

# A European Climate Bond

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# Climate transition is urgent but very costly

- Climate transition is **urgent**: postponing after 2030 would lead to over 12% real GDP loss by 2050 in the euro area compared to a timely carbon tax introduction
- But it is **very costly**: global funding needs in the range of \$ 4.5tn to 5tn per year (Climate Policy Initiative, 2021) for:
  - climate **mitigation**: decarbonization. E.g., switch to renewable energy and to electric cars, extend the electric grid, etc.
  - climate **adaptation**: increase disaster resilience. E.g., coastline defense against sea-level rise, water management to prevent floods, etc.
- **This paper**: for Europe this challenge is also an **opportunity**, if faced
  - via joint issuance of **EU climate bonds**
  - to be funded by **EU carbon fiscal capacity**

# Outline

- 1 EU climate investment gap
- 2 Why design and fund climate policies at the EU level?
- 3 Joint issuance of a EU Climate Bond?
- 4 Conclusions

## EU climate investment gap

# EU climate investment needs

investment needs = mitigation expenses + adaptation expenses

- **Mitigation expenses:**

- €58.4 bn/year to be invested in Europe's electric grid
- €336 bn/year for energy system investments (excluding transport)

- **Adaptation expenses:**

- €158-518 bn/year wide range because no precise estimates of adaptation investment needs by country and sector (EC 2017)

⇒ **Overall investment needs** range between €550bn/y and €912bn/y

- The **official EU estimate** is in the middle of this range: EU-27 must invest over €700 bn/year to achieve Net Zero emissions by 2050 (Green deal target). Source: EC 2023 Strategic Foresight Report

## Gap between investments needs and budgeted expenses

- EU budget 2021-2027 + NextGenEU: EU Commission long-term budget of €2 tn at current prices (30% of EU budget) → about €330 bn/year for mitigation, adaptation and cost of natural disasters
- Climate investment gap as of 2023:

$$\text{gap} = \underbrace{\text{needs}}_{\text{€700bn/y}} - \underbrace{\text{budgeted}}_{\text{€330bn/y}} = \text{€370bn/y}$$

- Caution:
  - based on €912bn/y upper bound of needs, gap rises to €582bn/y
  - calculation may omit relevant mitigation and adaptation expenses
- Gap may be partly covered by national member state budgets
- But in 2019 EU governments only spent €90bn on climate investment (OECD, 2022): less than 1/4 of the shortfall!

Why design and fund climate policies at the EU level?

# Why designing climate policies at the EU level?

- National standards would lead to **inefficient climate policy targets**:
  - each country has no incentive to account for cross-border externalities → insufficient spending on mitigation
  - less regulated countries attract carbon-intensive activities → regulatory arbitrage saps climate policies' impact (“carbon leakage”: Benincasa et al., 2022; Laeven and Popov, 2022)
- Supra-national monitoring of climate investments **limits capture** of national authorities by national pressure groups: parallel with prudential bank supervision (SSM vs. national central banks)
- Hence, EU-level cooperation is efficient to **design** an efficient EU climate investment program and **monitor** its implementation



## Why funding climate policies at the EU level?


- Fiscal capacity of some EU member states (MS) is insufficient (also considering that the EU fiscal compact will be reinstated in 2024)  
⇒ MS with lower fiscal capacity will **underinvest**
- Outcome is **inefficient for the whole EU** because of:
  - climate spillovers: cross-border impact of emissions
  - economic spillovers: insufficient adaptation investments → lower growth in underinvesting country → lower imports from the rest of EU, potential sovereign crisis

⇒ efficiency requires **joint EU-level funding**

- Growing consensus: *“Europe must now confront a host of supranational challenges [...] however, Europe neither has a federal strategy to finance them, nor can national policies take up the mantle [...] Without action, there is a serious risk that Europe underdelivers on its climate goals”* (Draghi, 2023)

## Joint issuance of a EU Climate Bond?

# Status quo in the EU: carbon taxes and ETS price



# EU Climate Bond: our proposal

- 1 The EU strengthens its current carbon pricing framework by
  - extending the ETS to all sectors (in line with planned ETS 2)
  - managing the supply of carbon allowances so as to target a science-based carbon price path
- 2 The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) issues EU climate bonds:
  - (i) interest and capital to be serviced by ETS sales revenue; (ii) guarantee provided by unused ESM resources (90% of total)
- The cost of servicing the climate Eurobond would benefit from
  - the “green” nature of the bond appealing to ESG institutional investors
  - the “sovereign” nature of the bond → favorable treatment by prudential regulation of banks’ and insurance companies’ exposures
  - the ESM’s AAA rating keeping the bond risk profile low

# Next Gen EU Bond vs. EU Climate Bond

## Next Generation EU bond

- fixed issuance → no rollover
- low volume → low liquidity
- backed by MS → quasi-sovereign asset → not fully safe asset
- funding various programs → no “greenium”
- placed mainly via syndication → high issuance cost

