Low for how long? Estimating the ECB’s “Extended Period of Time”
Tilman Bletzinger, Volker Wieland 05 September 2013
The ECB has promised to keep interest rates low for an “extended period of time”. In a broad hint to the profession, President Draghi stressed a reasonable forecast of this period could be extracted from a monetary policy reaction function. This column presents one such forecast based on published macro forecasts and a reaction function that fits the ECB’s past behaviour. The result is that ECB interest rates will rise by May 2014 at the latest.
The ECB Governing Council has given hints that it will keep rates low for long (see its May and June statements). On 4 July 2013, the Council went further embracing ‘forward guidance’ (Praet 2013, Woodford 2013).1
“The Governing Council expects the ECB interest rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period of time.”
ECB, forecast, monetary rule
A safe asset for Eurozone QE: A proposal
Luis Garicano, Lucrezia Reichlin 14 November 2014
The ECB seems to be edging towards QE, but faces a quandary on what to buy. This proposal suggests that the ECB buy ‘Safe Market Bonds’. These would be synthetic bonds formed by the senior tranches of EZ national bonds combined in GDP-weighted proportions. The ECB would merely announce the features of the synthetic bonds it will purchase. The market would create the bonds in response to this announcement, thus avoiding new EZ-level institutions or funds.
As Europe moves closer to deflation, the ECB is gradually inching towards outright quantitative easing (QE) – increasing the monetary base through purchases of government bonds (Draghi 2014). But undertaking such purchases confronts a problem. There is no Eurozone ‘government bond’ to purchase. Were the ECB to purchase the debt of all member countries, it would end up with a large amount of debt on its balance sheet, making it impossible for a country to default without triggering very large redistribution.
Macroeconomic policy Monetary policy
Eurozone QE, Safe Market Bonds, ECB, quantitative easing, unconventional monetary policy, diabolic loop, doom loop, sovereign debt, safe assets, savings glut, risk weights, bank capital
After AQR and stress tests – where next for banking in the Eurozone?
Thorsten Beck 10 November 2014
The ECB has published the results of its asset quality review and stress tests of Eurozone banks. This column argues that, while this process had clear shortcomings, it still constitutes a huge improvement over the three previous exercises in the EU. Nevertheless, the banking union is far from complete, and the biggest risk now is complacency. A long-term reform agenda awaits Europe.
The ECB has concluded and published the results of a year-long painstaking process to go through the books of the 130 largest and most important banks of the Eurozone, adjusting balance sheets and testing the sensitivity of their capital position to two different scenarios, one of which includes a severe economic downturn. This exercise constitutes the entry point to the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), where the ECB has direct supervisory responsibility for most of these 130 banks and indirect responsibility for the rest of the banks in countries that are members of the SSM.
ECB, eurozone, banking union, stress tests, Asset Quality Review, forbearance, recapitalisation, balance sheets, leverage, bank resolution
Is the ECB doing QE?
Charles Wyplosz 12 September 2014
Last week, the ECB announced that it would begin purchasing securities backed by bank lending to households and firms. Whereas markets and the media have generally greeted this announcement with enthusiasm, this column identifies reasons for caution. Other central banks’ quantitative easing programmes have involved purchasing fixed amounts of securities according to a published schedule. In contrast, the ECB’s new policy is demand-driven, and will only be effective if it breaks the vicious circle of recession and negative credit growth.
The 4 September announcement by Chairman Mario Draghi has been greeted with enthusiasm by the markets and the media. It has been long awaited, and many believe that the ECB has finally delivered. This is not sure. The ECB intends to buy large amounts of securities backed by bank lending to households (mortgages) and to firms.
Exchange rates Financial markets Monetary policy
quantitative easing, QE, monetary policy, unconventional monetary policy, ECB, securitisation, bank lending, Europe, eurozone, Subprime, stress tests, deleveraging, recapitalisation, depreciation, exchange rates, euro, central banking
To exit the Great Recession, central banks must adapt their policies and models
Marcus Miller, Lei Zhang 10 September 2014
During the Great Moderation, inflation targeting with some form of Taylor rule became the norm at central banks. This column argues that the Global Crisis called for a new approach, and that the divergence in macroeconomic performance since then between the US and the UK on the one hand, and the Eurozone on the other, is partly attributable to monetary policy differences. The ECB’s model of the economy worked well during the Great Moderation, but is ill suited to understanding the Great Recession.
“Practical men…are usually the slaves…[of] some academic scribbler of a few years back” – John Maynard Keynes.
