Competition policy

Georges Siotis, Carmine Ornaghi, Micael Castanheira, 28 February 2021

A perplexing feature surrounding generic entry is that the price of the other on-patent potential substitutes is barelyaffected, leading competition authorities to conclude sometimes that a single molecule may constitute a distinct antitrust market.  Using data on prices, quantities, and promotional effort for a large number of molecules sold in the US, this column finds that there is no such thing as a single/natural antitrust market, even for a fixed set of products (and absent technological, regulatory, or trade shocks).  

Mark Schankerman, 19 February 2021

Diffusion of new drugs is painfully slow in low-income countries. Mark Schankerman tells Tim Phillips about how patent pools accelerate the process, and how we could still do a better job of licensing life-saving medicines.

Pierre Dubois, Yassine Lefouili, Stephane Straub, 30 January 2021

Patients in the developing world often face prices for essential medicines far in excess of international reference levels, even if those drugs have lost patent protection. This column presents evidence from seven low- and middle-income countries with diverse drug procurement systems to assess the effect of centralised procurement on drug prices. The results of the study highlight that centralised procurement of drugs by the public sector leads to lower prices, but that the induced price reduction is smaller when the supply side is more concentrated.

Chiara Farronato, Jessica Fong, Andrey Fradkin, 24 January 2021

Mergers between digital platforms frequently attract widespread attention, not just from the media but from researchers in economics and law as well. This column explores the effects of a merger between two rival platforms, using the case of the two largest US two-sided markets for dog sitting. The results of the study suggest that online users are, on average, no better off with a single dominant platform compared to two competitors. The authors argue that this net effect is the result of two counterbalancing forces: network effects and platform differentiation.

Martin Bichler, Peter Cramton, Peter Gritzmann, Axel Ockenfels, 10 January 2021

Airport time slots are currently awarded by historic use, with only small number reserved for new entrants. This hampers competition, promotes inefficient slot utilisation, and contributes to congestion. This column revisits the idea of carefully auctioning time slots at congested airports in order to foster competition by more flexibly allocating slots, as opposed to the current use-it-or-lose-it approach which favours the status quo. 

Other Recent Articles:

CEPR Policy Research