


# Resolve Falters As Global Prospects Worsen: The 9th GTA Report



Edited by Simon J. Evenett



GLOBAL  
TRADE  
ALERT

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# **Resolve Falters As Global Prospects Worsen: The 9th GTA Report**

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## Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Centre for Economic Policy Research  
77 Bastwick Street  
London  
EC1V 3PZ  
UK

Tel: +44 (0) 20 7183 8801  
Fax: +44 (0)20 7183 8820  
Email: [cepr@cepr.org](mailto:cepr@cepr.org)  
Web: [www.cepr.org](http://www.cepr.org)

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Global Trade Alert provides information in real time on state measures taken during the current global economic downturn that are likely to discriminate against foreign commerce. Global Trade Alert is:

**Independent:** GTA is co-ordinated by the Centre for Economic Policy Research, an independent academic and policy research think-tank based in London, UK. GTA draws upon expertise and analysis from 7 independent research institutions around the world.

**Comprehensive:** GTA complements and goes beyond the WTO and World Bank's monitoring initiatives by identifying those trading partners likely to be harmed by state measures.

**Accessible:** The GTA website allows policy-makers, exporters, the media, and analysts to search the posted government measures by implementing country, by trading partners harmed, and by sector. Third parties will be able to report suspicious state measures and governments will be given the right to reply to any of their measures listed on the website.

**Transparent:** The GTA website allows policymakers, government officials, exporters, the media, and analysts to report discriminatory measures, but also will provide data for all stakeholders on the posted government measures by implementing country, by trading partners harmed, and by sector.

**Timely:** The up-to-date information and informed commentary provided by Global Trade Alert will help ensure that the G20 pledge not to "repeat the historic mistakes of protectionism of previous eras" is met, by maintaining confidence in the world trading system, deterring beggar-thy-neighbour acts, and preserving the contribution that exports could play in the future recovery of the world economy.

For further information, visit [www.GlobalTradeAlert.org](http://www.GlobalTradeAlert.org)

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# 1 Executive Summary: The weakened resolve against protectionism since the Seoul G20 Summit

**Simon J. Evenett**

*University of St. Gallen and CEPR*

## **Unexpected adverse macroeconomics in 2011 combined with election cycles has probably weakened the resolve against protectionism**

In 2011 the world economy has been buffeted by a number of developments that were not foreseen at the time of the Seoul G20 Summit. Growing evidence of a stalled US economic recovery – coupled with the consequences of the Japanese earthquake in early 2011 and stubbornly high inflation rates in emerging markets that have led their governments to slow down growth – have resulted in many forecasters lowering their expectations about global economic growth this year.

These unanticipated, adverse macroeconomic developments now coincide with election cycles and political leadership transition cycles in a number of jurisdictions, increasing the risk that some political leaders will court short-term popularity by resorting to protectionist measures. Moreover, now that many governments are cutting their budgets and that interest rates cannot fall much further in many countries, restricting foreign competition is one of the few tools available to policymakers when responding to pleas from domestic firms and trade unions. The sooner global economic growth recovers its previous pace the better – one welcome side effect would be to take the some wind out of protectionist sails.

Plenty of evidence is presented in this report to show that the pick-up in protectionism since the Seoul G20 summit coincides with the deterioration in economic sentiment. Moreover, the information that has come to light since November 2010 calls into question the more rosy assessments of protectionist dynamics in 2010. It now seems that the only third quarter of 2010 saw a dip in the resort to protectionism, otherwise the 2010 data are on track to be as bad as the latter half of 2009 in terms of closing borders to trade. The optimism of many observers about falling protectionism in 2010, which we shared, now seems misplaced.

The message to policymakers is clear. Policymakers – in particular from the larger G20 countries – must renew their vigilance against protectionism. Otherwise a



“people in glass houses” dynamic will reassert itself, whereby governments won’t criticise others that close borders to trade precisely because they know their own protectionist acts will come under scrutiny. The global trading system does not need another bout of the collective non-compliance that it suffered during 2009.

## **Protectionism uncovered since the Seoul G20 Summit**

Since the last GTA report in November 2010, the GTA team has evaluated a substantial amount of information on government measures that might affect foreign commercial interests. A total of 463 new entries were added to the GTA’s online database (accessible and downloadable at [www.globaltradealert.org](http://www.globaltradealert.org)), bringing the total number of measures in the database to 1802. Some of this information refers to government measures implemented or announced after the Seoul summit, some to before that summit. As argued below, the latter information is sufficient to call into question our prior, relatively positive interpretation of protectionist dynamics in 2010.

Since November 2010 194 protectionist measures have been implemented.<sup>1</sup> G20 governments were responsible for 80% – 155 – of the protectionist measures taken since the Seoul summit. Moreover, the four BRICs countries are responsible for implementing a third of protection worldwide. A small number of governments bear a large share of the responsibility for restricting international commerce. The number of market-opening measures implemented since the Seoul summit (88) is less than half the number of market-closing ones. Some of the most prominent recent commerce-distorting measures are described in Box 1.

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<sup>1</sup> For these purposes a measure in the GTA database that is both implemented and categorised amber or red is considered protectionist.

**Box 1.1** Selected Trade-Distorting Measures with Systemic Impact implemented since the Seoul G20 ministerial meeting.

1. Rather than allow the importation of food through any seaport, Indonesia has restricted such imports to a selected number of seaports. This measure will last for all of 2011 and 2012.<sup>1</sup>
2. Indonesia has imposed non-automatic licensing requirements on the imports of electronic goods and household appliances, footwear, and food and beverages, effective 1 January 2011.<sup>2</sup>
3. In an obscure constitutional change, permitted under the latest EU treaty change, from 1 March 2011 the European Commission has changed its rules on the administration of anti-dumping and countervailing rules to make their application even easier.<sup>3</sup>
4. On the first quarter of 2011, in a series of announcements, the Chinese government has introduced a “national security” review system of mergers and acquisitions of local companies by foreign counterparts.<sup>4</sup>
5. In May 2011 the Korea Eximbank revealed a plan to promote 50 Korean firms that export green products. This plan involves offering 40 trillion won (37 billion US dollar) of financial support through 2015.<sup>5</sup>
6. The European Commission has announced in May 2011 that, as of 1 January 2014, it will withdraw its system of preferential tariffs for less poor developing countries. For those products for which the EU does not have zero tariffs bound in their WTO tariff schedules this may involve an increase in the tariffs faced by the soon-to-be-excluded trading partners.<sup>6</sup>

1 For more details see the GTA database entry at <http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/indonesia-determination-list-entry-point-selected-seaports-certain-food-products>

2 For more details see the GTA database entry at <http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/indonesia-list-products-subject-non-automatic-import-licensing>

3 For more details see the GTA database entry at <http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/ec-implementing-regulations-trade-defence-measures>

4 For more details see the GTA database entry at <http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/china-national-security-review-system-ma-local-companies-foreign-investors-temporary-measure>

5 For more details see the GTA database entry at <http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/republic-korea-trade-finance-measures-promote-exports-green-products>

6 For more details see the GTA database entry at <http://www.globaltradealert.org/measure/eu-revisions-gsp-regime>

So far the GTA team has found evidence of 84 protectionist measures in the first quarter of 2011, comparable to the 85 such measures found in the last quarter of 2010. Fifty protectionist measures were implemented in Q2 2011. If prior GTA experience is anything to go by, the quarterly rates of protectionism for Q4 2010-Q2 2011 will be revised upward substantially and could easily breach the 100-125 range last observed when protectionism worried policymakers in 2009. Put bluntly, those policymakers that were worried in 2009 ought to be worried now – recent protectionism is on same trajectory as that witnessed in 2009. The resolve

against protectionism appears to have weakened just at the time when global economic prospects have worsened.

The commercial interests of several nations have been particularly hit by foreign protectionism since November 2010. Chinese commercial interests have been harmed 91 times; that is, every other protectionist measure implemented since the Seoul G20 summit harms Chinese interests. Taken together, the BRICs' commercial interests were harmed 116 times. Germany, with its large export sector, saw its interests harmed 54 times. American commercial interests were harmed 61 times as well, implying that 30% of measures implemented since the Seoul G20 summit harm an American exporter, investor, migrant worker, or owner of intellectual property rights.


The world trading system is now almost certainly less open than it was at the time of the last G20 summit in Seoul. Yet, protectionism continues to slide down the work programme of the G20 countries in the run up to their next summit in Cannes, France, in November 2011.

## **A revised perspective on protectionism since 2009**

Important features of protectionism have changed since the global economic crisis began. Arguably, some of the available evidence is weaker than others (for more evidence see Chapter 3). The claim, for example, that the number of protectionist measures is now falling calendar year by calendar year could very plausibly be a function of reporting lags leading to lower totals being observed in more recent calendar years.

For example, by some measures of media reporting, fears that protectionism might pose a systemic threat to the open world trading system were at their peak in the first quarter of 2009. Such are the difficulties in assembling the relevant information that the Global Trade Alert team's current estimate of the resort to protectionism in that quarter is now double the team's best estimate in the third quarter of 2009 (see Figure 1.1 which plots the number of documented protectionist measures against the dates of publication of the second through ninth GTA reports).


**Figure 1.1** The number of protectionist measures implemented in Q1 2009 documented by the GTA team is now double the original estimate, presented in our second report.



As the sequence of Global Trade Alert reports have shown, estimates of the number of protectionist measures imposed in 2009 and 2010 have had to be revised upwards repeatedly and, quite often, markedly. Instant assessments based solely on the most recently available data on policy stance are almost certain to understate the scale of protectionism – and policymaking processes need to take this understatement into account.

The fact that so much information about protectionist state measures does not become public immediately upon the implementation of those measures implies that sustained information collection on policy stances is needed. Furthermore, reports on protectionism and associated trade policy developments should present updates of earlier estimates of the use of discriminatory policy interventions, much in the same way that government statisticians regularly revise employment, output, and inflation data.

After the recent update of the GTA database was completed, new quarterly totals of the number of protectionist measures implemented were calculated. These totals were plotted against those found in the last GTA report, published in November 2010. Figure 1.2 shows a pronounced upward revision in the amount of protectionism in 2010. Only Q3 2010 saw a pronounced fall in protectionism, implying that much commentary – including our last report – put too much weight on this quarter's good news. Once economic conditions in late 2010 were not as rosy as expected in the middle of that year, governments returned to imposing protectionist measures at the rate seen in the first quarter of 2010.

**Figure 1.2** Protectionism dipped in Q3 2010 and then recovered

Note: In Figure 1.2, a harmful measure is taken to be one which has been implemented since November 2008 and is almost certainly discriminatory (coded red) or likely to be discriminatory (coded amber).

A cautious interpretation of the quarterly totals reported here is that the global trading system is not out of the (protectionist) wood. Indeed, one might want to see more existing protectionist measures being revoked as well as fewer new protectionist measures being imposed before being more confident that the stock of outstanding protectionist measures is falling. A fall in the rate at which governments are closing borders to commerce is a lot less to celebrate than a fall in the total number of outstanding measures that impede global commerce.

The last update has also altered the ranking of countries according to which has inflicted the most harm on its trading partners. In terms of the number of almost certainly discriminatory measures implemented, the UK moves up from 7th position to 4th position. Also, France and China join the top 10 offenders on this criterion. In terms of tariff lines (products affected) taken together the EU27 states has imposed measures on 549 tariff lines (out of a total of 1214), up from 467 in November 2010. Likewise, Argentina's protectionist measures now affect 413 product categories, a third of the total, up from 396 product groups. China now enters the top 10 nations in terms of sectors affected by protectionism. In terms of trading partners harmed, the EU27 swaps its second place spot in November 2010 for Argentina's top slot.

**Table 1.1** Which countries have inflicted the most harm? Certain emerging markets and European nations

Metric, Country in specified rank, Number				
Rank	Ranked by number of (almost certainly) discriminatory measures imposed	Ranked by the number of tariff lines (product categories) affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures	Ranked by the number of sectors affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures	Ranked by the number of trading partners affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures
1	EU27 (227)	Vietnam (927)	Algeria (62)	EU27 (180)
2	Russian Federation (105)	Venezuela (785)	EU27 (58)	Argentina (175)
3	Argentina (88)	Kazakhstan (729)	Nigeria (45)	China (172)
4	UK (53)	Nigeria (599)	Kazakhstan (43)	Germany (161)
5	Germany (52)	EU27 (549)	Germany (42)	UK (154)
6	India (50)	Algeria (476)		United States of America (42)
7	Brazil (44)	Russian Federation (438)	China (41)	Finland (153)
8	France (44)		Argentina (413)	Indonesia (40)
9	China (42)	Indonesia (387)	Russian Federation (39)	Indonesia (151)
10	Italy (42)	India (369)	Venezuela (38)	France (149)

Note: There is no single metric to evaluate harm. Different policy measures affect different numbers of products, economic sectors, and trading partners. GTA reports four measures of harm.


## **Organisation of the rest of the report**

The remainder of this report is divided into two parts. Next come discussions of recent developments in protectionism (Chapter 2), assessing protectionist dynamics over the two-and-a-half years since 2009 (Chapter 3), the indicators of harm used by the Global Trade Alert team (Chapter 4), and Chinese policies towards its rare earth sector (Chapter 5). Later a report on the measures taken by each G20 country is presented, along with data on the harm done by other nations to the commercial interests of each G20 country.

*Simon J. Evenett is Professor of International Trade and Economic Development, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland; Co-Director of the International Trade and Regional Economics Programme, CEPR; and Coordinator of Global Trade Alert.*


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**Map 1.1** Number of discriminatory measures implemented since the first G20 crisis related summit, ignoring measures in the pipeline







**Map 1.2** Number of trading partners harmed by each jurisdiction's discriminatory measures




Map 1.3 Number of (4 digit) tariff lines harmed by each jurisdiction's discriminatory measures




Map 1.4 Number of sectors harmed by each jurisdiction's discriminatory measures




Map 1.5 Number of trading partners affecting a jurisdiction's commercial interests




**Map 1.6** Number of times a jurisdiction's commercial interests are harmed by trading partners



Map 1.7 Number of harmful measures implemented by G20 countries affecting each jurisdiction



**Map 1.8** Number of pending discriminatory measures likely to harm a jurisdiction



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# SECTION 1





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## 2 Developments since the Seoul G20 Summit in November 2010

**Simon J. Evenett**

*University of St Gallen and CEPR*

The second half of 2010 saw a marked improvement in sentiment, as prospects for a faster global economic recovery appeared to brighten. In our last GTA report published in November 2010, protectionist pressures seemed contained, despite the implementation of the US monetary policy Quantitative Easing II leading some senior policymakers to warn of a risks of a “currency war”.. Since then a number of unanticipated negative factors (the Japanese earthquake, but perhaps more importantly for the world economy the low employment growth in the United States and the rising interest rates in leading emerging markets to combat higher rates of inflation) have led to downward revisions in expected rates of economic growth and, inevitably, some degree of pessimism.

This deteriorating macroeconomic backdrop may well have conditioned the resort to protectionism by governments around the world. This chapter will report data that suggest that the downturn in protectionism was probably confined to Q3 2010 and not a trend deceleration throughout 2010. Worse, the recorded levels of protectionism in Q4 2010 and Q1 2011, that will inevitably be revised upwards in future reports as more information becomes available about government policies, could lift rates of protectionism in those quarters back to the quarterly rates seen in 2009.

The amount of information found by the GTA team since the Seoul G20 summit was extensive. The GTA database increased in size from 1339 measures to 1802 measures. Plenty of information about policy changes in 2010 was found, along with developments since the Seoul summit. As indicated above, taken together this information calls for a revision in the assessment of protectionist dynamics in 2010 and for concerns about the resort to protectionism in 2011 as global economic prospects worsen. Still, the news is not all bad, as the number of neutral or liberalising state measures increased markedly as well.

## **Protectionism outpaces liberalisation but the frequency of both increase**

1. Since the first G20 crisis-related summit in November 2008, the governments of the world have together implemented 932 beggar-thy-neighbour policy measures. Add in another 123 implemented measures that are likely to have harmed some foreign commercial interests, the total reaches 1055; that is, more than one for every day since the first G20 summit in November 2008. **See Tables 2.1 and 2.2.**
2. Since our last report was published in November 2010, the number of beggar-thy-neighbour measures reported (240) exceeds the number of benign or liberalising measures reported (151). **See Table 2.1.**
3. Although there are a lot of anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard measures in the pipeline, they still account for only 204 of the 932 harmful measures implemented since November 2008. The large numbers of discriminatory measures reported in the Global Trade Alert database are still not driven by so-called unfair trade actions. **See Table 2.1.**
4. No four-digit product line has emerged unscathed by crisis-era protectionism. This finding does not imply that every government has taken discriminatory measures that affect each product line. **See Table 2.2.**
5. Despite taking their no-protectionism pledge the G20 members have imposed 602 beggar-thy-neighbour policies since November 2008. Since our last report was published at the time of the Seoul G20 summit (in November 2010), 171 more discriminatory measures implemented by G20 countries have been discovered. **See Table 2.3 and Figure 2.1.**
6. The G20 countries also implemented 228 of the 359 benign or liberalising measures recorded in the GTA database. To their credit, over half of the benign or liberalising measures discovered since the last GTA report was published have been implemented by G20 countries. **See Table 2.3.**
7. Typically, since the first G20 summit in November 2008, every five days three G20 governments break the no-protectionism pledge. In contrast a benign or liberalising measure is implemented by a G20 government on average every 4 days. **See Table 2.3.**

## **The resort to protectionism in the second half of 2010 was much higher than thought – and started high this year too**

8. The additional information available since the Seoul G20 summit has led to a substantial upward revision in the number of protectionist measures taken in the third and fourth quarter of 2010. The downturn in protectionism in 2010 may well be confined to Q3 2010, when positive sentiment was probably at its peak. **See Figure 2.2.**
9. The reported levels of protectionism in Q4 2010 and Q1 2011 have already reached the levels seen in Q2 2011 and, with future revisions, could well return to the range seen during much of 2009 through to Q1 2010. That range saw 100-125 protectionist measures implemented per quarter. **See Figure 2.2.**

## **More protectionism is in the pipeline**

10. By July 2011 there were 318 potentially protectionist measures in the pipeline, 129 of which were ongoing trade defence investigations.<sup>1</sup> This represents an increase of 69 measures in the pipeline documented since the Seoul G20 summit. **See Tables 2.1 and 2.2.**

## **China remains the most frequent target of crisis-era protectionism, but other nations are hit often too**

11. Since November 2008 China's commercial interests have been hit 439 times by protectionist measures. Only if the 27 members of the European Union are counted together does any other jurisdiction come close to absorbing comparable harm (the EU27 group being hit 424 times). **See Table 2.4.**
12. Other than China, the top 10 targets jurisdictions hit by the most number of harmful foreign measures are all industrialised countries. **See Table 2.4.**
13. Eighty-one trading partners have imposed measures harmful to Chinese commercial interests. Taken together, eighty-seven jurisdictions have imposed measures harmful to the commercial interests of the EU 27 (although this number includes cases where one EU member state has harmed another EU member state). **See Table 2.4.**

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<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of this report (and the last one) the protectionist pipeline is said to include all those state measures that (i) have been publicly announced, (ii) that have yet to be implemented and (iii) upon examination are likely to harm foreign commercial interests. Such measures are classified amber in the GTA database until implemented, whereupon their classification may change (depending on the details about the potential discriminatory impact available at the time of implementation.)

14. In addition, 148 of the measures in the pipeline are likely to harm Chinese commercial interests, should those measures be implemented. No other jurisdiction comes close in terms of pending threats to its commercial interests. **See Table 2.4 and the GTA website.**

### **Which nations have inflicted the most harm?**

Since protectionist acts can affect different numbers of products, sectors, and trading partners, there is no single metric to identify the worst offending nations. The GTA reports four indicators of harm.<sup>2</sup> Compared to the last report, there have been few notable changes in the rankings.