For monetary policy to be most effective, Michael Woodford emphasised the crucial importance of managing expectations. For this purpose, he advocated that central banks adopt explicit rules for setting interest rates to check inflation and recession, and went on to note that:
Global crisis Macroeconomic policy Monetary policy
Taylor rule, forward guidance, great moderation, global crisis, Great Recession, quantitative easing, DSGE models, expectations, tapering, US, UK, Europe, eurozone, ECB, Bank of England, central banking, IMF, unconventional monetary policy
How to jumpstart the Eurozone economy
Francesco Giavazzi, Guido Tabellini 21 August 2014
The stagnating Eurozone economy requires policy action. This column argues that EZ leaders should agree a coordinated 5% tax cut, extension of budget deficit targets by 3 or 4 years, and issuance of long-term public debt to be purchased by the ECB without sterilisation.
The mantra is that once again it is up to the ECB to save the Eurozone. Quantitative easing is the last policy tool available to jumpstart the Eurozone economy. The longer the ECB waits before starting to buy government bonds, the further away will the recovery be. This analysis, however, overestimates the power of monetary policy.
Europe's nations and regions Macroeconomic policy
ECB, monetary policy, fiscal policy, quantitative easing, public debt, aggregate demand, Eurozone economy, stagnation
Revisiting the pain in Spain
Paul De Grauwe 07 July 2014
There has been a stark contrast between the experiences of Spain and the UK since the Global Crisis. This column argues that although the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions policy has been instrumental in reducing Spanish government bond yields, it has not made the Spanish fiscal position sustainable. Although the UK has implemented less austerity than Spain since the start of the crisis, a large currency depreciation has helped to reduce its debt-to-GDP ratio
The different macroeconomic adjustment dynamics in Spain – a member of a monetary union – and the UK – a stand-alone country – is stark. Paul Krugman popularised this contrast in his New York Times blog with the title “The Pain in Spain” (Krugman 2009, 2011), and commented on my own analysis in De Grauwe (2011).
Europe's nations and regions Global crisis Macroeconomic policy
ECB, monetary policy, euro, EMU, Spain, monetary union, fiscal policy, UK, government debt, austerity, EZ crisis, Outright Monetary Transactions, currency depreciation
The euro crisis: Muddling through, or on the way to a more perfect euro union?
Joshua Aizenman 03 July 2014
After a promising first decade, the Eurozone faced a severe crisis. This column looks at the Eurozone’s short history through the lens of an evolutionary approach to forming new institutions. German dominance has allowed the euro to achieve a number of design objectives, and this may continue if Germany does not shirk its responsibilities. Germany’s resilience and dominant size within the EU may explain its ‘muddling through’ approach to the Eurozone crisis. Greater mobility of labour and lower mobility of under-regulated capital may be the costly ‘second best’ adjustment until the arrival of more mature Eurozone institutions.
The short history of the Eurozone has been remarkable and unprecedented – the euro project has moved from the planning board to a vibrant currency within less than ten years. Otmar Issing’s optimistic speech in 2006 reflects well the buoyant assessment of the first decade of the euro – an unprecedented formation of a new currency without a state.1 Observers viewed the rapid acceptance of the euro as a viable currency and the deeper financial integration of the Eurozone and the EU countries as stepping stones toward a stable and prosperous Europe.
Institutions and economics International finance Monetary policy
Germany, ECB, eurozone, inflation targeting, euro, institutions, Eurozone crisis, GIIPS
Saving the euro: self-fulfilling crisis and the ‘Draghi put’
Marcus Miller, Lei Zhang 26 June 2014
Like banks, indebted governments can be vulnerable to self-fulfilling financial crises. This column applies this insight to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, and explains why the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions policy reduced sovereign bond spreads in the Eurozone.
In surveying eight centuries of financial folly, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) observed that:
International finance Monetary policy
ECB, eurozone, sovereign debt, financial crises, sovereign debt crisis, Outright Monetary Transactions, European sovereign debt crisis, self-fulfilling crises
Central bank transparency and committee deliberation
Stephen Hansen, Michael McMahon, Andrea Prat 20 June 2014
Central bank transparency is essential to democratic accountability. Central bankers often limit it – fearing its stifling effect on frank debate. Yet transparency may induce monetary policy committee members to be better prepared. This column discusses evidence showing that the ‘better prepared’ effect is important empirically. Exploiting a natural experiment in the Fed Open Market Committee in 1993 – and using computational linguistics tools to measure the impact of transparency on deliberation – the research shows that the net effect is a more informative deliberation process.
ECB, computational linguistics, central bank transparency, FOMC