but possibly illiquid households, can be quite helpful in speeding up recovery.

Bastian Von Beschwitz, Donald Keim, Massimo Massa, 02 July 2015

High-frequency news analytics can increase market efficiency by allowing traders to react faster to new information. One concern about such services is that they might provide a competitive advantage to their users with potential distortionary price effects. This column looks at how high frequency news analytics affect the stock market, net of the informational content that they provide. News analytics improve price efficiency, but at the cost of reducing liquidity and with potentially distortionary price effects.

Clemens Jobst, Stefano Ugolini, 23 June 2015

Central banks today provide liquidity exclusively through purchases of (mostly) government bonds and through collateralised open-market operations. This column considers the evolution of liquidity provision by central banks over the past two centuries, and argues that there are alternative approaches to those that are focused on today. One such alternative is a revival of the 19th century practice of uncollateralised lending. This would discourage market participants from relying on informational shortcuts, and reduce the likelihood that informational shocks trigger collateral crises.

Philippe Bacchetta, Kenza Benhima, Céline Poilly, 19 February 2015

The corporate cash ratio – the share of liquid assets in total assets – comoves with employment in the US. This column argues that disentangling liquidity shocks and credit shocks is key to understanding this comovement, and that liquidity shocks appear to be crucial. These shocks make production less attractive or more difficult to finance, while they also generate a need for internal liquidity to pay wages, which can be satisfied by holding more cash.

Philippe Karam, Ouarda Merrouche, Moez Souissi, Rima Turk, 02 February 2015

In the wake of the Crisis, policymakers have introduced liquidity regulation to promote the resilience of banks and lower the social cost of crisis management. This column shows that a funding liquidity shock, manifested as lower access to wholesale sources of funding following a credit rating downgrade, translates into a significant decline in both domestic and foreign lending. Liquidity self-insurance by banks mitigates the impact of a credit rating downgrade on lending.

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