Paolo Buccirossi, Giovanni Immordino, Giancarlo Spagnolo, 11 October 2017

Schemes that reward whistleblowers who provide evidence of corporate fraud have been effective in the US, but have generally been resisted in Europe. This column argues that a policy that trades off rewards to those who blow the whistle against punishment for fabricating evidence would increase both detection of, and punishment for, fraud. This will only be effective, however, if whistleblowers are protected from retaliation and the policy also invests in making court findings more accurate.

Niels Johannesen, Tim Stolper, 02 July 2017

Whistleblowing should improve immoral behaviour beyond the perpetrators exposed, according to standard economic theories of crime, but this has not always been the case. This column uses the example of offshore banking to examine whether whistleblowing successfully deters future immoral or criminal behaviour. Based on the evidence of the first whistleblowing event relating to tax evasion in 2008, an increase in the perceived probability of a leak should be expected to deter the demand and supply of criminal offshore banking services and reduce the earnings of offshore banks.

Events