15. Taken together the EU 27 retains the dubious distinction of being the only jurisdiction to be in the top-5 worst offenders on all four metrics. **See Table 2.5.**
16. On three of the four metrics, the Argentina, China, Germany, India, Indonesia, and Russian Federation are in the top 10 worst offending nations. **See Table 2.5.**
17. With its deliberate competitive devaluations Viet Nam has the dubious honour of discriminating against foreign commercial interests in the most product categories (tariff lines). Algeria takes the prize for measures that harm foreign commercial interests in the largest number of economic sectors; the EU27 for harming the most trading partners (174). **See Table 2.5.**
18. When nations are ranked by the number of trading partners their state measures have harmed, every one of the top-10 worst offenders has hurt the commercial interests of over 149 nations. Given the conservative methodology used to identify the harmed jurisdictions,<sup>3</sup> this finding indicates the scale of the adverse impact of many governments' crisis-era state measures. **See Table 2.5.**

### **As far as the range of the products affected is concerned, contemporary protectionism still falls short of its 1930's predecessor**

19. In the 1930s the across-the-board tariff increases are reported to have covered trade in almost all product categories (tariff lines). Taking the EU 27 countries as a single jurisdiction, there are now ten jurisdictions that have taken discriminatory measures against foreign commercial interests

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<sup>2</sup> See chapter 4 of this report for a discussion of how similar the rankings of jurisdictions created by these four indicators are.

<sup>3</sup> In short, identification is on the basis of an existing non-trivial trade, investment, or other commercial flow, not indicators of potential harm.

in more than a quarter of all the possible product categories. Emerging markets are well represented in those jurisdictions. **See Table 2.5.**

### **Which types of beggar-thy-neighbour policies are used the most?**

20. Since the first G20 crisis-summit, bailouts and state aids are the most frequent source of discrimination against other nations' commercial interests. Twenty-eight percent of all discriminatory measures were bailouts. By now 193 of the discriminatory state aid/bail out measures in the Global Trade Alert database are in sectors other than the financial sector. It is a mistake to associate the discriminatory bailouts of the recent past only to banks and insurance companies and to the preservation of financial stability.<sup>4</sup> **See Table 2.6 and Figure 2.3.**
21. The implementation of discriminatory trade defence instruments are the second most common form of protectionism. Investigations associated with trade defence account for the largest number of measures in the pipeline. **See Table 2.6. and Figure 2.4.**
22. Since our last report was published in November 2010, tariff and trade defence measures account for the overwhelming majority of new discriminatory state measures that the GTA has uncovered. Still, information on 53 new discriminatory bailouts was incorporated since the last GTA report. **See Table 2.6.**
23. While analysts may have developed data sources and tools to study the impact of tariff changes and trade defence measures, it is worth bearing in mind that since November 2008 these measures together account just 35% of all harmful discriminatory measures implemented by governments. **See Table 2.6. and Figure 2.3.**
24. Export taxes or restrictions, bailouts, export subsidies, and tariff increases imposed since November 2008 are each conservatively estimated to have harmed over 150 countries' commercial interests. **See Table 2.6.**
25. The last two remarks speak to the considerable diversity in contemporary protectionism, perhaps in contrast to the tariff-dominated accounts of 1930s protectionism. GTA reports have documented this diversity from the beginning, such diversity is not a recent phenomenon. **See Table 2.6 and previous GTA reports.**

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<sup>4</sup> This latter finding can be confirmed by going on to the "Advanced Search" page of the GTA website and searching for the bailout measures that do not affect sector 81, namely, financial intermediation services and auxiliary services thereof.

### **Which sectors are most affected by protectionism?**

26. The financial sector no longer stands out as an unusual recipient of state favours (discrimination). Firms in the basic agricultural products, basic chemicals, basic metals, and transport equipment have seen 85 or more discriminatory measures imposed since November 2008. **See Table 2.7.**
  
27. Looking ahead, basic chemicals could be affected by over 75 pending measures. As of July 2011, no other sector comes close in terms of facing future likely protectionism. **See Table 2.7.**

**Table 2.1** Total number of state measures reported in the GTA database

Statistic	This report (July 2011)		Increase from previous G20 meeting (November 2010)	
	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations
Total number of measures in GTA database	1802	1321	463	356
Total number of measures coded green	429	351	151	115
Total number of measures coded amber	441	242	72	57
Total number of measures coded red	932	728	240	184

How does the GTA colour code measures?

Color code	Criteria
Red	(i) The measure has been implemented and almost certainly discriminates against foreign commercial interests.
Amber	(i) The measure has been implemented and may involve discrimination against foreign commercial interests; OR (ii) The measure has been announced or is under consideration and would (if implemented) almost certainly involve discrimination against foreign commercial interests
Green	(i) The measure has been announced and involves liberalization on a non-discriminatory (i.e., most favored nation) basis; OR (ii) The measure has been implemented and is found (upon investigation) not to be discriminatory; OR (iii) The measure has been implemented, involves no further discrimination, and improves the transparency of a jurisdiction's trade-related policies.




**Table 2.2** Measures implemented since the first crisis-related G20 summit in November 2008, totals for all jurisdictions and change since last pre-summit report in November 2010

Statistic	This report (July 2011)		Increase from previous G20 meeting (November 2010)	
	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations
Total number of measures in GTA database	1414	1163	367	340
Total number of measures coded green	359	312	124	111
Total number of measures coded amber	123	123	3	45
Total number of measures coded red	932	728	240	184
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	1214	1214	0	0
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	71	71	-1	-1
Total number of trading partners affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	219	219	2	2


**Table 2.3** Measures implemented by G20 countries since the first crisis-related G20 summit in November 2008, totals for all G20 jurisdictions and change since last pre-summit report in November 2010

Statistic	This report (July 2011)		Increase from previous G20 meeting (November 2010)	
	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations	Total	Total except unfair trade and safeguards investigations
Total number of measures in GTA database	905	690	255	231
Total number of measures coded green	228	194	89	80
Total number of measures coded amber	75	75	-5	31
Total number of measures coded red	602	421	171	120
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	1049	1044	19	18
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	69	69	6	6
Total number of trading partners affected by almost certainly discriminatory measures	210	210	1	2

**Figure 2.1** The G20 members implement a higher share of beggar-thy-neighbour policies than other countries



**Figure 2.2** Once again, after reporting lags the total number of harmful measures for Q1 and Q2 2010 convergence to the 100-120 range seen in 2009. Q4 2008 seems more anomalous as time goes on, suggesting a big upward jump in protectionism in 2009



*Note:* In Figure 2.2, a harmful measure is taken to be one which has been implemented since November 2008 and is almost certainly discriminatory (coded red) or likely to be discriminatory (coded amber).

**Table 2.4** Top 10 biggest targets of discriminatory measures


Target	Number of discriminatory measures imposed on target		Number of trading partners imposing discriminatory measures		Number of pending measures, which if implemented, would harm target too	
	This report (July 2011)	Increase from previous G20 meeting (November 2010)	This report (July 2011)	Increase from previous G20 meeting (November 2010)	This report (July 2011)	Increase from previous G20 meeting (November 2010)
China	439	102	81	2	148	19
EU27	424	102	87	7	106	18
USA	329	69	74	4	65	14
Germany	319	79	61	6	68	5
France	273	52	63	6	57	7
UK	267	53	72	17	54	6
Italy	266	55	58	6	58	5
Netherlands	243	52	55	4	47	2
Republic of Korea	242	na	62	na	58	na
Japan	238	46	66	9	54	4

**Table 2.5** Which countries have inflicted the most harm?


Rank	Metric, Country in specified rank, Number			
	Ranked by number of (almost certainly) discriminatory measures imposed	Ranked by the number of tariff lines (product categories) affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures	Ranked by the number of sectors affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures	Ranked by the number of trading partners affected by (almost certainly) discriminatory measures
1.	EU27 (227)	Viet Nam (927)	Algeria (62)	EU27 (180)
2.	Russian Federation (105)	Venezuela (785)	EU27 (58)	Argentina (175)
3.	Argentina (88)	Kazakhstan (729)	Nigeria (45)	China (172)
4.	UK (53)	Nigeria (599)	Kazakhstan (43)	Germany (161)
5.	Germany (52)	EU27 (549)	Germany (42)	UK (154)
6.	India (50)	Algeria (476)	United States of America (42)	Belgium (153)
7.	Brazil (44)	Russian Federation (438)	China (41)	Finland (153)
8.	France (44)	Argentina (413)	Indonesia (40)	India (153)
9.	China (42)	Indonesia (387)	Russian Federation (39)	Indonesia (151)
10.	Italy (42)	India (369)	Venezuela (38)	France (149)

*Note:* There is no single metric to evaluate harm. Different policy measures affect different numbers of products, economic sectors, and trading partners. GTA reports four measures of harm.

**Figure 2.3** Top 10 implemented measures used to discriminate against foreign commercial interests since the first G20 crisis meeting.



**Figure 2.4** Top 10 pending measures that target foreign commercial interests.



**Table 2.6** Ten most used state measures to discriminate against foreign commercial interests since the first G20 crisis meeting  
(Ranked by number of discriminatory measures imposed)

State measure	Number of discriminatory (red) measures imposed.		Number of measures implemented (red, amber, or green).		Number of jurisdictions that imposed these discriminatory measures.		Number of jurisdictions harmed by these discriminatory measures.	
	This report (July 2011)	Increase from previous G20 meeting (November 2010)	This report (July 2011)	Increase from previous G20 meeting (November 2010)	This report (July 2011)	Increase from previous G20 meeting (November 2010)	This report (July 2011)	Increase from previous G20 meeting (November 2010)
Bail out / state aid measure	264	53	287	63	49	3	186	1
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	205	56	252	27	58	1	74	-3
Tariff measure	126	26	384	131	63	28	157	12
Export taxes or restriction	65	20	108	39	52	5	188	4
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	65	37	86	43	22	4	134	5
Migration measure	39	8	61	16	21	2	96	1
Public procurement	35	na	45	na	19	na	135	na
Investment measure	28	-3	79	43	21	2	73	-60
Export subsidy	27	4	44	14	41	1	175	8
Import ban	24	3	35	-29	16	-1	92	19

**Table 2.7** Top 20 sectors most affected by discriminatory measures.

CPC code, Affected Sector	Number of discriminatory (red) measures affecting commercial interests in this sector	Number of implemented measures affecting specified sector	Number of jurisdictions implementing measures affecting specified sector and classified as red	Number of pending measures affecting specified sector
81 ( Financial intermediation services and auxiliary services therefor)	95	102	33	5
01 ( Products of agriculture, horticulture and market gardening)	91	157	61	15
34 ( Basic chemicals)	86	145	53	75
41 ( Basic metals)	85	146	56	45
49 ( Transport equipment)	85	166	56	25
44 ( Special purpose machinery)	76	149	54	12
21 ( Meat, fish, fruit, vegetables, oils and fats)	73	117	61	17
23 ( Grain mill products, starches and starch products; other food products)	66	117	56	16
42 ( Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment)	63	105	51	40
43 ( General purpose machinery)	55	114	23	20
02 ( Live animals and animal products)	54	83	52	9
26 ( Yarn and thread; woven and tufted textile fabrics)	53	93	52	13
36 ( Rubber and plastics products)	53	89	48	21
22 ( Dairy products)	50	73	49	12
27 ( Textile articles other than apparel)	48	92	30	22
35 ( Other chemical products; man-made fibres)	47	98	51	20
38 ( Furniture; other transportable goods n.e.c.)	47	83	23	10
46 ( Electrical machinery and apparatus)	44	103	21	13
28 ( Knitted or crocheted fabrics; wearing apparel)	43	80	24	12
37 ( Glass and glass products and other non-metallic products n.e.c.)	43	80	53	28





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## 3 The changing nature of crisis-era protectionism: 2009-H1 2011<sup>1</sup>

**Simon J. Evenett**

*University of St. Gallen and CEPR.*

The last chapter of this report chronicled the principal changes in commercial policy stance since the Seoul G20 summit in November 2010. The extensive update of the GTA database performed for the publication of the present report also allows for a reassessment of the nature of crisis-era discrimination against foreign commercial interests from 2009 through to the end of the first half of 2011. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the principal changes in such discrimination and to draw out the potential implications for policymaking.

Bearing in mind the earlier findings concerning reporting lags (described in the Executive Summary), we have contrasted the information contained in the Global Trade Alert database on commercial policy stance for each calendar year. Such an analysis might reveal annual similarities and differences in the resort to protectionism, in the form of discrimination employed used, in the jurisdictions responsible for implementing discriminatory measures, and in the victims of such discrimination.


While there is certain symmetry – even tidiness – associated with comparing annual data, this should not be taken to imply that the twists and turns of the crisis-era protectionism fall neatly into twelve-month blocks. After all, the cover of this very report suggests a downward shift in the prospects for the world economy in the second quarter of 2011 as compared to the first quarter. The annual data presented below, then, are probably best seen as summary statistics for comparable periods of time rather than attempts to identify different phases of discriminatory response.

### **On the resort to protectionism**

For the purposes of this chapter, discriminatory state measures are taken to be those implemented measures classified as red or amber in the Global Trade Alert database. Measures neutral or favourable to foreign commercial interests are those recorded as implemented and green in that database. Figure 1 presents the annual totals for both types of measure since 2009.

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<sup>1</sup> In this chapter H1 refers to the first half of a given year. Qn refers to the “n”th quarter of a given year

**Figure 3.1** The number of new commercial policy measures implemented 2009-H1 2011, by type

On the basis of information available at the beginning of July 2011, it looks as if the total number of new measures implemented was lower in 2010 than in 2009. In fact, the reported total measures for these years were 511 and 627, respectively. The total numbers of discriminatory measures for 2010 and 2009 were 355 and 496, respectively. A similar fall between 2010 and the first half of 2011 is apparent too.

The impact of reporting lags on the recorded totals of measures and of discriminatory measures should not be overlooked, however. For example, six months after the closure of Q1 2009 our best estimate of the number of discriminatory measures implemented in that quarter was 77; now that estimate is 150, nearly double the original estimate. Figure 1 is based on evidence collected six months after 2010 closed. If the total number of discriminatory measures for 2010 were to rise in future reports by 40%, then it would equal the resort to protectionism in 2009.


The interpretation of protectionist dynamics will probably turn on how much the 2010 totals are revised upwards over time. Was 2009 the outlier, when protectionism spiked in response to fears about the depth of the Great Recession? Or, if 2009 and 2010 involved approximately the same resort to protectionism, were the dynamics behind closed markets more enduring? Of course, some might well argue that this misses the point. The data for 2009 through H1 2011 imply that the cumulative total of protectionist measures implemented has continuously risen and that each measure implemented represents a step back from an open world trading system. Unwinding those protectionist measures represents, on this view, an important challenge for policymakers made less likely by the recent deterioration in the prospects for the global economy. Still, it is of interest to know whether the flow of new protectionist measures is slowing down or not, as this affects the stock of market-closing measures.

## On the forms of protectionism

One of the defining characteristics of contemporary protectionism – noted in prior GTA reports – is the fact that so little of it is effectively regulated by multilateral trade rules. Resort to tariff increases and the use of trade defence instruments have occurred during the recent global economic downturn, but together these better regulated (from the perspective of multilateral trade rules) instruments have never accounted for more than half of the protectionist measures taken in each calendar year, 2009, 2010, and H1 2011.

Figure 2 presents data on the percentage of each annual total of implemented discriminatory measures accounted for by state aids (“bailouts”) with discriminatory strings attached, tariff increases, and trade defence measures. Interestingly, both as an absolute number and as a percentage of discriminatory measures implemented in a year, the contribution of discriminatory state aids falls. Even though the share of trade defence measures in H1 2011 is much higher than in 2010, the total percentage of new discrimination associated with trade defence and tariff increases never exceeds 50%. That is, other forms of protectionism, typically far less well regulated by multilateral trade rules, have filled the gap left by the falling share of discriminatory state aids. This finding appears to hold whichever year is being considered.

**Figure 3.2** While the number of new discriminatory state aids measures has fallen over time, tariff increases and trade defence instruments accounted for less than half of the annual totals of protectionist measures imposed



Note: the vertical axis refers to the percentage of each period’s total number of discriminatory measures accounted for by each policy instrument.


## On the perpetrators of protectionism

The extent to which certain jurisdictions are responsible for implementing discriminatory measures has changed during 2009-H1 2011. Although what follows relates to the total annual number of discriminatory measures implemented by jurisdiction, it is worth bearing in mind that the actual harm done to trade flows and economic wellbeing need not correlate precisely with the the total number of harmful measures implemented. So there may not be a straightforward relationship between changes in which jurisdictions are responsible for protectionism and which jurisdictions do the most economic harm with that protectionism.

Still, given that some governments, in particular G20 governments, have repeatedly made public statements eschewing protectionism, there is interest in holding policymakers to account by identifying how often each jurisdiction has implemented discriminatory measures in any one year and in the observed changes over time. Overall, then, by looking at the number of discriminatory measures implemented by jurisdictions over time, we are more likely to learn more about which governments have kept their promises than which governments have done the most harm to international commerce.

In what follows, particular attention is given to two of the world's largest traders, the United States and the EU27, and to groups of countries that receive a lot of current interest, namely, the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and the Group of 20 nations (G20). Figure 3 plots the percentage of the total number of discriminatory measures implemented during each calendar year by the BRICs, G20, USA, and EU27. Since the G20 includes the BRICs, USA, and EU27 the percentages reported in this figure do not sum to one hundred.

**Figure 3.3** The BRICs and G20 account for a growing percentage of the protectionist measures implemented over time



The proportion of discriminatory measures accounted for by the United States is small, but it increased a little in the first half of 2011. The EU27 are responsible for just over 10% of the worldwide total of measures in 2011, which is about half of the percentage attributable to the European Commission and the 27 member states in 2009.


Meanwhile, the percentage accounted for by the BRICs has grown 3% from 26.6% of the world total in 2009 to 29.6% in H1 2011. Quite remarkably, the G20 countries account for a much larger percentage of global protectionism over time. In 2009 they accounted for 60.7% of harmful measures implemented; by the first half of 2011 they implemented 80.7% of protectionist measures. No doubt those that have argued that trade policy matters have fallen down the G20 agenda will point to the growing share of G20-inspired protectionism as the consequence. Perhaps the resolve to keep borders open for commerce has weakened, at least for the world's largest economies.

## **On the targets of protectionism**


As the total number of discriminatory measures implemented has fallen, has there been a corresponding fall in the number of times each jurisdiction's commercial interests have been harmed? Each GTA report includes a table of the jurisdictions whose commercial interests are most often hit by foreign protectionism. China, Germany, and the USA are frequently near the top of these lists, and data relating to the incidence of harm to their commercial interests has been collected. Given their prominence, comparable data on the BRICs has been collected as well.

In Figure 4 the number of foreign measures that harm the commercial interests of the BRICs, China, Germany, and the USA is plotted for each calendar year. The pattern across all targets is the same: The number of harmful foreign protectionist measures implemented has fallen with each calendar year. The major caveat to this good news is that reporting lags are likely to lead to undercounts for the totals reported for 2010 and H1 2011.

**Figure 3.4** As the worldwide totals for protectionism fall, so has the incidence of harm to the commercial interests of leading jurisdictions



**Figure 3.5** Half of harmful measures target the BRICs, a proportion that was higher in H1 2011 than in 2009



Rather than consider the total number of times a country's commercial interests are harmed, it might be preferable to consider the proportion of the total number of measures implemented in a calendar year that adversely affect each country's commercial interests. These proportions are shown in Figure 5.

Remarkably, in each calendar year, half of all harmful measures implemented adversely affect the BRICs. If anything that proportion rises over time. Since the comparable proportion for China is lower in H1 2011 than in 2009, then it must be the other BRICs (Brazil, Russia, and India) that are being targeted more often over time. Like China, the proportion of worldwide measures harming German or American commercial interests seems to be lower in 2011, having risen for both nations in 2010 (as compared to 2009).

### On the impact on least developed countries

Trade and development matters have received considerable attention during the past decade or so. Consequently, it may be of interest to report on the extent to which crisis-era policy measures affect the commercial interests of the 50 or so least developed countries (LDCs). Table 1 reports the relevant information for each calendar year.

In each calendar year, the number of measures harming LDCs' commercial interests exceeds the number of measures neutral to, or benefiting, those interests. For the completed calendar years, the harmful measures outnumber the beneficial ones at least three to one. There does appear to be an increase in the percentage of beneficial measures in H1 2011, a matter that ought to be followed with some interest.

