Leo de Haan, Jan Willem van den End, 29 September 2017

High asset prices can foreshadow tail risks in inflation. Based on data from 11 advanced economies since 1985, this column shows that high asset prices usually signal future high inflation episodes, but can occasionally signal low inflation or deflation instead. The transmission time of asset prices to inflation can be quite long. For central banks, this implies that the signalling content of asset prices for inflation is uncertain, both in timing and direction.

Julian Kozlowski, Laura Veldkamp, Venky Venkateswaran, 11 September 2016

The Great Recession has had long-lasting effects on credit markets, employment, and output. This column combines a model with macroeconomic data to measure how the recession has changed beliefs about the possibility of future crises. According to the model, the estimated change in sentiment correlates with economic activity. A short-lived financial crisis can trigger long-lived shifts in expectations, which in turn can trigger secular stagnation.

Jon Danielsson, 18 January 2015

The Swiss central bank last week abandoned its euro exchange rate ceiling. This column argues that the fallout from the decision demonstrates the inherent weaknesses of the regulator-approved standard risk models used in financial institutions. These models under-forecast risk before the announcement and over-forecast risk after the announcement, getting it wrong in all states of the world.

Masazumi Hattori, Andreas Schrimpf, Vladyslav Sushko, 17 November 2013

This column argues that asset purchases and forward guidance by central banks can be effective in reducing financial market participants’ tail-risk perceptions. US data suggest that, since their inception in 2008, the unconventional policies adopted by the Federal Reserve have significantly compressed perceptions of tail risk. Despite increases in risk premia during the recent ‘tapering’ episode, estimates of tail-risk perceptions still remain significantly below the levels observed when the measures were introduced. Still, the effects of exit on tail-risk perceptions remain uncertain, and will require careful monitoring.

Enrico Perotti, Lev Ratnovski, Razvan Vlahu, 26 August 2011

As leading economists in Jackson Hole and Lindau call for more and better regulation to avoid a repeat global crisis, this column argues that higher bank capital, while essential, will be no panacea. In particular, it shows that tail risk often goes unaddressed. Regulators should therefore adopt direct tools for dealing with tail risk, including limits on asset and liability-side risk exposures.

Richard Portes, 15 November 2007

The global financial system shows signs of stress – turmoil, not a systemic financial crisis. Risk is being repriced and the unwinding will take some time. Now is the time to think carefully about longer-term reforms needed to improve the stability of the international financial system.