## EU climate bond


- regular issuance → debt rollover
- high volume → high liquidity
- backed by ETS sales revenues → sovereign asset → safe asset
- only funding climate policy → “greenium”
- placed via auction → low issuance cost

Next Gen EU details



## How many climate bonds could the EU issue?

- EU climate bond issuance is determined by the fiscal capacity generated by sales of ETS allowances at the targeted carbon price
- Hence, at each future date:  $\text{revenue} = \text{carbon price} \times \text{emissions}$
- Carbon prices and GHG emissions are based on projections from Integrated Assessment Models (IAM) for 4 NGFS scenarios:
  - **Below 2°C** (Orderly). Gradually increases the stringency of climate policies, giving a 67% chance of limiting global warming to below 2°C.
  - **Current Policies** (Hot house world). Only currently implemented policies are kept, leading to high physical risks: 2.9°C end of century.
  - **Fragmented World** (Too little, too late). Delayed and divergent climate policy responses among countries globally, leading to high physical and transition risks: 2.3°C end of century.
  - **Delayed Transition** (Disorderly). Annual emissions do not decrease until 2030. Strong policies are needed to stay below 2°C end of century.

# REMIND-MAgPIE framework




# NGFS carbon price and emissions projections (REMIND)





# Revenues from EU carbon pricing

Estimated revenues = carbon price  $\times$  CO<sub>2</sub>e GHG emissions




## Assessing EU carbon fiscal capacity: five steps

- 1 NGFS provides carbon prices in US\$2010/ton Kyoto GHG emissions in Megatons (Mt) CO<sub>2</sub>eq, every 5 or 10 years, from 2020 to 2100
- 2 Turn emissions from Megatons to tons (1 Mt = 1mln t)
- 3 Convert revenues in US\$2023 using the US GDP deflator, and interpolate to obtain yearly observations
- 4 Compute the present discounted value (PDV) of constant-dollar revenues over the 2024-2100 horizon for each NGFS scenario using the US TIPS rates from FED as discount rates:

$$PDV = \sum_{j=0}^{76} \frac{revenue_{2024+t}}{(1 + r_t)^t}$$

- 5 Convert the PDV into euros using the 2024 exchange rate \$1/€0.9167

# EU carbon fiscal capacity




Recall: €2tn is the EC's long-term budget (6y) for climate actions and €2.22tn is the corresponding 6y climate investment gap

# Financial benefits of EU climate bond issuance

- ① **Cost-efficient** way to fund EU climate policies:
  - **safe**: backed by ETS allowances' sales → no need for transfers by MS
  - **green**: revenue earmarked for EU climate policies
  - **liquid**: regular issuance, large supply
- ② Safe asset: backbone of an **integrated EU capital market** (CMU)
- ③ Financial resources to counter **competition from US and China** attracting investments for low-carbon transition (e.g., IRA)
- ④ Key policy **instrument** for **monetary policy** conduct in the euro area
  - Market neutrality in open market operations and collateral policy
  - Way to green the ECB monetary policy: supports the objective of decarbonization without jeopardizing price stability objective
- ⑤ May avoid **inefficient equilibria** with low climate investments, frequent natural disasters and bad macro performance...

# Real and financial climate feedback loops



# Conclusions

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# Conclusions

- Climate action is urgently needed: the earlier the action, the lower the social costs
- But addressing and mitigating climate change requires huge commitment of resources
- Even in the EU the resources needed vastly exceed those currently budgeted
- This paper: a uniform carbon pricing scheme on greenhouse gas emissions in the EU would create a sizeable EU-level fiscal capacity
- Issuing a EU climate bond that draws on this additional fiscal capacity would go a long way towards filling the climate investment gap...
- ... and would have the additional benefit of creating a EU-wide safe asset, with regular and sizeable issues, high liquidity and low yields!

# Appendix



## Next Generation EU: any lessons to be learnt?


- MS empowered the EU Commission to borrow up to €750bn by 2026
- Bonds to be issued at maturities ranging from 3 to 30 years
- Pre-agreed issuance volume, placed via bank-syndicated transactions
- No debt roll over: the EU to repay debt starting from 2028 up to 2058
- MS agreed to increase the EU's debt guarantees by adding 0.6%
- MS might introduce new own EU resources in the future

back


# Next Generation EU bonds: borrowing costs

- EU bond yields exceed German ones by about 80bp
- They were lower than French ones in 2021 & are now higher than 20bp

Panel A: 10-year benchmark yields (in %)





Panel B: yield curves in January 2022-April 2023 (in %)



Source: Bruegel based on Bloomberg. Notes: dashed lines represent data as of 3 January 2022 while unbroken lines represent data as of 11 April 2023. For January 2022, the EU yield curve was incomplete so the values for the 1- and 3-year maturity yields are extrapolated.

# Next Generation EU bonds: market liquidity

- Bid-ask spread for EU bonds exceeds that for France and Germany



Source: Bruegel based on Bloomberg. Notes: Panel A: Monthly average of bid-ask spreads for 10-year bonds for selected issuers in basis points. Panel B: Monthly average of daily volume of security trades by issuer in € billions.