**Table 3.1** The number of measures harming LDCs clearly exceeds the number benefitting them

Number of measures affecting LDCs	All 2009		All 2010		H1 2011	
	Number	% of total implemented	Number	% of total implemented	Number	% of total implemented
Total discriminatory	76	12.1	65	12.7	19	9.9
Total neutral or liberalising	23	3.7	21	4.1	12	6.3
Reference: Total implemented	627	100.0	511	100.0	192	100.0

*Note:* Harmful measures are taken to be implemented measures classified as red or amber. Therefore, these totals do not include potentially harmful measures that have been announced but have not yet been implemented.

*Source:* Global Trade Alert, data extracted 1 November 2010.



Finally, approximately one in six state measures implemented has some implications – good or bad – for LDCs. This proportion has been constant from 2009 to H1 2011. Whether the stability of this proportion or its level reflect deliberate policy choice is a matter worth exploring.

## **Concluding remarks**

Important features of protectionism have changed since the global economic crisis began. Arguably, some of the available evidence is weaker than others. The claim, for example, that the number of protectionist measures is now falling calendar year by calendar year could very plausibly be a function of reporting lags leading to lower totals being observed in more recent calendar years. For example, by some measures of media reporting, fears that protectionism might pose a systemic threat to the open world trading system were at their peak in the first quarter of 2009. Such are the difficulties in assembling the relevant information that the Global Trade Alert team's current estimate of the resort to protectionism in that quarter is now double the team's best estimate in the third quarter of 2009.

As the sequence of Global Trade Alert reports have shown, estimates of the number of protectionist measures imposed in 2009 and 2010 have had to be revised upwards repeatedly and, quite often, markedly. Instant assessments based solely on the most recently available data on policy stance are almost certain to understate the scale of protectionism – and policymaking processes need to take this understatement into account.

The fact that so much information about protectionist state measures does not become public immediately upon the implementation of those measures implies that sustained information collection on policy stance is needed. Furthermore, reports on protectionism and associated trade policy developments should present updates of earlier estimates of the frequency of discriminatory policy interventions, much in the same way that government statisticians regularly revise employment, output, and inflation data.

A cautious interpretation of the annual totals reported here is that the global trading system is not out of the (protectionist) wood, yet. Indeed, one might want to see more existing protectionist measures being revoked as well as fewer new protectionist measures being imposed before being more confident that the stock of outstanding protectionist measures is falling. A fall in the rate at which governments are closing borders to commerce is a lot less to celebrate than a fall in the total number of outstanding measures that impede global commerce.

There are clear shifts in the forms of protectionism used (away from state aids towards forms of protectionism other than tariff increases and trade defence measures), in those responsible for that protectionism (a surge in measures for which the G20 is responsible), and changes in the propensity with which leading trading partners are being hurt by protectionism. These developments all require further monitoring and examination, for they have direct implications for assessing the effectiveness during the sharp global economic downturn of

multilateral trade rules and for government compliance with the G20 statements concerning protectionism. To the extent that the latter are found wanting, calls for further international initiatives to defend the open world trading system may be warranted.



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## 4 Indicators of the harm done by discriminatory measures: Many indicators, one message

**Simon J Evenett**

*University of St Gallen and CEPR*

Discussions of commercial policy have been informed by a variety of indicators over the years. Some indicators are based on policy stance, others on the likely effects of policy. The pros and cons of each indicator have been debated. Often the best measure in principle is difficult, or impossible, to calculate in practice, not least because of aggregation problems across different classes of trade-policy instrument.

Since the Global Trade Alert employs, in its reports such as this one as well as on its website, indicators of the extent of discrimination by governments against foreign commercial interests, it is worth exploring to what extent these indicators are correlated with one another. That is the purpose of this chapter, which draws upon data on policy measures implemented since the G20's first crisis-related summit in November 2008.

As earlier chapters and reports have stated, the unit of observation in the GTA database is a statement by a government concerning policies that may alter the relative treatment of foreign commercial interests vis-à-vis their domestic counterparts. In principle, the GTA team could compute the welfare effect, trade effect, and amount of trade affected by each policy measure. Given our finite resources and the nearly 2,000 measures reported thus far, this would substantially detract from the GTA team's monitoring activities.

Of course, this does not stop a subset of measures being examined. In this regard, several observations are noteworthy.

- First, it seems the authors of the World Trade Organisation's reports have faced a similar challenge, as they repeatedly choose to report estimates of the trade covered only by a narrow range of trade-restricting policy measures. The usefulness of these estimates stands and falls on how representative the selected subset of policy measures is compared to the set overall discriminatory policy measures implemented since the global economic downturn began.
- Second, in an analysis conducted in 2010, Johannes Fritz and I used a very conservative methodology that estimated the trade covered by a number of discriminatory measures that (on the basis of available information about the direction of trade) affected either many trading

partners or many products. The methodology employed almost certainly underestimated the total amount of world trade affected by contemporary discrimination against foreign commercial interests. Yet, for a subset of 15 “jumbo” discriminatory measures for which plausible estimates could be obtained, we found that the total trade covered exceeded \$1.6 trillion in 2008, or more than 10% of world merchandise imports in that year (Evenett and Fritz 2010). This estimate is a multiple of those reported by the WTO and leads to a less sanguine assessment about the likely impact of crisis-era protectionism.

- Third, over time a body of econometric studies using GTA data is reporting estimates of the trade effects of contemporary discriminatory measures (a recent example being Henn and McDonald 2010). To the best of my knowledge, these effects-based studies are confined to estimates of the impact on imports or exports. There are no estimates of the welfare effects of contemporary commercial policy discrimination. This state of affairs is bound to improve over time, but in terms of advising decision-makers here and now at best there are estimates of policy stance, potential trade coverage, and of the effects of certain policy instruments.

While estimating the trade and welfare effects of each contemporary policy measure likely to affect foreign commercial interests is very resource intensive, with some – but considerably less – effort other useful information can be gleaned about the dimensions of commerce and trading partners affected by state measures. To that end, for each measure reported in the GTA database, whether liberalising or otherwise, the products likely affected by a measure (coded using the 4-digit product classification associated with the UN COMTRADE database), the economic sectors affected (coded using a two digit UN classification), and the trading partners likely affected have been identified.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, it is possible to add up for each implementing jurisdiction the total number of discriminatory measures imposed and the total number of products (tariff lines), sectors, and trading partners affected by those discriminatory measures.

For each jurisdiction, then, there are four indicators of different dimensions of harm done by discriminatory measures implemented since November 2008. A priori there is little reason to believe that these measures must be highly correlated with one another. For example, the imposition of a traditional safeguard measure may affect a large number of trading partners but only one good and one sector. Still, it would be useful to know whether these four indicators are indeed positively correlated with one another, not least because the GTA reports tend to include more discussion of the number of discriminatory measures implemented by jurisdictions than the other three measures.

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<sup>1</sup> The methods and data used to identify the trading partners affected differ across trade-policy instruments. For instance, data on prior migration inflows are used to identify which trading partners are adversely affected by a visa restriction imposed by a government. In every case a *de minimis* threshold is employed so as to rule out trading partners that are unlikely to be affected much. Moreover, our reliance on data on international migration and commercial transactions that have taken place inevitably implies that our estimates of the trading partners affected only include those jurisdictions for which an existing commerce existed prior to the government intervention in question. Therefore, our estimates of the trading partners affected do not cover trading partners potentially affected. Once again, the GTA methodology is more conservative than some might say is appropriate.

Having completed the latest update of the GTA database, we conducted a straightforward analysis of the four indicators of harm. The first step was to compute the Spearman rank correlation coefficients between the four indicators. One advantage of this measure is that it is not affected by the scale of each indicator. The correlation coefficients were all very close to one.

However, not every jurisdiction has implemented a discriminatory state measure since the crisis began and this raised a question as to whether the rank correlations were different between those governments that implemented discriminatory measures and those that did not. Consequently, the Spearman rank correlations were re-calculated for those 106 jurisdictions that have implemented a discriminatory measure (classified amber or red in the GTA database). Table 1 below reports the Spearman rank correlation coefficients among the four indicators of harm for this subset of jurisdictions.

**Table 4.1** Among jurisdictions that have discriminated against foreign commercial interests, the four indicators of harm are highly correlated with one another


	Number of "red" measures implemented	Number of products affected	Number of sectors affected	Number of trading partners affected
Number of "red" measures	1	0.77	0.84	0.91
Number of products affected		1	0.92	0.81
Number of sectors affected			1	0.83
Number of trading partners affected				1

Sometimes correlation coefficients obscure certain patterns of variation, so the second step was to transform each indicator of harm so that its scale was irrelevant<sup>2</sup> and then plot each indicator against every other indicator. Figures 1-3 below plot the number of almost certainly discriminatory measures ("red measures") against the other three indicators of harm. A pronounced upward relationship between the variables plotted can be discerned, as well among the other plots not reported here.


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<sup>2</sup> This transformation was undertaken by adding one to each indicator's value and then taking natural logarithms of the sum. To be precise, if an indicator of harm takes value  $x$  then the transformed value was the natural logarithm of  $(1+x)$ .


**Figure 4.1** The frequency of resort to discriminatory measures correlates highly with the range of products affected by contemporary protectionism



**Figure 4.2** The frequency of resort to discriminatory measures correlates highly with the number of sectors affected by contemporary protectionism



**Figure 4.3** Countries that frequently resort to discriminatory measures tend to hurt more trading partners' commercial interests



This step – along with the computed raw correlation coefficients between the transformed indicators – confirms that the four measures of harm reported by the Global Trade Alert are highly correlated with one another. Although policy measures vary, overall, governments that impose lots of discriminatory measures tend to harm more trading partners' commerce. Moreover, governments that impose lots of discriminatory measures tend to distort commerce in a larger number of traded products and economic sectors.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> An alternative measure of trade policy stance for a jurisdiction might be the difference between the number of "red" measures and the number of (neutral or liberalising) "green" measures implemented by that jurisdiction. The above calculations were repeated for this alternative measure. The relevant correlation coefficients are positive and not much lower than those reported above. Thus, correcting for the propensity of a jurisdiction to liberalise does not seem to affect the principal finding of this chapter.





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# 5 China's rare earth industry: Are golden times coming?

**Yang Chun Jing**  
*Global Trade Alert*

As the dominant supplier of rare earth elements (REEs), China's REEs production and policies are now under scrutiny, raising concerns in the EU, Japan, and the US, among others. In recent years China has adopted many measures concerning REEs production and export with the stated purpose of protecting the environment and certain supplies of REEs raw materials identified by the Chinese government. As a result, trading parties have faced REEs shortages and higher prices. This chapter provides a general overview of the China REEs industry and conducts an analysis of China's current REEs policies. Furthermore, this column considers possible future trends facing the Chinese rare earth sector.

## 5.1 Rare earths and China's rare earth industry

Rare earths is the collective term for 17 elements, 15 within the chemical group called lanthanides plus yttrium and scandium. The lanthanides consist of the following elements: lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, and lutetium. REEs are widely used in high-tech industries and have national security applications.<sup>1</sup> Given the wide range of uses of REEs, they are seen by some as "industrial vitamins."

China has deep reserves of REEs and produces a number of different kinds of rare earth products. In 1927, Chinese scientists discovered REEs in Banyan Obo (now the biggest REEs mining site in China, located in Inner Mongolia, Northern China) and started the production of REEs in 1957. After more than eight decades of exploration, REEs have been discovered in most of China's provinces.<sup>2</sup> In accordance with data from the US Department of Interior, China's REEs reserve is 36 Million Tons (MT), making up about 36% of the total reserves

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1 For example, Lanthanum is used in hybrid engines, mental alloys; Neodymium is used in auto catalyst, petroleum refining, hard drives in laptop, headphones; Yttrium, Holmium, Ytterbium Terbium and Europium are used in defence applications, such as satellites, antimissile, communication system and fighter engines etc.

2 In 21 Chinese provinces and autonomous regions, such as Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Hainan, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Liaoning, Inner Mongolia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Shandong, Shanxi, Sichuan, Xinjiang, Yuanan, Zhejiang. Inner Mongolia is rich in light rare-earth metals autonomous region, while heavy rare earths are mostly scattered in South China (Jiangxi, Hunan, Guangdong, Fujian, Guangxi).

available worldwide.<sup>3</sup>

REEs are found in many places of the world, but they are concentrated in several countries, such as China (36%), Russia (including other Former Soviet Union states, 19%), the US (13%), Australia (5.4%) and India (3.1%), with all the remaining countries together have a 23.6 % share.

Between 1990 and 2000 China's production of rare earths increased over 450% to 73,000t from 16,000t. In the first ten years of 21st century, China's REEs production was continually increasing. In 2009, worldwide REEs production is about 132,000t, while China's output amounts to 129,000t, more than 98% of the world total. After nearly 20 years of increasing production, China's REEs output as a percentage of total output rose from 27% in 1990 to more than 95% in 2010.

Although China is the largest REEs supplier and has the largest REEs reserve, China REEs producers face fierce competitive pressure and struggle to maintain profitability. This is because the price of REEs is quite low, due to so many Chinese suppliers selling into the international market. Moreover, most of other countries have stopped REEs production and closed most of their REEs mines; for them importing REEs from China is much cheaper than domestic production. For example, there is no REEs mine production in the United States in operation today, yet the US used to rely wholly on domestically produced REEs. In 15 years, the United States has become 100% import reliant.

## 5.2 China's policies towards REEs

### Foreign investment must form joint ventures and face output quotas

In 1990 Deng Xiaoping remarked that "Middle East is rich in oil, and China is rich in REEs," and since then China government protected its REEs resources and treated REEs as strategic minerals. Chinese law prohibits foreigners from investing in REEs mining, smelting, and separation unless they form joint ventures (JVs) with local Chinese companies. Moreover, the JV must be approved by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC, formerly the State Development and Planning Commission, SDPC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM, formerly was the Ministry of the Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, MFTEC)

From 1990 China drafted development plans for its REEs resources, including output quotas for each province and mining company. In the early 1990s the Ministry of Land and Resource (MLR) was responsible for administering the production quotas of REEs. In 2008, the Rare Earth Office in the NDRC was transferred to the newly established Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). From 2008, the MIIT started to issues quotas for REEs. Due to a lack of communication between the MIIT and MLR, their respective quotas

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<sup>3</sup> Source: US Department of the Interior, Mineral Commodity Summaries (USSG 2010).

for REEs frequently differed, which led to confusion for mining companies. This problem was resolved in 2010 when these two governmental departments issued the same production quotas to each supplier.

Although detailed quotas for individual provinces and REEs producers were issued, actual output is much higher than the total quota amount. Many companies without licensed quotas are still mining REEs. In addition, local governments seeking faster economic growth, revenue, and employment have not strictly enforced quotas on REEs production. As a result in the past three to four years, China's central government has further strengthened the enforcement of quota licenses and their administration.

### **REEs export quotas**

China's Foreign Trade Law confers the authority on the state to restrict or prohibit the export of goods through quotas. During the past 10 years Chinese domestic demand for REEs has surged. In 2000 China's REEs consumption was 19,000t, rising to 52,000t in 2005 and 73,000t in 2009 (see Figure 5.1: China's REEs Consumption below). As a result, meeting domestic needs are the supply priority and so the government has gradually reduced export quotas for REEs. Since 2003 MOFCOM is responsible for setting REEs export quotas.


Under the export quota system both domestic producers and JV companies are entitled to receive export quotas (see Figure 5.2: REEs Export Quotas for Domestic Companies and JV Companies).<sup>4</sup> From Figure 2 we can see that quotas for both domestic companies and JV companies have generally experienced a year-on-year decline. On 28 December 2010, MOFCOM issued a first batch of REEs export quotas of 14,508t for the first half of 2011, an amount 35% lower than the comparable period in 2010. According to MOFCOM statistics, 22 approved domestic companies were granted a combined REE export quota of 10,672t for the first half of 2011.

The number of qualified REEs exporters is being gradually reduced as well. In 2006, 59 companies were permitted to export REEs (47 domestic companies and 12 JV companies). By 2009 this had fallen to 34 (23 domestic companies, and 11 JV companies); and in 2010 and 2011, the number was reduced to 32 (22 domestic companies and 10 JV companies) and 31 (22 domestic companies and 9 JV companies), respectively.


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<sup>4</sup> In 2005 (domestic companies' total quota: 48,010t, JV companies: 17,570t ); in 2006 (domestic companies' total quotas: 45,000t, JV companies: 16,070t); in 2007 (domestic companies' total quotas: 45,574t, JV companies: 16,069t); in 2008 (domestic companies' total quotas: 34,156t, JV companies: 15,834t); in 2009 (domestic companies' total quotas: 31,310t, JV companies: 16,845t); in 2010 (domestic companies' total quotas: 22,512t, JV companies: 7,746t).

**Figure 5.1** China's REEs consumption



**Figure 5.2** REEs export quotas for domestic companies and JV companies



## Export taxation and natural resource taxation

China taxes natural resource extraction to raise revenue and to regulate mineral industries. In the 1990s, China's government encouraged enterprises to export their products by refunding the value-added taxation paid on exported products. In early 2000, due to increased domestic needs, the Chinese government reduced the export rebates on many strategic commodities and raw materials. In 2005, the rebate on exported REEs was completely eliminated and trade in rare earth concentrate was banned.

In 2007, the government went further and started to impose an export duty on REEs shipments. The objective was to restrict export of products that use large amounts of energy to produce, so as to protect the domestic supply of strategic minerals. With the purpose of further strengthening its REEs exports in 2008, China has dramatically increased the export duty on REEs; in fact, the export duty rates on most REEs more than doubled compared to their 2007 rates.<sup>5</sup>

In order to protect REE resources and undermine illegal mining, in 1993 China enacted the Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Resource Taxation ("Provisional Regulations") to levy natural resource taxes on REEs producers. However under the Provisional Regulations, the taxes levied on REEs were initially listed under the item of "other non ferrous metal," with a rate of RMB 3 yuan per ton. As this rate is quite low, it had no effect on REEs producers, so the Chinese government increased the rate of taxation on REEs. From 1 April 2011, the tax rates on most of REEs were increased more than 10 times, while the rates on some light REEs were increased more than 20 times from RMB 3 yuan per ton to RMB 60 yuan per ton. With the imposition of much higher rates, many small REEs producers without sufficient funds came under financial pressure and may have closed.

## China's state REEs development activities

In order to strengthen the administration of policy towards REEs, on 19 May 2011, the State Council of China announced *Several Opinions on Promoting Sustainable and Healthy Development of the Rare Earth Industry* ("Opinions"), which, as the title suggests, provides guidance for the development of China's REEs.

REEs industry entry standards will be much stricter than before. In accordance with these *Opinions*, China will not permit any new rare-earth separation project before 2015. REEs producers with a mine output capacity of 300,000 metric tons per year (t/yr) of ore for light rare earths and 3,000 t/yr for ion-adsorption rare earths will be shut down. Metal smelting producers must have an output capacity of 1,500 t/yr. If a REEs producer does not meet relevant capability standards, it will be shut down by the Chinese government. Moreover, unlicensed REEs producers will be shut down without any compensation from the Chinese government.

Strict REEs environmental emission standards were released by the Chinese government – and those REEs producers that cannot meet these standards will

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<sup>5</sup> For example, export duty rates on Yttrium oxide, Terbium and its oxide, chloride, and carbonate, Dysprosium oxide, chloride, and carbonate were raised from 15% (2007) to 25% (2008). Source: China Import and Export Tariff, General Administration of Customs.

be shut down as well. In March 2011, the Ministry of Environment Protection (MEP) released stricter rules on emissions limits that will come into effect on 1 October 2011. For example, these rules set an emission cap for ammonia nitrogen content at 25 mg per liter of water for existing rare earths companies during the two years beginning from 1 January 2012, a sharp drop from the current level, which ranges from 300 mg to 5,000 mg per liter of water.<sup>6</sup> With stricter environmental standards in the future for REEs industry, some REEs producers may need to upgrade their production technology, which will dramatically increase costs. Since some small REEs producers may not be able to recover those costs, further consolidation in the REEs sector is likely.

