EU institutions

Ralf Fendel, Nicola Mai, Oliver Mohr, 17 January 2019

The flattening of the US yield curve has left academics, central bankers and market commentators divided, with one camp interpreting it as a sign of impending recession (in line with historical patterns), and the other camp arguing that this time is different given unprecedented changes in monetary policy and other structural forces. This column argues that the ECB’s quantitative easing programme undermined the performance of term spreads as predictors of recessions. It suggests and tests a modified term spread and several other variables that are more successful at predicting recessions. 

Jasper De Jong, Niels Gilbert, 15 January 2019

The Stability and Growth Pact has been criticised by some for imposing fiscal tightening during recessions, and by others for a lack of compliance. Using a database of all country-specific Excessive Deficit Procedure recommendations since the introduction of the euro, this column shows that the corrective arm of the pact, which is procyclical by design, is an important driver of euro area fiscal policy. The preventive arm, which is designed to avoid the need for such procyclical policies, is much less effective and reform of the pact should focus on addressing this.

Ashoka Mody, Milan Nedeljkovic, 14 January 2019

The ECB’s actions in the wake of the Global Crisis have been described as hesitant, relative to other central banks. Based on analysis of financial markets' response to the ECB's interventions during the euro crisis, this column argues that central bank interventions are effective if they clearly signal a commitment to reinvigorating the economy and if they address the source rather than the symptom of financial stress. The ECB did not follow these principles, limiting its ability to improve financial market sentiment. 

Marco Buti, Nicolas Carnot, 07 December 2018

The debate continues over the needed ingredients for a stable Economic and Monetary Union. Some authors have argued that the completion of a financial union (banking union and capital markets union) together with sound national fiscal policies eliminate the need for common budgetary instruments. The authors of this column beg to disagree and re-state the case for a central fiscal capacity. In essence, whilst financial union and a euro area fiscal stabilisation are substitutes in normal times, they are complementary in bad times. 

Michel Heijdra, Tjalle Aarden, Jesper Hanson, Toep van Dijk, 30 November 2018

A central fiscal capacity is a recurring topic in discussions on reform of the Economic and Monetary Union, but no consensus on the usefulness and necessity of a such a capacity has been reached. This column, part of the Vox debate on euro area reform, argues that the potential stability benefits of a central fiscal capacity can be achieved through stronger financial market risk sharing and more effective use of fiscal stabilisers, without any additional fiscal risk sharing.

Other Recent Articles:

Events

CEPR Policy Research