Paul Tucker, 06 November 2017

If another big bank fails, it is going to be very problematic. In this video, Paul Tucker underlines the need to design and implement new reforms. This video was recorded at the "10 years after the crisis" conference held in London, on 22 September 2017.

Stephen Cecchetti, Kim Schoenholtz, 03 November 2017

Black Monday has been referred to as the first contemporary global financial crisis. This column reviews key aspects of the 1987 crash and discusses the subsequent steps taken to improve the resilience of the financial system. It also highlights a key lingering vulnerability – the lack of a mechanism for managing the insolvency of critical payment, clearing, and settlement institutions.

Paul Krugman, 30 October 2017

What did we learn from the crisis? In this video, Paul Krugman explains why we might be in a worse situation than we were in 2007. This video was recorded at the "10 years after the crisis" conference held in London, on 22 September 2017.

Stefania Albanesi, Giacomo De Giorgi, Jaromir Nosal, 03 October 2017

The Global Crisis narrative has suggested that an expansion of subprime credit was the reason for rising mortgage defaults, leading to the large-scale recession in 2007-09. Taking a closer look at the characteristics of subprime credit holders over the period, this column argues that the growth in mortgage defaults did not occur predominantly amongst subprime credit holders. Instead, it was real estate investors that played a critical role in the rise in mortgage debt, specifically among the middle and the top of the credit score distribution.

Stephen Cecchetti, Kim Schoenholtz, 29 August 2017

There is still a notable lack of consensus over when exactly the 2007-09 financial crisis started. This column argues that the crisis began on 9 August 2007, when BNP Paribas announced they were suspending redemptions. In 2007, the US and European financial systems lacked two key shock absorbers: adequate capital to meet falls in asset values, and adequate holdings of high-quality liquid assets to meet temporary liquidity shortfalls. Lacking these, the financial system was vulnerable to even relatively small disturbances, like the BNP Paribas announcement.

Nicholas Crafts, Terence Mills, 17 July 2017

Estimates of trend total factor productivity growth in the US have been significantly reduced, contributing to fears that the slowdown is permanent. This column provides an historical perspective on the relationship between estimated trends in total factor productivity growth and subsequent outcomes. It argues that In the past, trend growth estimates have not been a good guide for future medium-term outcomes, and ‘techno-optimists’ should not be put off by time-series econometrics.

Glenn Hoggarth, Carsten Jung, Dennis Reinhardt, 07 July 2017

Partly as a result of the Global Crisis, assessments of capital inflows and their impact on market efficiency and technology transfer have begun to take into account their association with financial crises. This column argues that the riskiness of inflows depends on the type of lender and its currency denomination. It finds that equity flows are more stable than debt flows, non-banks more stable than banks, and local currency more stable than foreign. Macroprudential policies can support the stabilisation of inflows.

Thorsten Beck, Olivier De Jonghe, Klaas Mulier, 09 May 2017

There is little empirical evidence that specialised banks are less stable or perform worse, as suggested by standard portfolio diversification theory. This column uses new data to argue that more specialised banks between 2002 and 2012 did not perform as theory would suggest. More specialised banks, and banks with similar sectoral exposures to their peers, suffered less volatility and had lower exposure to systemic risk. The lack of post-crisis regulatory reform in this area may, accidentally, have been a good thing.

Stephen Cecchetti, Kim Schoenholtz, 18 January 2017

‘Too big to fail’ is an enduring problem for financial authorities and regulators. While forbidding government bailouts may be a popular move, the strategy lacks credibility. This column examines the proposals of the Minneapolis Plan to End Too Big to Fail. The plan has many virtues that tackle systemic problems and that build on the Dodd-Frank Act’s crisis prevention and management tools. However, further analysis of the plan is still needed to ensure that its measures aren’t circumvented.

Matthieu Chavaz, Marc Flandreau, 01 December 2016

Between 1870 and 1914, 68 countries – both sovereign and British colonies – used the London Stock Exchange to issue bonds. This column argues that bond prices and spreads in this period show that the colonies’ semi-sovereignty lowered credit risk at the price of higher illiquidity risk, and further worsened liquidity by attracting investors that rarely traded. Parallels between Eurozone and colonial bonds suggest that the pricing of liquidity and credit in government bond markets is an institutional phenomenon.