In addition, the Chinese government will restructure the REEs industry through mergers and consolidation. Large REEs producers are expected to dominate the Chinese REEs industry. In January 2011, the MLR announced the establishment of 11 state-managed rare earth mining zones in Ganzhou, Jiangxi Province. The 11 mining zones have a combined area of 2,500 square kilometers, with rare earth reserves estimated at 760,000t. The world's largest rare earth producer, Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare-Earth Company, will consolidate about 35 local rare-earth miners with support of the local government, and after the consolidation, this company will be the only player in Inner Mongolia.

Furthermore, since there is no REEs industrial association, China's REEs producers do not have a unified voice on international markets, with direct implications for REEs pricing. To rectify this, China plans to establish a nationwide REEs industrial association with the purpose of monitoring market activities, to create a fair and transparent market, and to protect common interests of all its members especially with respect to pricing. Its preparatory works began in 2009, and it is reported that a REEs industrial association will be formally established in the near future.<sup>7</sup>

Another official concern is REEs smuggling. Xinhua Press, an official media source, reported that in 2008 about 20,000t of REEs were smuggled out of China due to higher overseas demand and the poor administration of Chinese customs. Estimates have been presented suggesting that one-third of REEs are smuggled out of China. As a result, since 2006 the Chinese government has reinforced the customs administration of REEs.

China also started the preparatory work for a national stockpile of REEs early in 2007. In addition on 9 February 2011, the local Inner Mongolia government approved the *Inner Mongolia REEs Strategic Resources Stockpile Plan* ("Stockpile Plan"). In accordance with this Stockpile Plan, the Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare-Earth Company wants over a three to four year period to set aside 300,000t of REEs. To pay for this the Inner Mongolia government and local Baotou government are to provide the Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare-Earth Company with a subsidy of RMB 200 million yuan. Jiangxi, Guangdong, Guangxi, Fujian and Hunan in South China are rich in heavy REEs, and these provinces have worked on plans to create stockpiles.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> See "China's rare earth industry faces reshuffle under new emission limits", *China Daily*, 11 March 2011.

<sup>7</sup> See *China Rare Earth Industrial Association will be established*, last visited on June 28, 2011.


<sup>8</sup> See *Inner Mongolia Start REEs Strategic Stockpile*.

### 5.3 A bright future ahead?

#### Inadequate legal basis for REEs restrictions

Traditionally, even though China is the largest REEs supplier, due to disorderly production and fierce competition between Chinese producers REEs are exported from China at quite low prices. With China reducing its export and production quotas and adopting more measures to strengthen the administration of its REEs industry, prices for REEs in both domestic and international market are increasing sharply, shifting the sector away from its history of low prices. Most of the prices of REEs have increased more than 5 times over in the past few months (See Figure 5.3). As a result, in a short period of time China's REEs producers have experienced substantial increases in profits. Indeed, achieving a higher price for REEs is one of the reasons why China strengthened the administration of its REEs resources. As the biggest provider, it is quite easy for China to use its leverage to achieve this purpose in the near term.

**Figure 5.3** Selected HREO (Heavy Rare Earth Oxides, HREO) prices



Source: ASX/Media announcement.<sup>9</sup>

But temporary profit surges are no guarantee of long-term increases in profitability and, therefore, of a bright future (from a commercial point of view). There are plenty of developments that might alter the current trajectory of prices. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) may soon finalise its rulings on the legality of Chinese restrictions on the export of raw materials. In 2009, Mexico, the US, and the EU jointly filed a WTO complaint concerning China's export restrictions on nine raw materials including bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, manganese,

<sup>9</sup> See ASX/Media Announcement, *Rare Earth and Price Update*, released on 1 June 2011.



silicon carbide, silicon metal, yellow phosphorus and zinc. In March 2011, the WTO released a confidential preliminary report on this complaint. Some trade diplomats and lawyers familiar with the case said this report concluded that China does not have the right to impose export restrictions on these nine raw materials (Miller and Areddy 2011).

In defence of China's export restriction the Chinese government cited "the protection of the environment and nonrenewable resources". In its defence, the Chinese government held that WTO rules permit export restrictions for environment concerns as long as "such measures are made effective in conjunction with restriction on domestic production or consumption". On the other hand, the Chinese government appears to have neglected two important considerations, namely, whether China's measures discriminated against its trade partners and whether China's measures violate its obligations under *China's Accession Protocol*.

According to the paragraph 11.3 of *China's Accession Protocol* "China shall eliminate all taxes and charges applied to exports unless specially provided for in Annex 6 of this Protocol or applied in conformity with the provisions of Article VIII of the GATT 1994". However, of the minerals involved in this case only manganese, yellow phosphorus, and zinc are listed in this Annex 6 "*Products Subject to Export Duty*".<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, at the end of Annex 6 it is noted that "China confirmed that the tariff levels included in this Annex are maximum levels which will not be exceeded. China confirmed furthermore that it would not increase the presently applied rates, except under exceptional circumstances. If such circumstances occurred, China would consult with affected members prior to increasing applied tariffs with a view to finding a mutually acceptable solution."

On July 5, 2011, WTO released "*Panel reports out on China's export measures on various raw materials*", finding that China's application of export quotas, export duties, export price requirements were inconsistent with China's obligations under the *GATT 1994, China's Accession Protocol and China's Working Party Report*. The Panel recommends that the Dispute Settlement Body requests China to bring its restrictions into conformity with its WTO obligations.<sup>11</sup> After hearing of the conclusions of this Panel Report, MOFCOM officially said "China feels regret for WTO's Panel Report"<sup>12</sup>, and interestingly, on the same day, 6 July 2011, one Vice-Minister of the MOFCOM said that China will improve its REEs export administration in line with its obligations under the WTO.<sup>13</sup>

It is reported that China is preparing an appeal to the WTO Appellate Body.<sup>14</sup> However, if China ultimately loses this case, the Chinese government should remove most of its restrictions on these nine raw materials. China's REEs restrictions are quite similar to the recently litigated case, and both the Chinese

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10 See *China's Accession Protocol, Annex 6: Products Subject to Export Duty*.

11 See *WTO Panel reports out on China's export measures on various raw materials*, 5 July 2011.

12 See *Speech delivered by the Director of Treaties and Laws Department, MOFCOM after Panel reports out on China's export measures on various raw materialz*. .

13 See *Vice-Minister of the MOFCOM: REEs export administration will be improved in accordance with obligations under WTO* .

14 See *WTO Panel Report: China's Raw Materials not in conformity with WTO Obligations*.

government and its REEs producers fear restrictions on REEs exports may face the same fate. REEs were not included in the *Annex 6 "Products Subject to Export Duty."* In addition restrictive measures on REEs, include export quotas, export duty, licensing administration, are almost a copy of the nine raw materials restrictions case. It is expected that the US and the EU may submit the REEs case on the same ground to WTO for settlement. In conclusion, then, the nine raw materials restrictions case could set off a domino effect for China's REEs restrictions.

### **Monopoly supplies may not last long**

As mentioned above, although China is now the dominant supplier – with a world market share of more than 95% – China's reserves make up around 36% of the world total stock of rare earths. With China's policies resulting in higher prices and shortages, importers may try to find alternative supplies. If trade partners submit a complaint to WTO, it could take four to five years before a final settlement is released, so again it may be much wiser for them to find alternative suppliers to China.

It is reported that the US reopened its biggest REEs site, Mountain Pass, in June 2011. This site used to be the biggest REEs in the world and supplied 100% of US domestic demand and one-third of global exports of REEs in 1984 (Lifton 2010). In 2002, this site was completely closed because of the huge savings obtained by importing REEs from China.<sup>15</sup> In addition, Japan has started to cooperate with Mongolia<sup>16</sup> and Vietnam<sup>17</sup> to search for REEs, so as to reduce its dependency on Chinese REEs. Furthermore, REEs buyers are searching for REEs all over the globe and it is reported that Japanese scientists have discovered REEs in some places of the ocean floor in the Pacific Ocean, the stock of which would be 1,000 times the amount of currently recognised reserves on land.<sup>18</sup>

Moreover, the EU, Japan, and the US have begun research into alternative elements to replace REEs. In addition recycling of REEs is being developed and has the potential to reduce annual consumption needs of REEs. Just as green fuel may replace the petroleum in the long run, human beings may find alternatives to REEs as well.

Although finding alternative suppliers and reopening mines, such as Mountain Pass, may take years, these actions signal that more and more industrialised countries are recognising the downsides of overdependence on China's REEs. Control of one factor driving prices – supply – assures no control of the other factor, demand. High prices for REEs may not last a very long time.

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15 See *Largest Rare-Earth Metal Mine In US Is Open*, WallStreetGrand.com, 2011.

16 See *Japan and Mongolia Cooperation for REEs Searching* (Chinese).

17 See *Japan joint with Vietnam for REEs Cooperation* (Chinese).

18 See *Japan finds REEs in Ocean Floor, 1000 times of reserve on land*.

## 5.4 Conclusions

With 36% of world REEs reserve and more than 95% of world's current REEs supplies, there is no doubt that Chinese policies can influence world market outcomes, including prices. During the last decade, especially over the last 5 years, China has adopted a wide range of measures towards its REEs industry, ranging from production and export quotas, stricter environmental standards, higher taxation and so on. REEs prices have increased substantially in the past year. Chinese REEs producers are enjoying a highly profitable period at the moment.

A very old Chinese saying warns that “things will develop in the opposite direction when they become extreme” and this may well apply to the China REEs sector over the coming years. If China's trade partners submit a complaint concerning REEs restrictions to WTO for dispute settlement, China may possibly lose that case in which case most of the restrictions on REEs will have to be abolished or changed. More generally, curbing export and production volumes with the purpose of enjoying a higher price is really not a wise enough strategy in international markets today. High prices will encourage the reopening of REEs sites, bringing to an end China's effective monopoly over REEs production.

Perhaps the saying “it was the best of times, it was the worst of times” accurately captures the current conditions facing China's REEs. Temporary higher prices may lead to higher profits for Chinese REEs producers; however, imposing restrictions on REEs supplies is not a permanent solution. Furthermore, when the WTO “domino” falls, it will spell disaster for current restrictions on Chinese rare earths.

*The author is an independent researcher for the Global Trade Alert (GTA) and holds a MA in international law. He graduated from the Law School, Tsinghua University in Beijing PRC and his main academic interests are international law, international trade and dispute settlement, climate change, and carbon trading, etc.*

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## **SECTION 2**

### **Country-by-Country Reports**



# Argentina

**Table 6.1.** Foreign state measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	252	240
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Argentina's commercial interests [1]	76	72
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Argentina's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Argentina's interests [2]	65	62
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Argentina's interests [3]	111	106
Total number of implemented measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	220	212
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Argentina's commercial interests	32	28
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Argentina's foreign commercial interests	28	25
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Argentina's commercial interests	59	57

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Argentina" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.2.** Argentina's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Argentina's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	125	72
Total number of Argentina's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	10	6
Total number of Argentina's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	27	9
Total number of Argentina's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	88	57
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Argentina that harm foreign commercial interests	413	404
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Argentina that harm foreign commercial interests.	27	27
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Argentina that harm foreign commercial interests	175	175

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Argentina" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.3.** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Argentina's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	22
Brazil	9
France	9
Indonesia	8
India	7
Spain	7
Netherlands	6
Belgium	5
Finland	5
Germany	5
Italy	5
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	5
Austria	4
Belarus	4
Bulgaria	4
China	4
Cyprus	4
Czech Republic	4
Denmark	4
Estonia	4
European Communities	4
Greece	4
Hungary	4
Ireland	4
Kazakhstan	4
Latvia	4
Lithuania	4
Luxembourg	4
Malta	4
Poland	4
Portugal	4
Romania	4
Slovakia	4
Slovenia	4
Sweden	4
South Africa	3
Ukraine	3
Viet Nam	3
Australia	2
Bolivia	2
Canada	2
Ghana	2
Mexico	2
Morocco	2



Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Nigeria	2
Pakistan	2
Paraguay	2
Republic of Korea	2
Switzerland	2
United States of America	2
Venezuela	2
Algeria	1
Chile	1
Croatia	1
Ecuador	1
Japan	1
Malaysia	1
Sudan	1
Thailand	1

**Table 6.4.** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Argentina's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	69
India	45
Indonesia	44
Republic of Korea	44
Thailand	44
Malaysia	42
Singapore	42
Viet Nam	41
Hong Kong	39
Philippines	38
Pakistan	35
Chinese Taipei	33
Brazil	32
Germany	28
Italy	27
Spain	27
France	26
Japan	26
United States of America	26
Uruguay	25
Chile	24
Netherlands	24
Belgium	23
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	22
Canada	21
Paraguay	21

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Sweden	21
Colombia	20
Portugal	19
Russian Federation	19
South Africa	18
Ecuador	17
Israel	17
Poland	17
Mexico	16
Peru	16
Czech Republic	15
Finland	15
Romania	15
Denmark	14
Norway	14
Turkey	14
Ukraine	14
Venezuela	14
Switzerland	13
Austria	12
Bolivia	12
Greece	12
Egypt	11
Hungary	11
United Arab Emirates	10
Bangladesh	9
Ireland	9
Sri Lanka	9
Algeria	8
Australia	8
Bulgaria	8
Croatia	8
Dominican Republic	8
Luxembourg	8
Saudi Arabia	8
Serbia	8
Slovenia	8
Trinidad and Tobago	8
Cuba	7
Ghana	7
Jordan	7
Lithuania	7
Nigeria	7
Tunisia	7
Bosnia and Herzegovina	6
Lebanon	6
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	6

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Malta	6
Morocco	6
Angola	5
Cameroon	5
Congo	5
Costa Rica	5
Iceland	5
Jamaica	5
Kazakhstan	5
Macedonia	5
Netherlands Antilles	5
New Zealand	5
Panama	5
Slovakia	5
Sudan	5
Albania	4
Cambodia	4
Côte d'Ivoire	4
El Salvador	4
Honduras	4
Iran	4
Kuwait	4
Mali	4
Mauritius	4
Montenegro	4
Myanmar	4
Niger	4
Palestinian	4
Senegal	4
Afghanistan	3
Aruba	3
Belarus	3
Brunei Darussalam	3
Burkina Faso	3
Cape Verde	3
Cyprus	3
Equatorial Guinea	3
Estonia	3
Gambia	3
Guatemala	3
Haiti	3
Lao People's Democratic Republic	3
Mauritania	3
Nicaragua	3
Yemen	3
Azerbaijan	2
Barbados	2

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Benin	2
Democratic Republic of the Congo	2
Ethiopia	2
Guyana	2
Kenya	2
Latvia	2
Liberia	2
Mozambique	2
Qatar	2
Republic of Moldova	2
Saint Lucia	2
Syrian Arab Republic	2
Uganda	2
United Republic of Tanzania	2
Zimbabwe	2
Andorra	1
Armenia	1
Bahamas	1
Bahrain	1
Belize	1
Botswana	1
Burundi	1
Central African Republic	1
Chad	1
Comoros	1
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1
Djibouti	1
Dominica	1
Eritrea	1
Gabon	1
Georgia	1
Grenada	1
Guinea	1
Guinea-Bissau	1
Iraq	1
Kyrgyzstan	1
Lesotho	1
Macao	1
Madagascar	1
Malawi	1
Namibia	1
Oman	1
Papua New Guinea	1
Rwanda	1
Saint Kitts and Nevis	1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1
Sao Tome and Principe	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Seychelles	1
Sierra Leone	1
Somalia	1
Suriname	1
Swaziland	1
Tajikistan	1
Togo	1
Zambia	1

**Table 6.5** Implemented measures that harm Argentina's commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	49	28%
Bail out / state aid measure	32	18%
Export subsidy	19	11%
Export taxes or restriction	14	8%
Public procurement	11	6%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	10	6%
Trade finance	8	5%
Local content requirement	7	4%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	6	3%
Import ban	5	3%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	5	3%
Competitive devaluation	4	2%
Technical Barrier to Trade	4	2%
Investment measure	3	2%
Migration measure	3	2%
Other service sector measure	3	2%
Consumption subsidy	2	1%
Import subsidy	2	1%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	1%
State-controlled company	2	1%
Intellectual property protection	1	1%
Total	176	100%

**Table 6.6** Argentina's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	36	39%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	31	33%
Bail out / state aid measure	9	10%
Export taxes or restriction	6	6%
Tariff measure	6	6%
Import ban	2	2%
Export subsidy	1	1%
Local content requirement	1	1%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	1%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	1%
Total	93	100%

# ARGENTINA

**Map 6.1** Argentina: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



Map 6.2 Argentina: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# ARGENTINA



# Australia

**Table 6.7.** Foreign state measures affecting Australia's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Australia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Australia's commercial interests	325	310
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Australia's commercial interests [1]	101	99
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Australia's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Australia's interests [2]	79	74
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Australia's interests [3]	145	137
Total number of implemented measures affecting Australia's commercial interests	283	273
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Australia's commercial interests	42	37
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Australia's foreign commercial interests	33	28
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Australia's commercial interests	56	56

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Australia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.8.** Australia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Australia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Australia's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	26	14
Total number of Australia's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	7	3
Total number of Australia's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	5	1
Total number of Australia's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	14	10
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Australia that harm foreign commercial interests	21	17
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Australia that harm foreign commercial interests	20	15
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Australia that harm foreign commercial interests	58	58

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Australia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.9** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Australia's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	21
Indonesia	17
India	12
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	9
Argentina	8
China	8
France	8
Germany	8
Poland	7
Belarus	6
Japan	6
Kazakhstan	6
Netherlands	6
Spain	6
Viet Nam	6
Belgium	5
Finland	5
Ireland	5
Italy	5
Republic of Korea	5
Slovakia	5
Austria	4
Bulgaria	4
Cyprus	4
Czech Republic	4
Denmark	4
Estonia	4
European Communities	4
Greece	4
Hungary	4
Latvia	4
Lithuania	4
Luxembourg	4
Malta	4
Portugal	4
Romania	4
Slovenia	4
Sweden	4
United States of America	4
Brazil	3
Malaysia	3
Nigeria	3
South Africa	3
Algeria	2
Canada	2

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Singapore	2
Switzerland	2
Egypt	1
Ethiopia	1
Mexico	1
Pakistan	1
Sri Lanka	1
Sudan	1
Thailand	1
Ukraine	1
Venezuela	1

**Table 6.10** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Australia's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
United States of America	7
China	6
Germany	6
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	6
India	5
Denmark	4
Indonesia	4
Ireland	4
Italy	4
Malaysia	4
Netherlands	4
New Zealand	4
Poland	4
Belgium	3
Brazil	3
Canada	3
Czech Republic	3
France	3
Portugal	3
Singapore	3
South Africa	3
Spain	3
Sweden	3
Thailand	3
Argentina	2
Austria	2
Chile	2
Cuba	2
Finland	2
Greece	2

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Hong Kong	2
Hungary	2
Japan	2
Mexico	2
Slovakia	2
Viet Nam	2
Zimbabwe	2
Belarus	1
Bulgaria	1
Cyprus	1
El Salvador	1
Estonia	1
Fiji	1
Jamaica	1
Latvia	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Malta	1
Norway	1
Philippines	1
Republic of Korea	1
Romania	1
Russian Federation	1
Slovenia	1
Sri Lanka	1
Switzerland	1
Turkey	1
United Arab Emirates	1

**Table 6.11.** Implemented measures that harm Australia's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	47	21%
Bail out / state aid measure	46	21%
Export subsidy	22	10%
Export taxes or restriction	19	8%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	17	8%
Migration measure	11	5%
Local content requirement	9	4%
Public procurement	9	4%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	8	4%
Trade finance	8	4%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	7	3%
Import ban	6	3%
Competitive devaluation	5	2%
Investment measure	4	2%


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Technical Barrier to Trade	4	2%
Import subsidy	3	1%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	3	1%
Consumption subsidy	2	1%
Other service sector measure	2	1%
State-controlled company	2	1%
Total	224	100%

**Table 6.12.** Australia's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	4	27%
Bail out / state aid measure	3	20%
Public procurement	3	20%
Investment measure	2	13%
Migration measure	2	13%
Tariff measure	2	13%
Local content requirement	1	7%
Total	15	100%

# AUSTRALIA

**Map 6.3** Australia: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



Map 6.4 Australia: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



AUSTRALIA



# Brazil

**Table 6.13.** Foreign state measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests	355	326
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Brazil's commercial interests [1]	92	83
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Brazil's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Brazil's interests [2]	83	75
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Brazil's interests [3]	180	168
Total number of implemented measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests	304	284
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Brazil's commercial interests	51	42
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Brazil's foreign commercial interests	41	33
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Brazil's commercial interests	65	65

