Paolo Buccirossi, Giovanni Immordino, Giancarlo Spagnolo, 11 October 2017

Schemes that reward whistleblowers who provide evidence of corporate fraud have been effective in the US, but have generally been resisted in Europe. This column argues that a policy that trades off rewards to those who blow the whistle against punishment for fabricating evidence would increase both detection of, and punishment for, fraud. This will only be effective, however, if whistleblowers are protected from retaliation and the policy also invests in making court findings more accurate.

Samuel Bowles, 26 May 2016

Explicit economic incentives – for example, a subsidy to contribute to a public good – can sometimes ‘crowd out’ generous and ethical motives. But when properly designed, can incentives ‘crowd in’ these civic virtues? This column uses an example from ancient Athens to show how this might be done, providing a lesson for modern mechanism design and public policy.