Christos Makridis, Jonathan Rothwell, 10 July 2020

There is significant dispersion in beliefs about the pandemic and its economic implications. This column uses new high-frequency and nationally representative data to document the overwhelming importance of political affiliation as a determinant of these beliefs and the adverse effects of partisanship on local economic activity. In the US, Republicans are significantly less worried about COVID-19 and less likely to expect a long-term disruption due to the virus. These results suggest that the macroeconomic effects of the pandemic on consumption may depend on behavioural factors, like political affiliation.

Jean-Pierre Dube, Andrey Simonov, Szymon Sacher, Shirsho Biswas, 06 July 2020

US televised news networks offer strikingly different coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic, the exposure risks, and the benefits of social distancing measures recommended by health experts. This column devises an empirical strategy to test for a causal effect of news viewership on compliance with social distancing. It finds a large effect of local Fox News viewership on local compliance, with a persuasion rate of up to 26%. These findings reinforce concerns about the media’s role in sowing distrust in scientific evidence in the determination of public policies.  

Gianmarco Daniele, Amedeo Piolatto, Willem Sas, 07 May 2020

Polarisation, populism, and extremism are on the rise on both sides of the Atlantic. This column focuses on the role of policies in multi-level federations (such as the EU) in partially explaining the rise of extreme political parties. An analysis of differences in vote shares between European and national parliamentary elections suggests that support for extreme politicians is highest in countries with the largest gains and losses from federal policies. Eurosceptic parties, which are very protective of national interests, win higher shares of the EU vote in core and periphery countries, whilst the opposite is true for countries in the middle.

Yves Zenou, 09 August 2019

When does social media polarize opinion, and when does it bring us closer together? Yves Zenou tells Tim Phillips about a new economic model that shows us how affinity can become division, and why the trolls often win.

Mirko Draca, 21 May 2019

Mirko Draca of the University of Warwick discusses the political polarisation that has emerged over the past few years.

Gaetano Basso, Giovanni Peri, Ahmed Rahman, 12 January 2018

The US and Europe have both seen wage polarisation in the last three decades, in parallel with increasing technical automation. This column analyses the impact of immigration on this wage divergence via its effect on the labour supply side. It finds that immigration partially reverses natives’ polarisation of employment opportunities and wages by expanding aggregate demand and allowing natives to move to better paying occupations. Policies to reduce low-skilled migration with the aim of favouring native middle-class labour market opportunities may in fact do the opposite.

Enrique Fernández-Macías, Martina Bisello, 25 September 2016

A tasks approach to labour market analysis can contribute to a better understanding of structural change and employment trends. However, its narrow focus on a few specific types of task content and its neglect of the social aspects of production can limit the usefulness of this approach. This column presents a new framework for conceptualising and measuring tasks, and discusses an application to Europe.

Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularick, Christoph Trebesch, 21 November 2015

Recent events in Europe provide ample evidence that the political aftershocks of financial crises can be severe. This column uses a new dataset that covers elections and crises in 20 advanced economies going back to 1870 to systematically study the political aftermath of financial crises. Far-right parties are the biggest beneficiaries of financial crises, while the fractionalisation of parliaments complicates post-crisis governance. These effects are not observed following normal recessions or severe non-financial macroeconomic shocks.

Lindsay Oldenski, 16 October 2012

The state of the US middle class has been a key issue this election season as middle-income workers have experienced relative wage losses in the last decade. Skill-biased technology change has previously been identified as a major cause of this polarisation of wages in the US. But this column shows that there is also an empirical link between offshoring by US firms and the polarisation of the US labour market.

Events

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