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Brazil" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.14.** Brazil's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Brazil's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	130	89
Total number of Brazil's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	57	52
Total number of Brazil's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	29	8
Total number of Brazil's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	44	29
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Brazil that harm foreign commercial interests	250	238
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Brazil that harm foreign commercial interests	30	29
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Brazil that harm foreign commercial interests	131	131

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Brazil" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.15.** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Brazil's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	32
Russian Federation	27
Indonesia	13
India	11
France	8
Germany	7
Poland	7
Portugal	7
Spain	7
China	6
Italy	6
Netherlands	6
Belarus	5
Belgium	5
Finland	5
Kazakhstan	5
Nigeria	5
Republic of Korea	5
Ukraine	5
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	5
Austria	4
Bulgaria	4
Cyprus	4
Czech Republic	4
Denmark	4
Estonia	4
European Communities	4
Greece	4
Hungary	4
Ireland	4
Latvia	4
Lithuania	4
Luxembourg	4
Malta	4
Romania	4
Slovakia	4
Slovenia	4
Sweden	4
United States of America	4
Australia	3
Paraguay	3
South Africa	3
Viet Nam	3
Bolivia	2
Canada	2

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Egypt	2
Japan	2
Malaysia	2
Morocco	2
Switzerland	2
Turkey	2
Venezuela	2
Armenia	1
Brazil	1
Ecuador	1
Ethiopia	1
Iran	1
Mexico	1
Pakistan	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Sri Lanka	1
Thailand	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Uzbekistan	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 6.16.** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Brazil's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	27
United States of America	20
Germany	15
France	10
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	10
Argentina	9
Japan	9
Hong Kong	8
India	8
Indonesia	8
Italy	8
Mexico	8
Spain	8
Belgium	7
Canada	7
Finland	7
Malaysia	7
Netherlands	7
Republic of Korea	7
Sweden	7
Turkey	6

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Austria	5
Bangladesh	5
Chile	5
Denmark	5
South Africa	5
Viet Nam	5
Paraguay	4
Peru	4
Portugal	4
Russian Federation	4
Singapore	4
Switzerland	4
Australia	3
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	3
Egypt	3
Israel	3
Pakistan	3
Philippines	3
Thailand	3
Ukraine	3
Belarus	2
Bolivia	2
Cote d'Ivoire	2
Ireland	2
Luxembourg	2
Morocco	2
New Zealand	2
Norway	2
Poland	2
Romania	2
Slovenia	2
Sri Lanka	2
Uruguay	2
Algeria	1
Angola	1
Antigua and Barbuda	1
Armenia	1
Aruba	1
Bahamas	1
Bahrain	1
Barbados	1
Benin	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1
Cambodia	1
Cameroon	1
Cape Verde	1
Cayman Islands	1

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Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Chad	1
Chinese Taipei	1
Colombia	1
Costa Rica	1
Croatia	1
Cuba	1
Cyprus	1
Czech Republic	1
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1
Djibouti	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ecuador	1
El Salvador	1
Equatorial Guinea	1
Estonia	1
Gabon	1
Gambia	1
Georgia	1
Ghana	1
Greece	1
Guatemala	1
Guinea	1
Guyana	1
Haiti	1
Honduras	1
Hungary	1
Iceland	1
Iran	1
Iraq	1
Jamaica	1
Jordan	1
Kenya	1
Kuwait	1
Latvia	1
Lebanon	1
Liberia	1
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1
Madagascar	1
Malta	1
Mauritania	1
Mauritius	1
Mozambique	1
Netherlands Antilles	1
Nicaragua	1
Nigeria	1
Oman	1
Panama	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Qatar	1
Saint Lucia	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Senegal	1
Slovakia	1
Sudan	1
Suriname	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Tajikistan	1
Togo	1
Tunisia	1
Turks and Caicos Islands	1
United Arab Emirates	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Venezuela	1

**Table 6.17.** Implemented measures that harm Brazil's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	58	22%
Bail out / state aid measure	48	18%
Non tariff barrier	27	10%
Export taxes or restriction	24	9%
Export subsidy	20	8%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	12	5%
Public procurement	11	4%
Local content requirement	10	4%
Import ban	9	3%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	8	3%
Trade finance	7	3%
Technical Barrier to Trade	6	2%
Competitive devaluation	5	2%
Consumption subsidy	5	2%
Investment measure	5	2%
Migration measure	5	2%
Import subsidy	3	1%
Other service sector measure	2	1%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	1%
State-controlled company	2	1%
Intellectual property protection	1	0%
Sub-national government measure	1	0%
Total	263	100%


**Table 6. 18** Brazil's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	22	42%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	15	29%
Trade finance	4	8%
Export subsidy	3	6%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	3	6%
Public procurement	2	4%
Bail out / state aid measure	1	2%
Export taxes or restriction	1	2%
Investment measure	1	2%
Local content requirement	1	2%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	2%
Total	52	100%




# BRAZIL

Map 6.5 Brazil: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



Map 6.6 Brazil: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others.



## Canada

**Table 6.19.** Foreign state measures affecting Canada's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Canada's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Canada's commercial interests	402	388
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Canada's commercial interests [1]	122	117
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Canada's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Canada's interests [2]	89	86
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Canada's interests [3]	191	185
Total number of implemented measures affecting Canada's commercial interests	352	341
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Canada's commercial interests	50	47
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Canada's foreign commercial interests	39	36
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Canada's commercial interests	63	63

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Canada" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.20.** Canada's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Canada's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Canada's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	47	36
Total number of Canada's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	11	7
Total number of Canada's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	18	16
Total number of Canada's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	18	13
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Canada that harm foreign commercial interests	17	9
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Canada that harm foreign commercial interests	13	8
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Canada that harm foreign commercial interests	44	43

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Canada" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.21.** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Canada's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	47
Argentina	21
India	12
France	11
Indonesia	11
Spain	10
Germany	9
Belarus	8
Italy	8
Kazakhstan	8
Poland	8
Sweden	8
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	8
Belgium	7
Brazil	7
China	7
Finland	7
Ireland	7
Netherlands	7
United States of America	7
Austria	6
Bulgaria	6
Cyprus	6
Czech Republic	6
Denmark	6
Estonia	6
Greece	6
Hungary	6
Latvia	6
Lithuania	6
Luxembourg	6
Malta	6
Portugal	6
Republic of Korea	6
Romania	6
Slovakia	6
Slovenia	6
European Communities	5
Ukraine	4
Australia	3
Japan	3
Viet Nam	3
Ghana	2
Malaysia	2
Morocco	2

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Singapore	2
South Africa	2
Switzerland	2
Algeria	1
Bolivia	1
Ecuador	1
Egypt	1
Ethiopia	1
Iran	1
Mexico	1
Nigeria	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Sri Lanka	1
Sudan	1
Thailand	1
Togo	1
Venezuela	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 6.22.** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Canada's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	9
United States of America	9
France	8
Mexico	6
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	6
India	5
Republic of Korea	5
Colombia	4
Germany	4
Iran	4
Morocco	4
Pakistan	4
Philippines	4
Romania	4
Sri Lanka	4
United Arab Emirates	4
Japan	3
Spain	3
Argentina	2
Australia	2
Brazil	2
Czech Republic	2
Hungary	2
Italy	2

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Netherlands	2
New Zealand	2
Austria	1
Chile	1
Croatia	1
Denmark	1
Finland	1
Indonesia	1
Ireland	1
Israel	1
Lebanon	1
Peru	1
Poland	1
Portugal	1
Singapore	1
South Africa	1
Sweden	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Ukraine	1

**Table 6.23.** Implemented measures that harm Canada's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	62	22%
Tariff measure	62	22%
Export subsidy	24	9%
Export taxes or restriction	23	8%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	23	8%
Public procurement	15	5%
Migration measure	12	4%
Local content requirement	9	3%
Trade finance	9	3%
Import ban	7	3%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	7	3%
Consumption subsidy	6	2%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	6	2%
Competitive devaluation	5	2%
State-controlled company	5	2%
Investment measure	4	1%
Other service sector measure	4	1%
State trading enterprise	4	1%
Technical Barrier to Trade	4	1%
Import subsidy	3	1%
Intellectual property protection	3	1%

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	3	1%
Sub-national government measure	1	0%
Total	280	100%


**Table 6.24.** Canada's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Migration measure	8	36%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	5	23%
Investment measure	3	14%
Local content requirement	2	9%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	5%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	5%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	5%
Trade finance	1	5%
Total	22	100%




# CANADA

**Map 6.7** Canada: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



Map 6.8 Canada: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# China

**Table 6.25.** Foreign state measures affecting China's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting China's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting China's commercial interests	864	604
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of China's commercial interests [1]	208	175
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm China's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against China's interests [2]	217	113
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against China's interests [3]	439	316
Total number of implemented measures affecting China's commercial interests	690	547
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect China's commercial interests	174	57
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm China's foreign commercial interests	148	44
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm China's commercial interests	81	73

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "China" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.26.** China's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting China's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of China's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	83	48
Total number of China's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	23	17
Total number of China's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	18	13
Total number of China's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	42	18
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by China that harm foreign commercial interests.	351	333
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by China that harm foreign commercial interests	41	35
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by China that harm foreign commercial interests	172	171

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "China" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.27.** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting China's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	69
Russian Federation	67
India	36
Germany	29
Brazil	27
France	27
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	27
Poland	26
Spain	26
Italy	25
Netherlands	25
Sweden	25
Austria	23
Belgium	23
Finland	23
Greece	23
Ireland	23
Latvia	23
Portugal	23
Romania	23
Slovakia	23
Cyprus	22
Czech Republic	22
Denmark	22
Estonia	22
Hungary	22
Lithuania	22
Malta	22
Slovenia	22
European Communities	21
Bulgaria	20
Indonesia	20
Luxembourg	20
Belarus	15
Kazakhstan	14
South Africa	14
United States of America	14
Viet Nam	11
Canada	9
Republic of Korea	9
Australia	6
Mexico	6
Ukraine	6
Japan	5
Nigeria	5

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Pakistan	5
Turkey	5
Algeria	3
Iran	3
Paraguay	3
Saudi Arabia	3
Thailand	3
Bolivia	2
Egypt	2
Ghana	2
Malaysia	2
Singapore	2
Switzerland	2
Venezuela	2
Zimbabwe	2
Bangladesh	1
Botswana	1
Chinese Taipei	1
Colombia	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ethiopia	1
Iraq	1
Israel	1
Jordan	1
Kyrgyzstan	1
Mongolia	1
New Zealand	1
Philippines	1
Sierra Leone	1
Sri Lanka	1
Sudan	1
Togo	1
Uganda	1
United Arab Emirates	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Uzbekistan	1

**Table 6.28.** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by China's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
United States of America	23
Germany	21
Netherlands	21
Italy	18
Japan	18

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Belgium	17
France	16
Republic of Korea	16
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	15
Thailand	13
Denmark	12
Spain	12
Sweden	12
Indonesia	11
Malaysia	11
Viet Nam	10
Austria	9
Czech Republic	9
Philippines	9
Poland	9
Russian Federation	9
Australia	8
Finland	8
India	8
Ireland	8
Turkey	8
Canada	7
Mexico	7
New Zealand	7
Switzerland	7
Brazil	6
Greece	6
Hungary	6
Israel	6
Saudi Arabia	6
Singapore	6
South Africa	6
Croatia	5
Luxembourg	5
Norway	5
Romania	5
Slovakia	5
United Arab Emirates	5
Argentina	4
Bangladesh	4
Bulgaria	4
Chinese Taipei	4
Costa Rica	4
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	4
Estonia	4
Iran	4
Lithuania	4

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Madagascar	4
Myanmar	4
Portugal	4
Slovenia	4
Ukraine	4
Belize	3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3
Cambodia	3
Chile	3
Colombia	3
Cuba	3
Dominican Republic	3
Egypt	3
El Salvador	3
Fiji	3
Iraq	3
Kazakhstan	3
Kenya	3
Kyrgyzstan	3
Latvia	3
Malta	3
Nigeria	3
Pakistan	3
Peru	3
Sri Lanka	3
Uzbekistan	3
Zimbabwe	3
Azerbaijan	2
Bahamas	2
Barbados	2
Belarus	2
Benin	2
Bermuda	2
Cyprus	2
Cote d'Ivoire	2
Ethiopia	2
Gabon	2
Ghana	2
Guyana	2
Iceland	2
Jamaica	2
Jordan	2
Kuwait	2
Lao People's Democratic Republic	2
Liberia	2
Malawi	2
Mauritius	2



Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Mongolia	2
Morocco	2
Mozambique	2
Netherlands Antilles	2
Panama	2
Paraguay	2
Qatar	2
Republic of Moldova	2
Serbia	2
Sierra Leone	2
Swaziland	2
Tunisia	2
United Republic of Tanzania	2
Vanuatu	2
Venezuela	2
Yemen	2
Zambia	2
Afghanistan	1
Albania	1
Algeria	1
Angola	1
Antigua and Barbuda	1
Aruba	1
Bahrain	1
Bolivia	1
Botswana	1
Burkina Faso	1
Cameroon	1
Cape Verde	1
Chad	1
Congo	1
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1
Djibouti	1
Ecuador	1
Equatorial Guinea	1
Eritrea	1
Gambia	1
Georgia	1
Guatemala	1
Guinea	1
Haiti	1
Honduras	1
Hong Kong	1
Kiribati	1
Lebanon	1
Lesotho	1
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Mali	1
Marshall Islands	1
Mauritania	1
Namibia	1
Nepal	1
New Caledonia	1
Nicaragua	1
Niger	1
Oman	1
Papua New Guinea	1
Rwanda	1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1
Senegal	1
Seychelles	1
Somalia	1
Sudan	1
Suriname	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Tajikistan	1
Togo	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Turkmenistan	1
Tuvalu	1
Uganda	1
Uruguay	1

**Table 6.29.** Implemented measures that harm China's commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	123	19%
Tariff measure	122	19%
Bail out / state aid measure	83	13%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	53	8%
Export taxes or restriction	35	5%
Export subsidy	27	4%
Migration measure	25	4%
Import ban	21	3%
Local content requirement	15	2%
Public procurement	15	2%
Trade finance	11	2%
Investment measure	9	1%
Consumption subsidy	7	1%
Other service sector measure	6	1%
Competitive devaluation	5	1%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	5	1%
Technical Barrier to Trade	5	1%

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Import subsidy	4	1%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	4	1%
State trading enterprise	4	1%
State-controlled company	2	0%
Intellectual property protection	1	0%
Sub-national government measure	1	0%
Total	656	100%

**Table 6.30.** China's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	14	27%
Export taxes or restriction	8	15%
Investment measure	6	12%
Public procurement	5	10%
Tariff measure	3	6%
Technical Barrier to Trade	3	6%
Local content requirement	2	4%
Consumption subsidy	1	2%
Import ban	1	2%
Intellectual property protection	1	2%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	2%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	2%
Total	52	100%

Map 6.9 China: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



# CHINA

Map 6.10 China: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# France

**Table 6.31.** Foreign state measures affecting France's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting France's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting France's commercial interests	537	489
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of France's commercial interests [1]	153	145
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm France's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against France's interests [2]	111	91
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against France's interests [3]	273	253
Total number of implemented measures affecting France's commercial interests	466	440
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect France's commercial interests	71	49
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm France's foreign commercial interests	57	37
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm France's commercial interests	63	61

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "France" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.2.** France's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting France's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of France's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	87	35
Total number of France's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	18	7
Total number of France's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	25	8
Total number of France's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	44	20
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by France that harm foreign commercial interests	112	83
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by France that harm foreign commercial interests	26	19
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by France that harm foreign commercial interests	149	148

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "France" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.33.** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting France's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	66
Argentina	26
China	16
Belarus	14
Indonesia	14
India	12
Kazakhstan	11
Brazil	10
Canada	8
Germany	7
Nigeria	7
South Africa	7
Italy	6
Republic of Korea	5
United States of America	5
Algeria	4
Poland	4
Spain	4
Ukraine	4
Australia	3
Japan	3
Saudi Arabia	3
Sweden	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
Viet Nam	3
Finland	2
Ghana	2
Iran	2
Malaysia	2
Netherlands	2
Pakistan	2
Singapore	2
Slovakia	2
Switzerland	2
Turkey	2
Venezuela	2
Austria	1
Belgium	1
Bolivia	1
Cameroon	1
Croatia	1
Cote d'Ivoire	1
Ecuador	1
Egypt	1
Ethiopia	1



Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Gambia	1
Greece	1
Hungary	1
Israel	1
Latvia	1
Mauritania	1
Mexico	1
Morocco	1
Paraguay	1
Portugal	1
Romania	1
Thailand	1
Togo	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
United Arab Emirates	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Zambia	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 6.34.** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by France's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	27
Canada	11
United States of America	11
India	10
South Africa	10
Turkey	10
Argentina	9
Japan	9
Switzerland	9
Thailand	9
Australia	8
Bosnia and Herzegovina	8
Brazil	8
Colombia	8
Croatia	8
Israel	8
Mexico	8
New Zealand	8
Serbia	8
Singapore	8
United Arab Emirates	8
Bulgaria	7
Malaysia	7

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Pakistan	7
Republic of Korea	7
Russian Federation	7
Belarus	6
Egypt	6
Kenya	6
Norway	6
Peru	6
Philippines	6
Republic of Moldova	6
Romania	6
Tunisia	6
Ukraine	6
Algeria	5
Armenia	5
Austria	5
Belgium	5
Costa Rica	5
Czech Republic	5
Cote d'Ivoire	5
Denmark	5
Dominican Republic	5
Greece	5
Ireland	5
Italy	5
Oman	5
Paraguay	5
Portugal	5
Sweden	5
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	5
Viet Nam	5
Chile	4
El Salvador	4
Estonia	4
Ethiopia	4
Germany	4
Guatemala	4
Indonesia	4
Jordan	4
Kazakhstan	4
Lebanon	4
Lithuania	4
Madagascar	4
Mauritius	4
Morocco	4
Netherlands	4
Nicaragua	4

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Senegal	4
Slovakia	4
Slovenia	4
Trinidad and Tobago	4
Zambia	4
Albania	3
Azerbaijan	3
Benin	3
Bolivia	3
Cuba	3
Cyprus	3
Finland	3
Ghana	3
Hong Kong	3
Hungary	3
Iceland	3
Iran	3
Luxembourg	3
Namibia	3
Netherlands Antilles	3
Poland	3
Saudi Arabia	3
Spain	3
Sudan	3
Uruguay	3
Yemen	3
Zimbabwe	3
Bangladesh	2
Barbados	2
Belize	2
Ecuador	2
Georgia	2
Guyana	2
Honduras	2
Jamaica	2
Kyrgyzstan	2
Latvia	2
Macedonia	2
Malawi	2
Mali	2
Nigeria	2
Panama	2
Qatar	2
Saint Lucia	2
Sri Lanka	2
Togo	2
Uganda	2

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
United Republic of Tanzania	2
Venezuela	2
Andorra	1
Angola	1
Bahrain	1
Burkina Faso	1
Burundi	1
Cameroon	1
Chinese Taipei	1
Comoros	1
Congo	1
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1
Equatorial Guinea	1
Faeroe Islands	1
Fiji	1
Gabon	1
Greenland	1
Guinea	1
Kuwait	1
Mayotte	1
Mozambique	1
New Caledonia	1
Niger	1
Palestinian	1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1
Seychelles	1
Sierra Leone	1
Suriname	1
Swaziland	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Tajikistan	1
Uzbekistan	1

**Table 6.35.** Implemented measures that harm France's commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	91	24%
Bail out / state aid measure	88	23%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	31	8%
Export taxes or restriction	23	6%
Export subsidy	20	5%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	20	5%
Migration measure	16	4%
Public procurement	14	4%
Local content requirement	12	3%

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade finance	10	3%
Import ban	9	2%
Investment measure	7	2%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	7	2%
Technical Barrier to Trade	7	2%
Consumption subsidy	6	2%
Competitive devaluation	5	1%
Other service sector measure	5	1%
State trading enterprise	5	1%
State-controlled company	5	1%
Import subsidy	4	1%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	3	1%
Intellectual property protection	2	1%
Sub-national government measure	1	0%
Total	384	100%

**Table 6.36.** France's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	24	49%
Bail out / state aid measure	12	24%
Export subsidy	7	14%
Investment measure	2	4%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	2	4%
Consumption subsidy	1	2%
Export taxes or restriction	1	2%
Local content requirement	1	2%
Public procurement	1	2%
Tariff measure	1	2%
Total	49	100%

**Map 6.11** France: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



# FRANCE

Map 6.12 France: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others.



