

## **European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory**

**Gerzensee, 30 June - 11 July**

### **Revised Programme**

#### **Monday 30 June      Half-Day Workshop on ‘Experimental Economics’**

Workshop leader: Alvin Roth (University of Pittsburgh)

8.30 - 12.00      **Using Learning Models to Predict Behaviour**

Alvin Roth (University of Pittsburgh)

**On the Role of Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games: The Cognitive Game Theory Approach**

Ido Erev (University of Pittsburgh)

**Cooperation, Emotion, and Punishment: An Experimental Analysis of Norm Formation and Enforcement**

Ernst Fehr (Universität Zürich)

#### **Tuesday 1 July**

8.30 - 09.45      **Theoretically Robust But Empirically Invalid? An Experimental Investigation into Tax Equivalence**

Rudolf Kerschbamer (Universität Wien)

Georg Kirchsteiger (CentER, Tilburg University)

20.30 - 21.30      **A Simple Test of Explanations for Contributions in Dilemma Games**

Gary Bolton (Pennsylvania State University)

Jordi Brandts (Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), Barcelona)

Elena Katok (Pennsylvania State University)

**Wishful Thinking and Strategic Ignorance**

Juan Carillo (ECARE, Université Libre de Bruxelles)

Thomas Mariotti (Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse)

**Wednesday 2 July Half-Day Workshop on 'Matching'**

Workshop leader: Alvin Roth (University of Pittsburgh)

8.30 - 12.00: **Introduction to Two-Sided Matching Markets and Models**  
Alvin Roth (University of Pittsburgh)

**The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by a Natural Experiment**  
John Kagel (University of Pittsburgh)

**Unravelling and Capacity Withholding in Two-sided Matching Markets**  
Tayfun Sonmez (University of Michigan)

**Some Engineering Aspects of Mechanism Design: The Redesign of the American Clearinghouse for New Physicians**  
Alvin Roth (University of Pittsburgh)

**Thursday 3 July**

8.30 - 09.45 **The Generalized War of Attrition**

Jeremy Bulow (Stanford University)  
Paul Klemperer (Nuffield College, Oxford, and CEPR)

20.30 - 21.30 **Strategic Complementarity, Bounded Rationality and the Non-Neutrality of Money**

Ernst Fehr (Universität Zürich)  
Jean-Robert Tyran (Universität Zürich)

**Repeated Games and Limited Forecasting**

Philippe Jéhier (Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chausées, CERAS, Paris and CEPR)

**Friday 4 July**

8.30 - 09.45 **ERC. A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition**

Gary Bolton (Pennsylvania State University)  
Axel Ockenfels (Universität Magdeburg)

20.30 - 21.30 **Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies**

Winand Emons (Universität Bern and CEPR)

**On the Effects of the Pricing Rule in Auction and Fair Division Games - An Experimental Study**  
Werner Güth (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)

**Monday 7 July**

8.30 - 09.45 **Reputation or Reciprocity?**

Armin Falk (Universität Zürich)  
Simon Gächter (Universität Zürich)  
Judith Kovacs (University of Debrecen, Hungary)

20.30 - 21.30        **Post-Trade Transparency in Multiple Dealer Financial Markets**  
Mark D Flood (Concordia University, Montreal)  
Ronald Huisman (Universiteit van Limburg, Maastricht)  
Kees Koedijk (Universiteit van Limburg, Maastricht)  
Ronald J Mahieu (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)  
Ailsa A Röell (ECARE, Université Libre de Bruxelles, and CEPR)

**Evolving Social Hierarchies in Large Population Games**  
Fernando Vega-Redondo (Universidad de Alicante)

**Tuesday 8 July        Half-Day Workshop on ‘The Psychology of Preference’**

Workshop leaders: Colin Camerer (California Institute of Technology)  
George Loewenstein (Carnegie Mellon University)  
Richard Thaler (University of Chicago)

8.30 - 12.00        **The Psychology of Preference: Mental Accounting**  
George Loewenstein (Carnegie Mellon University)

**Behavioral Finance**  
Richard Thaler (University of Chicago)

**Wednesday 9 July**

8.30 - 09.40        **Rational Social Learning with Random Sampling**  
Lones Smith (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)  
Peter Sørensen (Nuffield College, Oxford)

20.30 - 21.30        **How to Account for Fair and Unfair Outcomes - A Model of Biased Inequality Aversion**  
Ernst Fehr (Universität Zürich)  
Klaus Schmidt (Universität München and CEPR)

**Hyperbolic Discount Functions and Time Preference Heterogeneity**  
David Laibson (Harvard University)

**Thursday 10 July        Half-Day Workshop on ‘Intertemporal Choice and Behavioral Game Theory’**

Workshop leaders: Colin Camerer (California Institute of Technology)  
George Loewenstein (Carnegie Mellon University)  
Richard Thaler (University of Chicago)

8.30 - 12.00            **Intertemporal Choice, Emotion and the Brain**  
George Loewenstein (Carnegie Mellon University)

**Behavioral Game Theory**  
Colin Camerer (California Institute of Technology)

**Friday 11 July**

8.30 - 09.45            **Home Bias in International Stock Return Expectations**  
Michael Kilka (Universität Mannheim)  
Martin Weber (Universität Mannheim)

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