Pauline Gandré, Mike Mariathasan, Ouarda Merrouche, Steven Ongena, 30 May 2020

Managing global financial risks requires coordinated policies and a firm commitment by national actors. In the absence of such commitment, risks are reallocated and concentrate where they are least effectively addressed. Using data on the staggered implementation of the G20’s global derivatives market reform, this column documents US banks’ response to reform progress. It finds that banks shift trading activities towards less regulated jurisdictions and adopt riskier portfolios overall. The effects are driven by agenda items – like the promotion of central clearing – that are costly and do not benefit banks directly.

Giorgio Barba Navaretti, Giacomo Calzolari, Alberto Pozzolo, 01 March 2018

Financial technology companies have spurred innovation in financial services while fostering competition amongst incumbent players. This column argues that although incumbents face rising competitive pressure, they are unlikely to be fully replaced by FinTechs in many of their key functions. Traditional banks will adapt to technological innovations, and the scope for regulatory arbitrage will decline.

Dennis Reinhardt, Rhiannon Sowerbutts, 27 September 2015

Regulatory arbitrage is an essential feature of modern banking. This column presents new evidence on avoiding macroprudential policies by borrowing from abroad. Domestic non-banks borrow more from abroad after an increase in capital requirements, but not after an increase in lending standards. This is most likely because of differences in the way the two regulations apply, and suggests that we should have strong frameworks for reciprocating capital regulation.

Olivier Blanchard, 03 October 2014

Before the 2008 crisis, the mainstream worldview among US macroeconomists was that economic fluctuations were regular and essentially self-correcting. In this column, IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard explains how this benign view of fluctuations took hold in the profession, and what lessons have been learned since the crisis. He argues that macroeconomic policy should aim to keep the economy away from ‘dark corners’, where it can malfunction badly.

Alan Moreira, Alexi Savov, 16 September 2014

The prevailing view of shadow banking is that it is all about regulatory arbitrage – evading capital requirements and exploiting ‘too big to fail’. This column focuses instead on the tradeoff between economic growth and financial stability. Shadow banking transforms risky, illiquid assets into securities that are – in good times, at least – treated like money. This alleviates the shortage of safe assets, thereby stimulating growth. However, this process builds up fragility, and can exacerbate the depth of the bust when the liquidity of shadow banking securities evaporates.

Viral Acharya, Sascha Steffen, 21 April 2013

This paper argues that the European banking crisis can in part be explained by a “carry trade” behavior of banks. The results are supportive of moral hazard in the form of risk-taking by under-capitalized banks to exploit low risk weights and central-bank funding of risky government bond positions.


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