# Germany

**Table 6.37.** Foreign state measures affecting Germany's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Germany's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Germany's commercial interests	630	558
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Germany's commercial interests [1]	180	166
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Germany's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Germany's interests [2]	131	104
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Germany's interests [3]	319	288
Total number of implemented measures affecting Germany's commercial interests	548	507
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Germany's commercial interests	82	51
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Germany's foreign commercial interests	68	41
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Germany's commercial interests	61	59

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Germany" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.



**Table 6.38.** Germany's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Germany's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Germany's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	94	42
Total number of Germany's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	19	8
Total number of Germany's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	23	6
Total number of Germany's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	52	28
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Germany that harm foreign commercial interests.	55	25
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Germany that harm foreign commercial interests	42	31
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Germany that harm foreign commercial interests	161	161

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Germany" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.39.** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Germany's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	72
Argentina	28
China	21
Belarus	20
Kazakhstan	18
India	17
Indonesia	16
Brazil	15
South Africa	10
Nigeria	7
Ukraine	7
Australia	6
Republic of Korea	6
United States of America	6
Italy	5
Viet Nam	5
Algeria	4
Canada	4
France	4
Japan	4
Pakistan	4
Poland	4
Saudi Arabia	4
Spain	4
Austria	3
Denmark	3
Malaysia	3
Sweden	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
Bolivia	2
Egypt	2
Finland	2
Ghana	2
Morocco	2
Netherlands	2
Slovakia	2
Switzerland	2
Turkey	2
Uzbekistan	2
Belgium	1
Cameroon	1
Croatia	1
Ecuador	1
Ethiopia	1
Gambia	1

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Greece	1
Hungary	1
Iran	1
Israel	1
Latvia	1
Mexico	1
Paraguay	1
Portugal	1
Republic of Moldova	1
Romania	1
Sudan	1
Thailand	1
Togo	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Venezuela	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 6.40.** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Germany's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	29
Japan	12
United States of America	12
Republic of Korea	11
Switzerland	11
India	10
Canada	9
Turkey	9
Australia	8
Brazil	7
Croatia	7
Denmark	7
France	7
New Zealand	7
Norway	7
Russian Federation	7
Singapore	7
Thailand	7
Austria	6
Egypt	6
Finland	6
Italy	6
Netherlands	6
Pakistan	6
Serbia	6

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
South Africa	6
Spain	6
Sweden	6
United Arab Emirates	6
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	6
Argentina	5
Belarus	5
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5
Colombia	5
El Salvador	5
Iceland	5
Iran	5
Malaysia	5
Oman	5
Paraguay	5
Philippines	5
Romania	5
Saudi Arabia	5
Viet Nam	5
Algeria	4
Bahrain	4
Belgium	4
Bolivia	4
Dominican Republic	4
Guatemala	4
Hong Kong	4
Hungary	4
Ireland	4
Israel	4
Jordan	4
Kazakhstan	4
Latvia	4
Lebanon	4
Mexico	4
Netherlands Antilles	4
Panama	4
Poland	4
Republic of Moldova	4
Slovakia	4
Sudan	4
Ukraine	4
Yemen	4
Zambia	4
Armenia	3
Bangladesh	3
Bulgaria	3
Chile	3

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Chinese Taipei	3
Costa Rica	3
Cote d'Ivoire	3
Ethiopia	3
Greece	3
Indonesia	3
Kenya	3
Kyrgyzstan	3
Liechtenstein	3
Lithuania	3
Macedonia	3
Mauritius	3
Nicaragua	3
Nigeria	3
Peru	3
Trinidad and Tobago	3
Tunisia	3
Uruguay	3
Zimbabwe	3
Albania	2
Azerbaijan	2
Barbados	2
Belize	2
Benin	2
Cyprus	2
Czech Republic	2
Ecuador	2
Ghana	2
Guyana	2
Jamaica	2
Luxembourg	2
Madagascar	2
Malawi	2
Morocco	2
Namibia	2
Qatar	2
Slovenia	2
Syrian Arab Republic	2
Tajikistan	2
Uganda	2
United Republic of Tanzania	2
Uzbekistan	2
Andorra	1
Angola	1
Antigua and Barbuda	1
Bahamas	1
Bermuda	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Burundi	1
Cayman Islands	1
Comoros	1
Congo	1
Cuba	1
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1
Equatorial Guinea	1
Faeroe Islands	1
Fiji	1
Gabon	1
Georgia	1
Greenland	1
Guinea	1
Honduras	1
Kuwait	1
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1
Liberia	1
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1
Mali	1
Malta	1
Marshall Islands	1
Mayotte	1
Mongolia	1
Mozambique	1
Myanmar	1
Nepal	1
New Caledonia	1
Niger	1
Palestinian	1
Papua New Guinea	1
Portugal	1
Saint Lucia	1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1
Senegal	1
Seychelles	1
Sierra Leone	1
Somalia	1
Sri Lanka	1
Swaziland	1
Togo	1
Turkmenistan	1
Venezuela	1

**Table 6.41.** Implemented measures that harm Germany's commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	115	26%
Bail out / state aid measure	87	19%
Export taxes or restriction	42	9%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	33	7%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	31	7%
Export subsidy	20	4%
Public procurement	17	4%
Local content requirement	15	3%
Import ban	14	3%
Migration measure	11	2%
Trade finance	11	2%
Technical Barrier to Trade	9	2%
Investment measure	8	2%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	7	2%
Consumption subsidy	6	1%
Other service sector measure	6	1%
Competitive devaluation	5	1%
Import subsidy	4	1%
State trading enterprise	3	1%
Intellectual property protection	2	0%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	0%
State-controlled company	2	0%
Sub-national government measure	1	0%
Total	450	100%

**Table 6.42.** Germany's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	24	44%
Bail out / state aid measure	21	38%
Export subsidy	6	11%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	2	4%
Export taxes or restriction	1	2%
Investment measure	1	2%
Other service sector measure	1	2%
Tariff measure	1	2%
Total	55	100%

# GERMANY


Map 6.13 Germany: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures.





# GERMANY

Map 6.14 Germany: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# India

**Table 6.43.** Foreign state measures affecting India's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting India's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting India's commercial interests	457	418
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of India's commercial interests [1]	128	121
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm India's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against India's interests [2]	104	86
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against India's interests [3]	225	211
Total number of implemented measures affecting India's commercial interests	392	373
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect India's commercial interests	54	36
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm India's foreign commercial interests	49	38
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm India's commercial interests	66	65

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "India" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.44.** India's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting India's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of India's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	131	62
Total number of India's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	41	27
Total number of India's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	40	14
Total number of India's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	50	21
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by India that harm foreign commercial interests	369	332
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by India that harm foreign commercial interests	32	30
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by India that harm foreign commercial interests	153	152

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "India" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.45.** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting India's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	45
Russian Federation	29
Indonesia	14
France	10
Germany	10
Spain	10
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	10
Netherlands	9
Poland	9
Brazil	8
China	8
Sweden	8
Austria	7
Belgium	7
Finland	7
Hungary	7
Ireland	7
Italy	7
Latvia	7
Portugal	7
Republic of Korea	7
Romania	7
Slovakia	7
United States of America	7
Bulgaria	6
Cyprus	6
Czech Republic	6
Denmark	6
Estonia	6
European Communities	6
Greece	6
Lithuania	6
Luxembourg	6
Malta	6
Slovenia	6
South Africa	6
Australia	5
Canada	5
Kazakhstan	5
Nigeria	5
Viet Nam	5
Belarus	4
Saudi Arabia	4
Ukraine	4
Algeria	3

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Malaysia	3
Pakistan	3
Sri Lanka	3
Ghana	2
Japan	2
Mexico	2
Singapore	2
United Arab Emirates	2
United Republic of Tanzania	2
Ecuador	1
Egypt	1
Ethiopia	1
Kenya	1
Paraguay	1
Peru	1
Sudan	1
Thailand	1
Togo	1
Turkey	1
Venezuela	1
Zambia	1

**Table 6.46** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by India's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	36
Thailand	19
Germany	17
Japan	17
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	17
Italy	16
Republic of Korea	16
United States of America	16
Singapore	15
Spain	15
Belgium	14
Malaysia	13
Australia	12
Canada	12
France	12
Indonesia	12
Russian Federation	12
Sweden	12
Brazil	11
Israel	11
Switzerland	11
Finland	10

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Netherlands	10
Saudi Arabia	10
South Africa	10
Turkey	10
Austria	9
Bangladesh	9
Egypt	9
Mexico	9
Poland	9
Portugal	9
United Arab Emirates	9
Denmark	8
Greece	8
Hong Kong	8
Nepal	8
Norway	8
Pakistan	8
Philippines	8
Sri Lanka	8
Ukraine	8
Viet Nam	8
Algeria	7
Argentina	7
Benin	7
Czech Republic	7
Ireland	7
Kazakhstan	7
Mauritius	7
Oman	7
Qatar	7
Romania	7
Senegal	7
United Republic of Tanzania	7
Zimbabwe	7
Azerbaijan	6
Chile	6
Cote d'Ivoire	6
Kenya	6
Kuwait	6
New Zealand	6
Nigeria	6
Peru	6
Slovenia	6
Sudan	6
Tunisia	6
Yemen	6
Afghanistan	5

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Bulgaria	5
Cambodia	5
Colombia	5
Croatia	5
Dominican Republic	5
Ecuador	5
Estonia	5
Fiji	5
Ghana	5
Guatemala	5
Hungary	5
Iran	5
Jordan	5
Latvia	5
Lebanon	5
Lithuania	5
Madagascar	5
Mali	5
Morocco	5
Mozambique	5
Panama	5
Togo	5
Trinidad and Tobago	5
Turkmenistan	5
Uganda	5
Uruguay	5
Venezuela	5
Zambia	5
Angola	4
Bahamas	4
Bhutan	4
Congo	4
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	4
Djibouti	4
Ethiopia	4
Gambia	4
Guinea	4
Honduras	4
Kyrgyzstan	4
Lesotho	4
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	4
Luxembourg	4
Malawi	4
Mauritania	4
Myanmar	4
Netherlands Antilles	4
Niger	4

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Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Slovakia	4
Syrian Arab Republic	4
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3
Cameroon	3
Swaziland	3
Armenia	2
Bahrain	2
Belarus	2
Burkina Faso	2
Chinese Taipei	2
Costa Rica	2
Cyprus	2
Gabon	2
Macedonia	2
Maldives	2
Nicaragua	2
Paraguay	2
Republic of Moldova	2
Uzbekistan	2
Albania	1
Brunei Darussalam	1
Central African Republic	1
Chad	1
Cuba	1
El Salvador	1
Eritrea	1
Georgia	1
Iceland	1
Iraq	1
Jamaica	1
Malta	1
Namibia	1
New Caledonia	1
Papua New Guinea	1
Serbia	1
Seychelles	1
Somalia	1

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
**Table 6.47.** Implemented measures that harm India's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	72	22%
Bail out / state aid measure	54	16%
Migration measure	51	16%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	26	8%
Export taxes or restriction	26	8%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	14	4%
Local content requirement	11	3%
Export subsidy	11	3%
Import ban	10	3%
Public procurement	10	3%
Trade finance	8	2%
Competitive devaluation	6	2%
Investment measure	6	2%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	5	2%
Technical Barrier to Trade	4	1%
Intellectual property protection	4	1%
Consumption subsidy	3	1%
Other service sector measure	3	1%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	1%
Import subsidy	2	1%
State-controlled company	1	0%
Sub-national government measure	1	0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>329</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Table 6.48.** India's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	29	45%
Tariff measure	12	19%
Export subsidy	9	14%
Export taxes or restriction	7	11%
Import ban	2	3%
Investment measure	2	3%
Migration measure	2	3%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	2	3%
Trade finance	2	3%
Import subsidy	1	2%
Local content requirement	1	2%
Public procurement	1	2%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>100%</b>


Map 6.15 India: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



INDIA

# INDIA

Map 6.16 India: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# Indonesia

**Table 6.49.** Foreign state measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests	342	302
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Indonesia's commercial interests [1]	99	89
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Indonesia's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Indonesia's interests [2]	82	69
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Indonesia's interests [3]	161	144
Total number of implemented measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests	291	266
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Indonesia's commercial interests	51	36
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Indonesia's foreign commercial interests	42	29
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Indonesia's commercial interests	56	55

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Indonesia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.50.** Indonesia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Indonesia's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	55	43
Total number of Indonesia's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	8	8
Total number of Indonesia's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	18	9
Total number of Indonesia's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	29	26
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Indonesia that harm foreign commercial interests	387	387
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Indonesia that harm foreign commercial interests	40	40
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Indonesia that harm foreign commercial interests	151	151

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Indonesia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.51.** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Indonesia's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	44
Russian Federation	15
India	12
China	11
Brazil	8
Republic of Korea	7
Pakistan	5
South Africa	5
United States of America	5
Viet Nam	5
Australia	4
France	4
Italy	4
Poland	4
Spain	4
Ukraine	4
Belgium	3
Finland	3
Germany	3
Japan	3
Mexico	3
Netherlands	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
Austria	2
Belarus	2
Bulgaria	2
Cyprus	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Estonia	2
Ghana	2
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Ireland	2
Latvia	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2
Malaysia	2
Malta	2
Nigeria	2
Portugal	2
Romania	2
Singapore	2
Slovakia	2
Slovenia	2

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Sweden	2
Canada	1
Ethiopia	1
European Communities	1
Jordan	1
Kazakhstan	1
Paraguay	1
Sri Lanka	1
Turkey	1
Uganda	1
Venezuela	1

**Table 6.52.** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Indonesia's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	20
United States of America	19
Singapore	18
Australia	17
Malaysia	17
Germany	16
Thailand	16
Netherlands	15
Republic of Korea	15
France	14
India	14
Japan	14
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	14
Belgium	13
Brazil	13
Philippines	13
Spain	13
Italy	12
Sweden	12
Viet Nam	12
Canada	11
Denmark	11
Finland	11
Switzerland	11
New Zealand	10
South Africa	10
United Arab Emirates	10
Austria	9
Hong Kong	9
Ireland	9

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Mexico	9
Argentina	8
Czech Republic	8
Norway	8
Turkey	8
Chile	7
Israel	7
Morocco	7
Poland	7
Russian Federation	7
Ukraine	7
Bulgaria	6
Egypt	6
Estonia	6
Greece	6
Hungary	6
Luxembourg	6
Portugal	6
Croatia	5
Cote d'Ivoire	5
Lithuania	5
Pakistan	5
Romania	5
Slovakia	5
Slovenia	5
Sri Lanka	5
Tunisia	5
Belarus	4
Colombia	4
Ghana	4
Jordan	4
Kenya	4
Myanmar	4
Nigeria	4
Oman	4
Saudi Arabia	4
Senegal	4
United Republic of Tanzania	4
Yemen	4
Bangladesh	3
Benin	3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3
Brunei Darussalam	3
Costa Rica	3
Cyprus	3
Ecuador	3
Guatemala	3



Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Iran	3
Lebanon	3
Madagascar	3
Mauritius	3
Mozambique	3
Panama	3
Papua New Guinea	3
Peru	3
Qatar	3
Syrian Arab Republic	3
Timor-Leste	3
Togo	3
Uruguay	3
Venezuela	3
Algeria	2
American Samoa	2
Angola	2
Bahrain	2
Cambodia	2
Cameroon	2
Djibouti	2
Dominican Republic	2
El Salvador	2
Georgia	2
Iceland	2
Iraq	2
Kazakhstan	2
Kuwait	2
Latvia	2
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	2
Macedonia	2
Namibia	2
Samoa	2
Serbia	2
Sudan	2
Albania	1
Armenia	1
Azerbaijan	1
Bahamas	1
Barbados	1
Bolivia	1
Botswana	1
British Virgin Islands	1
Cape Verde	1
Chinese Taipei	1
Congo	1
Cuba	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1
Ethiopia	1
Fiji	1
Gabon	1
Gambia	1
Guinea	1
Guinea-Bissau	1
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1
Macao	1
Maldives	1
Mali	1
Malta	1
Marshall Islands	1
Mauritania	1
Nepal	1
Netherlands Antilles	1
Niger	1
Palestinian	1
Republic of Moldova	1
Sierra Leone	1
Solomon Islands	1
Swaziland	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Turkmenistan	1
Uganda	1
Zambia	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 6.53.** Implemented measures that harm Indonesia's commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	52	21%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	40	16%
Bail out / state aid measure	30	12%
Export taxes or restriction	20	8%
Export subsidy	17	7%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	17	7%
Migration measure	11	5%
Trade finance	10	4%
Public procurement	9	4%
Import ban	7	3%
Local content requirement	6	2%
Competitive devaluation	5	2%
Technical Barrier to Trade	5	2%
Investment measure	4	2%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	4	2%

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Other service sector measure	3	1%
Consumption subsidy	2	1%
Import subsidy	2	1%
Intellectual property protection	2	1%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	1%
State-controlled company	1	0%
Sub-national government measure	1	0%
Total	243	100%

**Table 6.54.** Indonesia's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Export taxes or restriction	5	16%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	5	16%
Tariff measure	5	16%
Bail out / state aid measure	3	9%
Other service sector measure	3	9%
Public procurement	3	9%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	3	9%
Import ban	2	6%
Technical Barrier to Trade	2	6%
Import subsidy	1	3%
Investment measure	1	3%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	3%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	1	3%
State-controlled company	1	3%
Total	32	100%


Map 6.17 Indonesia: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



INDONESIA

# INDONESIA

Map 6.18 Indonesia: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# Italy

**Table 6.55.** Foreign state measures affecting Italy's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Italy's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Italy's commercial interests	524	470
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Italy's commercial interests [1]	146	139
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Italy's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Italy's interests [2]	112	89
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Italy's interests [3]	266	242
Total number of implemented measures affecting Italy's commercial interests	452	424
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Italy's commercial interests	72	46
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Italy's foreign commercial interests	58	35
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Italy's commercial interests	58	56

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Italy" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.56.** Italy's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Italy's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Italy's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	79	28
Total number of Italy's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	17	6
Total number of Italy's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	20	4
Total number of Italy's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	42	18
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Italy that harm foreign commercial interests	62	34
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Italy that harm foreign commercial interests	25	15
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Italy that harm foreign commercial interests	145	144

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Italy" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.57.** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Italy's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	66
Argentina	27
China	18
India	16
Belarus	15
Kazakhstan	13
Indonesia	12
Brazil	8
Germany	6
Ukraine	6
France	5
Nigeria	5
Republic of Korea	5
Algeria	4
Australia	4
Pakistan	4
Poland	4
Saudi Arabia	4
South Africa	4
Spain	4
Egypt	3
Israel	3
Japan	3
Turkey	3
United States of America	3
Viet Nam	3
Austria	2
Canada	2
Malaysia	2
Mexico	2
Netherlands	2
Slovakia	2
Sweden	2
Switzerland	2
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	2
Venezuela	2
Armenia	1
Belgium	1
Bolivia	1
Cameroon	1
Croatia	1
Ecuador	1
Ethiopia	1
Finland	1
Ghana	1



Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Greece	1
Hungary	1
Iran	1
Jordan	1
Latvia	1
Morocco	1
Republic of Moldova	1
Romania	1
Sri Lanka	1
Sudan	1
Thailand	1
United Arab Emirates	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1

**Table 6.58.** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Italy's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	25
United States of America	11
Japan	10
Switzerland	10
Canada	8
Republic of Korea	8
Thailand	8
Croatia	7
India	7
Turkey	7
Brazil	6
France	6
Israel	6
Serbia	6
United Arab Emirates	6
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	6
Argentina	5
Australia	5
Austria	5
Belgium	5
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5
Bulgaria	5
Colombia	5
Germany	5
Malaysia	5
Mexico	5
Netherlands	5
Oman	5
Republic of Moldova	5

