Two events have shaped the financial system over the past ten years: the Global Crisis and the rise of fintech. But while the lessons learned after the crisis have been widely discussed and the regulatory response broadly agreed upon, the question of whether and how to regulate fintech is a topic of an ongoing policy debate. This column discusses the three basic options that regulators have: ignore it, ‘duck type’ rules into existing regulations, or specifically tailor new regulations.
Financial regulation and banking
Both proponents and opponents of central bank digital currency have suggested that it would fundamentally change the macroeconomy. This column questions this paradigm, arguing that the introduction of such a currency need not alter the allocation nor the price system. Concerns about central bank digital currency choking investment, cutting into banks’ profits, or increasing the likelihood of bank runs are misplaced.
The idea of a central bank digital currency has prompted a mixed reaction among economists. This column uses a simple theoretical framework to investigate the impact of such a currency on a monopolistic banking sector. There are two main results. First, the introduction of an interest-bearing digital currency increases financial inclusion, diminishing the demand for physical cash. Second, while an interest-bearing digital currency reduces monopoly profit, it need not disintermediate banks in any way. A central bank digital currency may, in fact, lead to an expansion of bank deposits if the resulting competition compels banks to raise their deposit rates.
Alongside liquidity and store of value, is privacy an important attribute of money? Using laboratory experiments, the column shows that privacy matters, and increases the overall appeal of money. The experiments suggest that future competition between alternative currencies will depend on how the three properties are mixed.
The Global Crisis brought attention to how connections among financial institutions may make systems more prone to crises. Turning to a major financial crisis from the past, this column uses data from the Great Depression to study risk in the commercial banking network leading up to the crisis and how the network structure influenced the outcomes. It demonstrates that when the distribution of risk is more concentrated at the top of the system, as it was in 1929, fragility and the propensity for risk to spread increases.
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28 - 29 March 2019 / Paris / SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum Banque de France (BDF)
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28 - 29 March 2019 / European Central Bank, Frankfurt / European Central Bank and the University of Ohio
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1 - 3 April 2019 / Florence, Italy / Florence School of Banking and Finance, European University Institute
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8 - 10 April 2019 / Florence, Italy / Florence School of Banking and Finance, European University Institute
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3 - 4 May 2019 / London / Queen Mary, University of London
