Monetary policy

Javier Cravino, Ting Lan, Andrei Levchenko, 16 June 2018

Monetary policy shocks can affect different types of agents differently. These distributional effects can have important consequences for policy effectiveness. Using US data, this column explores how shocks differentially affect the prices faced by households with different incomes. The results suggest that middle-income households’ consumption baskets have more volatile prices than those of high-income households, and they are therefore more exposed to monetary policy shocks.

Nicola Mai, 14 June 2018

The rise in global debt has continued unabated following the Global Crisis. This column argues that elevated debt levels will continue to put downward pressure on equilibrium interest rates across the world’s major economies, constraining central bank efforts to normalise rates and supporting the thesis that global equilibrium interest rates have fallen.

Eric Monnet, 13 June 2018

In the Bretton woods system, capital controls ensured the independence of monetary policy. This column argues that it is impossible to understand how they worked without understanding their role in supporting credit controls at the time, which were used to fight inflation without raising the domestic interest rate. This may be relevant today in emerging markets in which central bank instruments still resemble those used under Bretton Woods. 

Peter Bofinger, 12 June 2018

The digitalisation of money has the potential to change traditional structures of the financial system. This column discusses four areas in which it may have an impact, and argues that while digitalisation will not erode the importance of central banks, banks could be massively challenged by new forms of intermediation. 

Jan Fredrik Qvigstad, Tore Schei, 01 June 2018

The minutes in which central banks justify their decisions vary considerably in length, and the same also applies to supreme court judgements. This column proposes criteria for ‘good’ justifications and asks whether these criteria are met in practice. It concludes that the Swedish Riksbank could look at the way the UK Supreme Court’s justifications have developed, the European Court of Justice could learn something from Paul Romer’s insistence on clear language, and the European Court of Human Rights Grand Chamber might draw inspiration from the length and clarity of the Central Bank of Iceland’s minutes.

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