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Russian Federation	5
Singapore	5
South Africa	5
Spain	5
Tunisia	5
Algeria	4
Egypt	4
El Salvador	4
Indonesia	4
New Zealand	4
Pakistan	4
Paraguay	4
Philippines	4
Romania	4
Saudi Arabia	4
Ukraine	4
Viet Nam	4
Zambia	4
Albania	3
Armenia	3
Belarus	3
Bolivia	3
Costa Rica	3
Czech Republic	3
Cote d'Ivoire	3
Denmark	3
Dominican Republic	3
Finland	3
Ghana	3
Greece	3
Guatemala	3
Hong Kong	3
Hungary	3
Iran	3
Jordan	3
Kazakhstan	3
Kenya	3
Lebanon	3
Mauritius	3
Morocco	3
Netherlands Antilles	3
Nicaragua	3
Norway	3
Slovakia	3
Slovenia	3
Sudan	3
Sweden	3

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Trinidad and Tobago	3
Yemen	3
Zimbabwe	3
Bangladesh	2
Barbados	2
Belize	2
Benin	2
Chile	2
Ethiopia	2
Guyana	2
Iceland	2
Ireland	2
Jamaica	2
Kyrgyzstan	2
Macedonia	2
Madagascar	2
Malawi	2
Namibia	2
Nigeria	2
Panama	2
Peru	2
Portugal	2
Syrian Arab Republic	2
Uganda	2
United Republic of Tanzania	2
Uruguay	2
Andorra	1
Angola	1
Azerbaijan	1
Bahrain	1
Burundi	1
Chinese Taipei	1
Comoros	1
Congo	1
Cuba	1
Cyprus	1
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1
Ecuador	1
Equatorial Guinea	1
Estonia	1
Faeroe Islands	1
Fiji	1
Gabon	1
Georgia	1
Greenland	1
Guinea	1
Honduras	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Kuwait	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Mali	1
Malta	1
Mayotte	1
Mozambique	1
New Caledonia	1
Niger	1
Palestinian	1
Poland	1
Qatar	1
Saint Lucia	1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1
Senegal	1
Seychelles	1
Sierra Leone	1
Sri Lanka	1
Swaziland	1
Tajikistan	1
Togo	1
Uzbekistan	1

**Table 6.59.** Implemented measures that harm Italy's commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	88	23%
Bail out / state aid measure	80	21%
Export taxes or restriction	41	11%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	27	7%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	24	6%
Export subsidy	19	5%
Public procurement	14	4%
Local content requirement	12	3%
Import ban	8	2%
Technical Barrier to Trade	8	2%
Trade finance	8	2%
Consumption subsidy	7	2%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	7	2%
Competitive devaluation	5	1%
Investment measure	5	1%
Migration measure	5	1%
Import subsidy	3	1%
Other service sector measure	3	1%
State trading enterprise	3	1%
Intellectual property protection	2	1%

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	1%
State-controlled company	2	1%
Sub-national government measure	1	0%
Total	378	100%

**Table 6.60.** Italy's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	24	53%
Bail out / state aid measure	12	27%
Export subsidy	6	13%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	2	4%
Export taxes or restriction	1	2%
Investment measure	1	2%
Tariff measure	1	2%
Total	45	100%

Map 6.19 Italy: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



# ITALY

Map 6.20 Italy: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# Japan

**Table 6.61.** Foreign state measures affecting Japan's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Japan's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Japan's commercial interests	505	458
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Japan's commercial interests [1]	154	143
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Japan's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Japan's interests [2]	113	95
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Japan's interests [3]	238	220
Total number of implemented measures affecting Japan's commercial interests	434	408
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Japan's commercial interests	71	50
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Japan's foreign commercial interests	54	36
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Japan's commercial interests	66	65

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Japan" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.



**Table 6.62.** Japan's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Japan's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Japan's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	25	18
Total number of Japan's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	0	0
Total number of Japan's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	3	3
Total number of Japan's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	22	15
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Japan that harm foreign commercial interests.	135	131
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Japan that harm foreign commercial interests	12	12
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Japan that harm foreign commercial interests	111	110

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Japan" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.63.** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Japan's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	45
Argentina	26
China	18
India	17
Indonesia	14
Germany	12
Italy	10
Viet Nam	10
Belarus	9
Brazil	9
France	9
Poland	9
Spain	9
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	9
Sweden	8
Kazakhstan	7
Netherlands	7
Republic of Korea	7
Belgium	6
Finland	6
Hungary	6
Romania	6
Slovakia	6
United States of America	6
Austria	5
Bulgaria	5
Cyprus	5
Czech Republic	5
Denmark	5
Estonia	5
Greece	5
Ireland	5
Latvia	5
Lithuania	5
Luxembourg	5
Malta	5
Nigeria	5
Portugal	5
Slovenia	5
European Communities	4
Canada	3
South Africa	3
Australia	2
Malaysia	2
Pakistan	2

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Singapore	2
Uganda	2
Ukraine	2
Venezuela	2
Algeria	1
Bangladesh	1
Bolivia	1
Ecuador	1
Egypt	1
Ethiopia	1
Gambia	1
Ghana	1
Iran	1
Mauritania	1
Mexico	1
Philippines	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Sudan	1
Thailand	1
Togo	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 6.64.** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Japan's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Belgium	7
Australia	6
China	5
Netherlands	5
Germany	4
Singapore	4
United States of America	4
Canada	3
Denmark	3
France	3
Indonesia	3
Italy	3
Malaysia	3
New Zealand	3
Philippines	3
Republic of Korea	3
Switzerland	3
Thailand	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
Austria	2
Brazil	2

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Chile	2
India	2
Morocco	2
Norway	2
South Africa	2
Sweden	2
Viet Nam	2
Afghanistan	1
Argentina	1
Belarus	1
Belize	1
Bolivia	1
Bulgaria	1
Burkina Faso	1
Colombia	1
Cook Islands	1
Costa Rica	1
Croatia	1
Cuba	1
Cyprus	1
Czech Republic	1
Cote d'Ivoire	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ecuador	1
Egypt	1
Ethiopia	1
Fiji	1
Finland	1
Ghana	1
Greece	1
Greenland	1
Guam	1
Guatemala	1
Honduras	1
Hong Kong	1
Hungary	1
Iceland	1
Iran	1
Ireland	1
Israel	1
Kazakhstan	1
Kenya	1
Kiribati	1
Latvia	1
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1
Lithuania	1
Madagascar	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Malawi	1
Maldives	1
Malta	1
Marshall Islands	1
Mauritius	1
Mexico	1
Mozambique	1
Myanmar	1
Namibia	1
Netherlands Antilles	1
New Caledonia	1
Nicaragua	1
Nigeria	1
Oman	1
Pakistan	1
Palau	1
Panama	1
Papua New Guinea	1
Paraguay	1
Peru	1
Poland	1
Portugal	1
Russian Federation	1
Saint Helena	1
Senegal	1
Serbia	1
Seychelles	1
Solomon Islands	1
Spain	1
Sri Lanka	1
Sudan	1
Swaziland	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Tonga	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Tunisia	1
Turkey	1
Uganda	1
Ukraine	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Uruguay	1
Vanuatu	1
Venezuela	1

**Table 6.65.** Implemented measures that harm Japan's commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	73	21%
Bail out / state aid measure	72	21%
Export taxes or restriction	35	10%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	28	8%
Export subsidy	22	6%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	18	5%
Import ban	16	5%
Public procurement	13	4%
Migration measure	12	3%
Local content requirement	11	3%
Trade finance	10	3%
Investment measure	7	2%
Technical Barrier to Trade	7	2%
Competitive devaluation	5	1%
Consumption subsidy	5	1%
Other service sector measure	5	1%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	5	1%
Import subsidy	3	1%
Intellectual property protection	3	1%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	1%
State trading enterprise	2	1%
State-controlled company	2	1%
Total	351	100%

**Table 6.66.** Japan's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade finance	8	33%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	7	29%
Bail out / state aid measure	6	25%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	2	8%
Consumption subsidy	1	4%
Public procurement	1	4%
Sub-national government measure	1	4%
Total	24	100%

# JAPAN

**Map 6.21** Japan: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



Map 6.22 Japan: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others





# Mexico

**Table 6.67.** Foreign state measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests	334	312
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Mexico's commercial interests [1]	102	95
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Mexico's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Mexico's interests [2]	81	73
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Mexico's interests [3]	151	144
Total number of implemented measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests	287	273
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Mexico's commercial interests	47	39
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Mexico's foreign commercial interests	39	31
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Mexico's commercial interests	57	56

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Mexico" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.68.** Mexico's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Mexico's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	28	14
Total number of Mexico's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	11	8
Total number of Mexico's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	7	1
Total number of Mexico's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	10	5
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Mexico that harm foreign commercial interests	86	81
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Mexico that harm foreign commercial interests	25	24
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Mexico that harm foreign commercial interests	36	35

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Mexico" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.69.** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Mexico's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	33
Argentina	16
United States of America	10
India	9
Indonesia	9
Brazil	8
France	8
China	7
Canada	6
Netherlands	6
Italy	5
Spain	5
Sweden	5
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	5
Belgium	4
Finland	4
Germany	4
Poland	4
Romania	4
Slovakia	4
Austria	3
Bulgaria	3
Cyprus	3
Czech Republic	3
Denmark	3
Estonia	3
European Communities	3
Greece	3
Hungary	3
Ireland	3
Latvia	3
Lithuania	3
Luxembourg	3
Malta	3
Portugal	3
Republic of Korea	3
Slovenia	3
Venezuela	3
Australia	2
Belarus	2
Bolivia	2
Nigeria	2
South Africa	2
Switzerland	2
Ukraine	2

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Viet Nam	2
Ecuador	1
Ethiopia	1
Iran	1
Japan	1
Kazakhstan	1
Malaysia	1
Pakistan	1
Peru	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Thailand	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1

**Table 6.70.** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Mexico's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	6
United States of America	5
Indonesia	3
Argentina	2
Colombia	2
Guatemala	2
India	2
Italy	2
Malaysia	2
Philippines	2
Spain	2
Thailand	2
Viet Nam	2
Australia	1
Austria	1
Brazil	1
Canada	1
Chinese Taipei	1
Costa Rica	1
Cuba	1
Czech Republic	1
Denmark	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ecuador	1
France	1
Germany	1
Honduras	1
Hungary	1
Israel	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Japan	1
Nicaragua	1
Pakistan	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Slovenia	1
South Africa	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1

**Table 6.71.** Implemented measures that harm Mexico's commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	57	25%
Tariff measure	43	19%
Export subsidy	22	9%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	16	7%
Export taxes or restriction	14	6%
Migration measure	11	5%
Public procurement	11	5%
Local content requirement	10	4%
Trade finance	8	3%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	7	3%
Consumption subsidy	6	3%
Competitive devaluation	5	2%
Import ban	4	2%
Other service sector measure	4	2%
Import subsidy	3	1%
Investment measure	3	1%
State-controlled company	3	1%
Technical Barrier to Trade	3	1%
Intellectual property protection	2	1%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	2	1%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	1%
State trading enterprise	2	1%
Sub-national government measure	1	0%
Total	232	100%

**Table 6.72.** Mexico's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	5	50%
Tariff measure	3	30%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	10%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	1	10%
Total	10	100%

# MEXICO

**Map 6.23** Mexico: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



Map 6.24 Mexico: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



MEXICO



# Republic of Korea

**Table 6.73.** Foreign state measures affecting Republic of Korea's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Republic of Korea's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Republic of Korea's commercial interests	499	435
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Republic of Korea's commercial interests [1]	141	129
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Republic of Korea's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Republic of Korea's interests [2]	116	88
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Republic of Korea's interests [3]	242	218
Total number of implemented measures affecting Republic of Korea's commercial interests	430	399
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Republic of Korea's commercial interests	69	36
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Republic of Korea's foreign commercial interests	58	30
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Republic of Korea's commercial interests	62	60

Note: As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Republic of Korea" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.74.** Republic of Korea's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Republic of Korea's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Republic of Korea's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	39	34
Total number of Republic of Korea's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	8	7
Total number of Republic of Korea's measures that		
(i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or	13	9
(ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]		
Total number of Republic of Korea's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	18	18
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Republic of Korea that harm foreign commercial interests.	195	195
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Republic of Korea that harm foreign commercial interests	32	32
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Republic of Korea that harm foreign commercial interests	120	120

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Republic of Korea" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.75.** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Republic of Korea's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	49
Argentina	44
China	16
India	16
Indonesia	15
Germany	11
Poland	9
Spain	9
Belarus	8
Italy	8
Brazil	7
France	7
Netherlands	7
Sweden	7
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	7
Viet Nam	7
Austria	6
Belgium	6
Finland	6
Hungary	6
Latvia	6
Romania	6
Slovakia	6
Bulgaria	5
Canada	5
Cyprus	5
Czech Republic	5
Denmark	5
Estonia	5
Greece	5
Ireland	5
Kazakhstan	5
Lithuania	5
Luxembourg	5
Malta	5
Nigeria	5
Portugal	5
Slovenia	5
European Communities	4
United States of America	4
Japan	3
Pakistan	3
South Africa	3
Ukraine	3
Uzbekistan	3

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Malaysia	2
Saudi Arabia	2
Singapore	2
Venezuela	2
Algeria	1
Australia	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ecuador	1
Ethiopia	1
Ghana	1
Iran	1
Philippines	1
Sierra Leone	1
Sri Lanka	1
Sudan	1
Thailand	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 6.76.** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Republic of Korea's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	9
India	7
Indonesia	7
Japan	7
United States of America	7
Canada	6
Germany	6
Norway	6
Thailand	6
Australia	5
Brazil	5
Denmark	5
Finland	5
France	5
Italy	5
Malaysia	5
New Zealand	5
Philippines	5
Poland	5
Romania	5
Russian Federation	5
Singapore	5
Turkey	5
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	5

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Belgium	4
Croatia	4
Estonia	4
Israel	4
Saudi Arabia	4
South Africa	4
Spain	4
Sweden	4
Switzerland	4
Viet Nam	4
Algeria	3
Austria	3
Bulgaria	3
Chile	3
Costa Rica	3
Czech Republic	3
Hong Kong	3
Iceland	3
Ireland	3
Kuwait	3
Mexico	3
Morocco	3
Netherlands	3
Nigeria	3
Pakistan	3
Panama	3
Slovakia	3
Sri Lanka	3
Tunisia	3
Uruguay	3
Angola	2
Argentina	2
Azerbaijan	2
Cambodia	2
Cameroon	2
Chinese Taipei	2
Cyprus	2
Egypt	2
Greece	2
Guinea	2
Hungary	2
Iran	2
Kyrgyzstan	2
Latvia	2
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Mongolia	2
Myanmar	2
Oman	2
Peru	2
Portugal	2
Qatar	2
Slovenia	2
Swaziland	2
United Arab Emirates	2
Uzbekistan	2
Afghanistan	1
Aruba	1
Bahamas	1
Bahrain	1
Belarus	1
British Virgin Islands	1
Brunei Darussalam	1
Colombia	1
Congo	1
Cuba	1
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ecuador	1
El Salvador	1
Ethiopia	1
Faeroe Islands	1
Georgia	1
Ghana	1
Greenland	1
Guatemala	1
Guinea-Bissau	1
Honduras	1
Iraq	1
Kazakhstan	1
Kenya	1
Malta	1
Marshall Islands	1
Mauritania	1
Namibia	1
Netherlands Antilles	1
Nicaragua	1
Paraguay	1
Samoa	1
Senegal	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1
Ukraine	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Venezuela	1
Yemen	1


**Table 6.77.** Implemented measures that harm Republic of Korea's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	71	20%
Bail out / state aid measure	67	19%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	44	12%
Export taxes or restriction	31	9%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	24	7%
Export subsidy	20	6%
Migration measure	14	4%
Import ban	13	4%
Public procurement	12	3%
Local content requirement	9	3%
Technical Barrier to Trade	7	2%
Trade finance	7	2%
Competitive devaluation	5	1%
Consumption subsidy	5	1%
Investment measure	4	1%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	4	1%
Import subsidy	3	1%
Other service sector measure	3	1%
Intellectual property protection	2	1%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	1%
State trading enterprise	2	1%
State-controlled company	2	1%
Sub-national government measure	1	0%
Total	358	100%

**Table 6.78.** Republic of Korea's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade finance	9	41%
Bail out / state aid measure	5	23%
Tariff measure	5	23%
Investment measure	3	14%
Migration measure	3	14%
Intellectual property protection	1	5%
Total	22	100%

Map 6.25 Republic of Korea: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory




# REPUBLIC OF KOREA



# REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Map 6.26 Republic of Korea: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by



# Russian Federation

**Table 6.79.** Foreign state measures affecting Russian Federation's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Russian Federation's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Russian Federation's commercial interests	293	260
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Russian Federation's commercial interests [1]	82	76
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Russian Federation's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Russian Federation's interests [2]	75	58
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Russian Federation's interests [3]	136	126
Total number of implemented measures affecting Russian Federation's commercial interests	245	231
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Russian Federation's commercial interests	48	29
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Russian Federation's foreign commercial interests	37	20
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Russian Federation's commercial interests	60	58

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Russian Federation" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.80.** Russian Federation's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Russian Federation's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Russian Federation's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	170	156
Total number of Russian Federation's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	48	48
Total number of Russian Federation's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	17	15
Total number of Russian Federation's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	105	93
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Russian Federation that harm foreign commercial interests	438	433
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Russian Federation that harm foreign commercial interests	39	38
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Russian Federation that harm foreign commercial interests	143	141

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Russian Federation" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.81.** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Russian Federation's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	19
India	12
China	9
Kazakhstan	9
Ukraine	8
France	7
Germany	7
Indonesia	7
Spain	7
Poland	6
Slovakia	6
Belarus	5
Finland	5
Ireland	5
Italy	5
Latvia	5
Netherlands	5
Republic of Korea	5
Romania	5
Sweden	5
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	5
Austria	4
Belgium	4
Brazil	4
Bulgaria	4
Cyprus	4
Czech Republic	4
Denmark	4
Estonia	4
Greece	4
Hungary	4
Lithuania	4
Luxembourg	4
Malta	4
Portugal	4
Slovenia	4
United States of America	4
Uzbekistan	4
Viet Nam	4
European Communities	3
Nigeria	3
Egypt	2
Morocco	2
Armenia	1
Australia	1

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Cameroon	1
Ethiopia	1
Iran	1
Japan	1
Kyrgyzstan	1
Malaysia	1
Mongolia	1
Philippines	1
Sierra Leone	1
South Africa	1
Switzerland	1
Thailand	1
Turkey	1
Venezuela	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 6.82.** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Russian Federation's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Germany	72
Ukraine	70
China	67
France	66
Italy	66
United States of America	65
Poland	61
Finland	57
Belgium	54
Netherlands	54
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	54
Spain	53
Sweden	53
Turkey	53
Czech Republic	51
Lithuania	49
Republic of Korea	49
Austria	48
Hungary	48
Canada	47
Japan	45
Denmark	38
Latvia	38
Slovakia	37
Thailand	35
Mexico	33

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Switzerland	32
Portugal	30
Romania	30
India	29
Iran	29
Slovenia	29
Uzbekistan	29
Brazil	27
Kazakhstan	27
Estonia	23
Norway	23
Argentina	22
Republic of Moldova	22
Singapore	22
Australia	21
Greece	20
Bulgaria	19
Israel	17
Malaysia	17
Azerbaijan	16
Serbia	16
Indonesia	15
Kyrgyzstan	15
Ireland	14
Armenia	13
Egypt	13
South Africa	13
Viet Nam	13
Luxembourg	12
United Arab Emirates	12
Uruguay	12
Croatia	11
Georgia	11
New Zealand	11
Turkmenistan	11
Hong Kong	9
Mongolia	9
Cyprus	8
Tajikistan	8
Iceland	7
Pakistan	7
Peru	7
Philippines	7
Saudi Arabia	7
Tunisia	7
Albania	6
Algeria	6

