Competition policy

Ester Faia, Sébastien Laffitte, Gianmarco Ottaviano, 20 September 2018

There is a general consensus that lax monetary policy and banking globalisation were two critical factors behind the Global Crisis. This column explores how banks’ decisions to enter foreign markets impacted their individual and systemic risk. Results from a sample of European banks suggest that banks’ foreign expansions decreased risk from both an individual and systemic viewpoint. The findings cast doubt on the idea that banking globalisation was one of the culprits behind the crisis.

Gilbert Cette, Jimmy Lopez, Jacques Mairesse, 13 September 2018

Although many product and labour market reforms have been implemented in OECD countries during the last two decades, further reforms are still frequently promoted to increase competitiveness, restore economic growth, and improve workers’ purchasing power. This column uses new cross-country and cross-industry measures to explore how deregulation affects these markets. The results confirm that product market deregulation may reduce rent creation, but that labour market deregulation may have two opposing effects on rent sharing – a negative impact on wages and a positive impact on hours worked.

Oleg Itskhoki, Benjamin Moll, 05 September 2018

From a neoclassical perspective, export promotion and comparative advantage policies are unambiguously detrimental. This column extends the standard growth model with financial frictions to explore how such policies affect a country’s development trajectory. Results show that the presence of financial frictions opens the door for welfare-improving government interventions in product and factor markets. Optimal development policy interventions feature a pro-business tilt early on, but change towards a more redistributive pro-labour stance as the economy accumulates financial wealth.

Alexandre de Cornière, Greg Taylor, 15 August 2018

A general challenge facing competition authorities in the digital era is learning how to apply the traditional tools of competition policy in multi-sided platform environments. This column argues that the Google Android case offers a great example of the need to consider the implications of the market's two-sidedness. It also argues that bundling can, in fact, be profitable by virtue of its effect on competition once one accounts for some of the key features of mobile app markets.

Hal Varian, 14 August 2018

The European Commission’s case against Android has been hailed as a “milestone” in antitrust enforcement. This column, written by Google’s Chief Economist, argues that the case is more of a millstone than a milestone for not just Google, but the entire Android ecosystem of equipment manufacturers, carriers, app developers, and end users.

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