Paolo Buccirossi, Giovanni Immordino, Giancarlo Spagnolo, 11 October 2017

Schemes that reward whistleblowers who provide evidence of corporate fraud have been effective in the US, but have generally been resisted in Europe. This column argues that a policy that trades off rewards to those who blow the whistle against punishment for fabricating evidence would increase both detection of, and punishment for, fraud. This will only be effective, however, if whistleblowers are protected from retaliation and the policy also invests in making court findings more accurate.

Jörg Paetzold, Hannes Winner, 17 December 2016

Since the Global Crisis, many governments around the world have initiated policies against tax evasion and harmful tax avoidance. This column uses data from an Austrian commuter allowance scheme to explore how the design of tax schemes and the social environment affect compliance. A substantial share of employees in the study misreport their commuting distance in order to receive more compensation. Employees also appear to be influenced by the misreporting behaviour of their co-workers, showing how tax evasion can have spillover effects.

Margherita Comola, Marcel Fafchamps, 08 December 2015

Dyadic social network data – describing relations between two actors – are frequently derived from self-reporting surveys. This column explores how the misreporting problems that are typical of such data can bias estimations. Data on transfers between households in a Tanzanian village are shown to display a high rate of discrepancies within dyads. Failure to account for such misreporting results in a sizeable underestimation of inter-household transfers.