Thorsten Beck, Elena Carletti, Itay Goldstein, 22 November 2016

The Global Crisis has led to a new wave of regulation. This column argues that improved capital requirements, liquidity requirements, bank resolution and cross-border regulatory cooperation are welcome, but that unresolved problems remain. Specifically, regulation may become too complex, focus too little on macroprudential risks, be inadequate to deal with crises in global financial institutions, or fail to cope with financial innovation.

Jean-Noël Barrot, Erik Loualiche, Matthew Plosser, Julien Sauvagnat, 21 October 2016

In the years preceding the Great Recession there was a dramatic rise in household debt in the US, and an increase in import competition triggered by the expansion of China and other low-wage countries. This column uses consumer credit data to argue that these phenomena are intimately linked. Household debt levels increased significantly in counties where US manufacturing jobs shifted overseas, and regional exposure to import competition explains 30% of the cross-regional variation in the growth in household debt.

Carlos Garriga, Finn Kydland, Roman Šustek, 16 October 2016

Central banks responded to the financial crisis by cutting policy rates to prevent deflation and curb the decline in economic activity, but these responses have been anything but temporary. This column explores whether the sticky price channel is still relevant in an environment of persistently low rates. Although the effectiveness of the sticky price channel is limited, monetary policy instead transmits through mortgage debt. The recent period of low rates and low inflation has redistributed income and consumption from savers to mortgage borrowers.

Ricardo Reis, 14 October 2016

Conventional economic theory predicts that, outside of a financial crisis, quantitative easing should have no effect on real outcomes or inflation. This column proposes two theoretical channels through which quantitative easing might also work in a fiscal crisis. In this case, quantitative easing can be a valuable tool because it can control the path of inflation over time and reduce the distortions to the credit flow in the economy.

Marco Buti, José Leandro, Plamen Nikolov, 25 August 2016

The fragmentation of financial systems along national borders was one of the main handicaps of the Eurozone both prior to and in the initial phase of the crisis,  hindering the shock absorption capacity of individual member states. The EU has taken important steps towards the deeper integration of Eurozone financial markets, but this remains incomplete. This column argues that a fully-fledged financial union can be an efficient economic shock absorber. Compared to the US, there is significant potential in terms of private cross-border risk sharing through the financial channel, more so than through fiscal (i.e. public) means.

Laurence Ball, 24 August 2016

Much of the damage from the Great Recession is attributed to the Federal Reserve’s failure to rescue Lehman Brothers when it hit troubled waters in September 2008. It has been argued that the Fed’s decision was based on legal constraints. This column questions that view, arguing that the Fed did have the legal authority to save Lehman, but it did not do so due to political considerations.

Friederike Niepmann, Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 11 June 2016

To mitigate the risks of international trade for firms, banks offer trade finance products – specifically, letters of credit and documentary collections. This column exploits new data from the SWIFT Institute to establish key facts on the use of these instruments in world trade. Letters of credit (documentary collections) cover 12.5% (1.7%) of world trade, or $2.3 trillion ($310 billion). 

Fredrik Andersson, Lars Jonung, 30 May 2016

The volume of credit to Swedish households has grown twice as fast as incomes since the mid-1990s. This has resulted in both rising house prices and rising household debt. This column argues that these trends expose Sweden to important economic vulnerabilities. Curbing these vulnerabilities will require prompt action by the authorities.

Thomas Gehrig, 25 May 2016

During normal operations, price discovery is an important feature of decentralised market trading. But the process can be distorted when markets are under great stress, such as during the run up to the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. This column uses trading data from the days leading up to and following the collapse to show that price discovery at US stock exchanges remained remarkably efficient, even at the height of the turmoil.

Stijn Claessens, Nicholas Coleman, Michael Donnelly, 18 May 2016

Since the Global Crisis, interest rates in many advanced economies have been low and, in many cases, are expected to remain low for some time. Low interest rates help economies recover and can enhance banks’ balance sheets and performance, but persistently low rates may also erode the profitability of banks if they are associated with lower net interest margins. This column uses new cross-country evidence to confirm that decreases in interest rates do indeed contribute to weaker net interest margins, with a greater adverse effect when rates are already low.    

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