Monitoring European Integration 6: Flexible Integration




Mathias Dewatripont, Francesco Giavazzi, Jurgen von Hagen, lan Harden, Gerard Roland, Howard Rosenthal, Andre Sapir and Guido Tabellini 


1.    Europe at a crossroads
1.1  The challenges ahead
1.1.1.    Enlarging the Union
1.1.2.    Widening the scope of integration
1.1.3.    Deepening existing integration
1.1.4.    Closing the democratic deficit
1.2.    The agenda for the future of Europe
1.3.    Flexible integration
1.4.    Institutional reform
1.4.1.    A transparent legal order
1.4.2.    Serious enforcement of the common policies
1.4.3.    Efficient and legitimate decision-making
1.4.4.    Clear assignments of EU functions
1.4.5.    Macroeconomic coordination and the single currency
1.5.    The second and third pillars of the EU
1.6.    Structure of the Report

2.    European integration, 1945-95
2.1.    Origins and growth of the European Union
2.2.    Expansion in trade, transfers and decision-making
2.3.    The institutional framework of integration
2.3.1.    Community institutions
2.3.2.    Missing institutional structures: Enforcement and flexibility
2.3.3.    European Union
2.4.    Depth and scope of integration: The European trade-off
2.4.1.    lntergovemmentalism versus supranationalism
2.4.2.    Legal disorder
2.4.3.    Constitutional rigidity
2.4.4.    Flexibility and integration in the current EU 

3.    Combining flexibility and commitment in the EU
3.1.    Suggested paths for the future
3.1.1.    Europe a la carte 
3.1.2.    United States of Europe 
3.1.3.    Multispeed integration
3.1.4.    Variable geometry
3.2.    Flexible integration
3.2.1.    The main idea 
3.2.2.    Organizing the open partnerships
3.3.    Principles of flexible integration 
3.3.1.    Efficient overall integration 
3.3.2.    Efficient open partnerships: The generalized subsidiarity principle 
3.3.3.    Inefficient bundling across areas of integration
3.3.4.    Open partnerships and the distribution of the gains from cooperation
3.3.5.    Costly transfers
3.3.6.    Closed partnerships
3.3.7.    Free-riding
3.3.8.    Interest groups and cross-border coalitions 
3.3.9.    Uncertainty about the gains from integration 
3.3.10.    Conclusion 
3.4.    Institutional requirements of flexible integration

4.    Defining the common base 
4.1.    Preliminaries 
4.2.    The Common Agricultural Policy and the Structural Funds
4.2.1.    The Common Agricultural Policy
4.2.2.    The Structural and Cohesion Funds 
4.2.3.    Community transfers and future enlargement
4.3.    Tax coordination
4.3.1.    Indirect taxation
4.3.2.    Capital income taxation
4.3.3.    Labour income taxation
4.4.    The Social Charter and the Protocol on Social Policy
4.5.    Economic and Monetary Union
4.5.1.    A single currency
4.5.2.    Competitive devaluations
4.5.3.    Competitiveness versus productivity
4.6.    Social insurance and regional risk-sharing 
4.7.    Concluding remarks 

5.    Implementation and enforcement of the common base
5.1.    Law and administration in the Community
5.1.1.    Implementation of Single Market legislation
5.1.2.    State aids
5.1.3.    Merger control
5.2.    The existing procedures
5.2.1.    Actions against member states
5.2.2.    Actions against Community institutions
5.2.3.    Actions against private parties
5.3.    Regulatory theory
5.4.    Improving enforcement
5.4.1.    State aids and merger regulation
5.4.2.    Judicial procedures

6.    Currency union and other open partnerships
6.1.    Introduction
6.1.1.    Dealing with the externalities
6.1.2.    The entry rules
6.1.3.    The administration of open partnerships
6.2.    Currency union
6.2.1.    Why Germany cares about the stability of intra-European exchange rates
6.2.2.    The politics of Maastricht
6.3.    Rules for monetary coexistence in the EU
6.3.1.    Inflation targets
6.3.2.    Prudential regulation
6.4.    Conclusion

7.    Reforming the European constitution
7.1.    Points of departure
7.2.    The constitutional framework of flexible integration
7.2.1.    Procedures for constitutional change
7.2.2.    Institutions to protect the constitution
7.3.    Decision-making in the European Union
7.3.1.    Efficacy and adaptability
7.3.2.    Protection and representation of minority interests
7.3.3.    Accountability
7.4.    Suggestions for reform 
7.4.1.    The Commission as an executive
7.4.2.    The Commission as a European administration
7.5.    Conclusion



CEPR Policy Research