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Chile	6
Colombia	6
Kenya	6
Jordan	5
Lebanon	5
Sri Lanka	5
Uganda	5
Afghanistan	4
Bangladesh	4
Belarus	4
Bosnia and Herzegovina	4
Cuba	4
Democratic Republic of the Congo	4
Guatemala	4
Malawi	4
Morocco	4
Rwanda	4
Sudan	4
Syrian Arab Republic	4
United Republic of Tanzania	4
Cote d'Ivoire	3
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	3
Ghana	3
Iraq	3
Kuwait	3
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	3
Malta	3
Namibia	3
Nigeria	3
Oman	3
Panama	3
Paraguay	3
Venezuela	3
Yemen	3
Bahamas	2
Chinese Taipei	2
Costa Rica	2
Dominican Republic	2
Ecuador	2
El Salvador	2
Eritrea	2
Ethiopia	2
Guinea	2
Jamaica	2
Mauritania	2
Mauritius	2
Mozambique	2

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Niger	2
Qatar	2
Zambia	2
Zimbabwe	2
Barbados	1
Bolivia	1
British Virgin Islands	1
Cameroon	1
Faeroe Islands	1
Gambia	1
Greenland	1
Honduras	1
Liberia	1
Macao	1
Netherlands Antilles	1
Nicaragua	1
Papua New Guinea	1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1
Samoa	1
Togo	1
Trinidad and Tobago	1

**Table 6.83.** Implemented measures that harm Russian Federation's commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	44	21%
Bail out / state aid measure	32	15%
Export taxes or restriction	26	12%
Export subsidy	21	10%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	16	8%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	10	5%
Public procurement	9	4%
Trade finance	8	4%
Local content requirement	7	3%
Migration measure	7	3%
Competitive devaluation	5	2%
Import ban	4	2%
Investment measure	3	1%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	3	1%
Consumption subsidy	2	1%
Import subsidy	2	1%
Technical Barrier to Trade	2	1%
Other service sector measure	1	0%
Total	211	100%



**Table 6.84.** Russian Federation's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	41	35%
Tariff measure	38	32%
Export taxes or restriction	13	11%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	12	10%
State-controlled company	7	6%
State trading enterprise	6	5%
Other service sector measure	4	3%
Public procurement	4	3%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	4	3%
Consumption subsidy	3	3%
Export subsidy	3	3%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	3	3%
Local content requirement	2	2%
Import subsidy	1	1%
Migration measure	1	1%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	1%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>100%</b>


Map 6.27 Russian Federation: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



RUSSIAN FEDERATION

# RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Map 6.28 Russian Federation: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# Saudi Arabia

**Table 6.85.** Foreign state measures affecting Saudi Arabia's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Saudi Arabia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Saudi Arabia's commercial interests	150	134
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Saudi Arabia's commercial interests [1]	32	27
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Saudi Arabia's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Saudi Arabia's interests [2]	52	45
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Saudi Arabia's interests [3]	66	62
Total number of implemented measures affecting Saudi Arabia's commercial interests	124	116
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Saudi Arabia's commercial interests	26	18
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Saudi Arabia's foreign commercial interests	22	15
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Saudi Arabia's commercial interests	50	49

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Saudi Arabia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.86.** Saudi Arabia's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Saudi Arabia's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Saudi Arabia's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	11	11
Total number of Saudi Arabia's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	1	1
Total number of Saudi Arabia's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	1	1
Total number of Saudi Arabia's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	9	9
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Saudi Arabia that harm foreign commercial interests	22	22
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Saudi Arabia that harm foreign commercial interests	6	6
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Saudi Arabia that harm foreign commercial interests	35	35

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Saudi Arabia" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.87.** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Saudi Arabia's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
India	10
Argentina	8
Russian Federation	7
China	6
Germany	5
Finland	4
Indonesia	4
Italy	4
Poland	4
Republic of Korea	4
Spain	4
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	4
Austria	3
Belgium	3
Bulgaria	3
Cyprus	3
Czech Republic	3
Denmark	3
Egypt	3
Estonia	3
France	3
Greece	3
Hungary	3
Ireland	3
Latvia	3
Lithuania	3
Luxembourg	3
Malta	3
Netherlands	3
Portugal	3
Romania	3
Slovakia	3
Slovenia	3
Sweden	3
Algeria	2
European Communities	2
South Africa	2
Belarus	1
Brazil	1
Ethiopia	1
Jordan	1
Kazakhstan	1
Malaysia	1
Mexico	1
Nigeria	1

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Sudan	1
Thailand	1
Ukraine	1
United States of America	1
Viet Nam	1

**Table 6.88.** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Saudi Arabia's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Germany	4
India	4
Italy	4
China	3
France	3
Spain	3
Turkey	3
United Arab Emirates	3
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	3
United States of America	3
Egypt	2
Republic of Korea	2
Thailand	2
Yemen	2
Austria	1
Bangladesh	1
Belgium	1
Brazil	1
Canada	1
Czech Republic	1
Finland	1
Japan	1
Jordan	1
Kuwait	1
Malaysia	1
Mexico	1
Netherlands	1
Norway	1
Pakistan	1
Philippines	1
Singapore	1
South Africa	1
Sweden	1
Switzerland	1
Ukraine	1

**Table 6.89.** Implemented measures that harm Saudi Arabia's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	24	20%
Export taxes or restriction	22	19%
Bail out / state aid measure	16	14%
Export subsidy	16	14%
Trade finance	6	5%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	5	4%
Competitive devaluation	4	3%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	4	3%
Investment measure	3	3%
Public procurement	3	3%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	3	3%
Import subsidy	2	2%
Migration measure	2	2%
Other service sector measure	2	2%
Import ban	1	1%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	1%
Technical Barrier to Trade	1	1%
Total	118	100%


**Table 6.90.** Saudi Arabia's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Import ban	3	33%
Migration measure	2	22%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	22%
Tariff measure	2	22%
Investment measure	1	11%
Total	9	100%




# SAUDI ARABIA

**Map 6.29** Saudi Arabia: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



Map 6.30 Saudi Arabia: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by



# SAUDI ARABIA

# South Africa

**Table 6.91.** Foreign state measures affecting South Africa's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting South Africa's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting South Africa's commercial interests	301	290
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of South Africa's commercial interests [1]	95	90
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm South Africa's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against South Africa's interests [2]	70	68
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against South Africa's interests [3]	136	132
Total number of implemented measures affecting South Africa's commercial interests	265	256
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect South Africa's commercial interests	36	34
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm South Africa's foreign commercial interests	26	24
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm South Africa's commercial interests	60	60

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "South Africa" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.92.** South Africa's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting South Africa's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of South Africa's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	40	30
Total number of South Africa's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	13	12
Total number of South Africa's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	8	5
Total number of South Africa's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	19	13
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by South Africa that harm foreign commercial interests.	49	44
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by South Africa that harm foreign commercial interests	15	12
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by South Africa that harm foreign commercial interests	133	133

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "South Africa" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.93.** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting South Africa's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Argentina	18
Russian Federation	13
France	10
India	10
Indonesia	10
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	10
Spain	8
Poland	7
Sweden	7
Belgium	6
China	6
Finland	6
Germany	6
Ireland	6
Netherlands	6
Nigeria	6
Portugal	6
Romania	6
Austria	5
Brazil	5
Bulgaria	5
Cyprus	5
Czech Republic	5
Denmark	5
Estonia	5
Greece	5
Hungary	5
Italy	5
Latvia	5
Lithuania	5
Luxembourg	5
Malta	5
Slovakia	5
Slovenia	5
European Communities	4
Republic of Korea	4
United States of America	4
Australia	3
United Republic of Tanzania	3
Viet Nam	3
Iran	2
Japan	2
Malaysia	2
Switzerland	2
Uganda	2

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Ukraine	2
Belarus	1
Botswana	1
Canada	1
Ethiopia	1
Kazakhstan	1
Mexico	1
Pakistan	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Sri Lanka	1
Thailand	1
Turkey	1
Venezuela	1
Zambia	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 6.94.** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by South Africa's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	14
Germany	10
France	7
Malaysia	7
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	7
United States of America	7
India	6
Belgium	5
Indonesia	5
Netherlands	5
Italy	4
Poland	4
Spain	4
Argentina	3
Australia	3
Austria	3
Brazil	3
Finland	3
Hong Kong	3
Japan	3
Republic of Korea	3
Singapore	3
Slovakia	3
Thailand	3
Turkey	3
Viet Nam	3

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Bulgaria	2
Cambodia	2
Canada	2
Central African Republic	2
Chile	2
Czech Republic	2
Denmark	2
Egypt	2
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Israel	2
Madagascar	2
Malawi	2
Mauritius	2
Mexico	2
Myanmar	2
Norway	2
Pakistan	2
Portugal	2
Romania	2
Saudi Arabia	2
Sri Lanka	2
Sweden	2
Switzerland	2
Trinidad and Tobago	2
Tunisia	2
United Arab Emirates	2
Venezuela	2
Zimbabwe	2
Afghanistan	1
Algeria	1
Angola	1
Anguilla	1
Armenia	1
Bahamas	1
Bahrain	1
Bangladesh	1
Barbados	1
Benin	1
Bermuda	1
British Virgin Islands	1
Burundi	1
Cameroon	1
Chad	1
Colombia	1
Congo	1
Croatia	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Cote d'Ivoire	1
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1
Djibouti	1
Equatorial Guinea	1
Eritrea	1
Estonia	1
Ethiopia	1
Faeroe Islands	1
Gabon	1
Georgia	1
Ghana	1
Guinea	1
Iran	1
Iraq	1
Ireland	1
Kazakhstan	1
Kenya	1
Kuwait	1
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1
Lebanon	1
Liberia	1
Luxembourg	1
Mali	1
Mauritania	1
Mongolia	1
Morocco	1
Mozambique	1
Namibia	1
Netherlands Antilles	1
New Caledonia	1
New Zealand	1
Nicaragua	1
Nigeria	1
Oman	1
Panama	1
Papua New Guinea	1
Paraguay	1
Peru	1
Philippines	1
Qatar	1
Russian Federation	1
Rwanda	1
Saint Helena	1
Senegal	1
Seychelles	1
Sierra Leone	1



Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Slovenia	1
Solomon Islands	1
Somalia	1
Sudan	1
Syrian Arab Republic	1
Tonga	1
Turks and Caicos Islands	1
Uganda	1
Ukraine	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Uruguay	1
Yemen	1
Zambia	1

**Table 6.95.** Implemented measures that harm South Africa's commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	44	21%
Tariff measure	44	21%
Export subsidy	22	11%
Export taxes or restriction	21	10%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	19	9%
Public procurement	11	5%
Import ban	9	4%
Local content requirement	8	4%
Migration measure	8	4%
Trade finance	8	4%
Competitive devaluation	5	2%
Investment measure	5	2%
Technical Barrier to Trade	5	2%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	4	2%
Consumption subsidy	3	1%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	3	1%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	3	1%
Import subsidy	2	1%
Other service sector measure	2	1%
State-controlled company	2	1%
Sub-national government measure	1	0%
Total	206	100%

**Table 6.96.** South Africa's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	11	50%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	6	27%
Bail out / state aid measure	3	14%
Import ban	1	5%
Investment measure	1	5%
Local content requirement	1	5%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	1	5%
Total	22	100%

# SOUTH AFRICA

**Map 6.31** South Africa: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



Map 6.32 South Africa: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# SOUTH AFRICA

# Turkey

**Table 6.97.** Foreign state measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests	387	365
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of Turkey's commercial interests [1]	100	94
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm Turkey's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Turkey's interests [2]	85	74
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against Turkey's interests [3]	202	197
Total number of implemented measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests	338	329
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect Turkey's commercial interests	49	36
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm Turkey's foreign commercial interests	39	28
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm Turkey's commercial interests	64	64

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Turkey" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.98.** Turkey's state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of Turkey's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	25	9
Total number of Turkey's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	4	4
Total number of Turkey's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	11	1
Total number of Turkey's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	10	4
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by Turkey that harm foreign commercial interests	14	4
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by Turkey that harm foreign commercial interests	10	3
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by Turkey that harm foreign commercial interests	24	21

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "Turkey" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.99.** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting Turkey's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	53
Argentina	14
Kazakhstan	12
Belarus	11
France	10
India	10
Germany	9
Spain	9
China	8
Indonesia	8
Poland	8
Italy	7
Netherlands	7
Sweden	7
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	7
Austria	6
Belgium	6
Brazil	6
Finland	6
Greece	6
Hungary	6
Latvia	6
Romania	6
Slovakia	6
Ukraine	6
Bulgaria	5
Cyprus	5
Czech Republic	5
Denmark	5
Estonia	5
Ireland	5
Lithuania	5
Luxembourg	5
Malta	5
Portugal	5
Republic of Korea	5
Slovenia	5
Egypt	4
European Communities	4
Nigeria	4
Israel	3
Saudi Arabia	3
South Africa	3
United States of America	3
Ghana	2

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Iran	2
Pakistan	2
Switzerland	2
Uzbekistan	2
Viet Nam	2
Algeria	1
Australia	1
Ecuador	1
Ethiopia	1
Iraq	1
Japan	1
Malaysia	1
Republic of Moldova	1
Sierra Leone	1
Sri Lanka	1
Sudan	1
Thailand	1
United Arab Emirates	1
Venezuela	1

**Table 6.100.** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by Turkey's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	5
Italy	3
Brazil	2
France	2
Germany	2
United States of America	2
Algeria	1
Belgium	1
Greece	1
Hong Kong	1
India	1
Indonesia	1
Iran	1
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1
Morocco	1
Netherlands	1
Pakistan	1
Romania	1
Russian Federation	1
Singapore	1
South Africa	1
Tunisia	1



Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Ukraine	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1


**Table 6.101.** Implemented measures that harm Turkey's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	67	23%
Bail out / state aid measure	65	23%
Export taxes or restriction	39	14%
Export subsidy	23	8%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	18	6%
Public procurement	13	5%
Trade finance	8	3%
Consumption subsidy	7	2%
Import ban	7	2%
Local content requirement	7	2%
Technical Barrier to Trade	6	2%
Competitive devaluation	5	2%
Investment measure	5	2%
Migration measure	5	2%
Other service sector measure	5	2%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	5	2%
Import subsidy	3	1%
State trading enterprise	3	1%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	2	1%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	1%
State-controlled company	2	1%
Intellectual property protection	1	0%
Sub-national government measure	0	0%
Total	287	100%

**Table 6.102.** Turkey's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	6	55%
Tariff measure	4	36%
Public procurement	1	9%
Total	11	100%

Map 6.33 Turkey: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



# TURKEY

Map 6.34 Turkey: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# United Kingdom

**Table 6.103.** Foreign state measures affecting United Kingdom's commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting United Kingdom's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting United Kingdom's commercial interests	523	479
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of United Kingdom's commercial interests [1]	143	136
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm United Kingdom's commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against United Kingdom's interests [2]	113	97
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against United Kingdom's interests [3]	267	246
Total number of implemented measures affecting United Kingdom's commercial interests	453	427
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect United Kingdom's commercial interests	70	52
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm United Kingdom's foreign commercial interests	54	38
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm United Kingdom's commercial interests	72	71

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "United Kingdom" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.104.** United Kingdom state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting United Kingdom's commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of United Kingdom's measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	92	40
Total number of United Kingdom's measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	17	6
Total number of United Kingdom's measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	22	5
Total number of United Kingdom's measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	53	29
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by United Kingdom that harm foreign commercial interests.	155	135
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by United Kingdom that harm foreign commercial interests	26	18
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by United Kingdom that harm foreign commercial interests	154	153

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "United Kingdom" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.105.** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting United Kingdom's commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	54
Argentina	22
India	17
China	15
Indonesia	14
Belarus	13
Kazakhstan	11
Brazil	10
South Africa	7
Australia	6
Canada	6
Germany	6
Italy	6
France	5
Nigeria	5
Poland	5
Republic of Korea	5
Spain	5
Ukraine	5
United States of America	5
Algeria	4
Netherlands	4
Sweden	4
Denmark	3
Finland	3
Israel	3
Japan	3
Malaysia	3
Pakistan	3
Saudi Arabia	3
Austria	2
Belgium	2
Egypt	2
Greece	2
Hungary	2
Ireland	2
Latvia	2
Portugal	2
Romania	2
Singapore	2
Slovakia	2
Switzerland	2
Uganda	2
Viet Nam	2
Bolivia	1

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Bulgaria	1
Cyprus	1
Czech Republic	1
Côte d'Ivoire	1
Ecuador	1
Estonia	1
Ethiopia	1
Gambia	1
Ghana	1
Iran	1
Lithuania	1
Luxembourg	1
Malta	1
Mexico	1
Morocco	1
Republic of Moldova	1
Sierra Leone	1
Slovenia	1
Sudan	1
Thailand	1
Togo	1
Turkey	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Venezuela	1
Zambia	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 6.106.** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by United Kingdom's state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	27
India	10
South Africa	10
Australia	9
Japan	9
United States of America	9
Canada	8
New Zealand	8
Thailand	8
Pakistan	7
Philippines	7
Republic of Korea	7
Turkey	7
Bosnia and Herzegovina	6
Croatia	6

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Malaysia	6
Serbia	6
Switzerland	6
United Arab Emirates	6
Algeria	5
Argentina	5
Bangladesh	5
Brazil	5
Israel	5
Mexico	5
Norway	5
Oman	5
Russian Federation	5
Singapore	5
Belarus	4
Bolivia	4
Colombia	4
Costa Rica	4
Cote d'Ivoire	4
Dominican Republic	4
Egypt	4
El Salvador	4
Jordan	4
Kenya	4
Lebanon	4
Mauritius	4
Netherlands Antilles	4
Paraguay	4
Republic of Moldova	4
Saudi Arabia	4
Trinidad and Tobago	4
Tunisia	4
Ukraine	4
Viet Nam	4
Yemen	4
Zambia	4
Zimbabwe	4
Armenia	3
Barbados	3
Bulgaria	3
Chile	3
Cyprus	3
France	3
Germany	3
Ghana	3
Guatemala	3
Guyana	3



Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Iceland	3
Indonesia	3
Iran	3
Kazakhstan	3
Macedonia	3
Morocco	3
Nicaragua	3
Nigeria	3
Sudan	3
Albania	2
Angola	2
Azerbaijan	2
Belgium	2
Belize	2
Benin	2
Congo	2
Denmark	2
Equatorial Guinea	2
Ethiopia	2
Finland	2
Greece	2
Hong Kong	2
Hungary	2
Ireland	2
Italy	2
Jamaica	2
Kuwait	2
Kyrgyzstan	2
Luxembourg	2
Madagascar	2
Malawi	2
Namibia	2
Netherlands	2
Panama	2
Peru	2
Portugal	2
Qatar	2
Romania	2
Slovenia	2
Spain	2
Sri Lanka	2
Sweden	2
Syrian Arab Republic	2
Uganda	2
United Republic of Tanzania	2
Uruguay	2
Andorra	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Austria	1
Bahrain	1
British Virgin Islands	1
Burundi	1
Cambodia	1
Chinese Taipei	1
Comoros	1
Cuba	1
Czech Republic	1
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	1
Democratic Republic of the Congo	1
Ecuador	1
Estonia	1
Faeroe Islands	1
Fiji	1
Gabon	1
Georgia	1
Greenland	1
Guinea	1
Honduras	1
Iraq	1
Latvia	1
Lithuania	1
Mali	1
Malta	1
Marshall Islands	1
Mayotte	1
Mozambique	1
New Caledonia	1
Niger	1
Palestinian	1
Poland	1
Saint Lucia	1
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	1
San Marino	1
Senegal	1
Seychelles	1
Sierra Leone	1
Slovakia	1
Swaziland	1
Tajikistan	1
Togo	1
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	1
Uzbekistan	1
Venezuela	1


**Table 6.107.** Implemented measures that harm United Kingdom's commercial interests, by type

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Bail out / state aid measure	84	22%
Tariff measure	83	22%
Export taxes or restriction	37	10%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	28	7%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	21	6%
Export subsidy	20	5%
Migration measure	19	5%
Public procurement	15	4%
Import ban	11	3%
Local content requirement	11	3%
Investment measure	10	3%
Trade finance	10	3%
Technical Barrier to Trade	6	2%
Competitive devaluation	5	1%
Consumption subsidy	5	1%
Import subsidy	4	1%
Other service sector measure	4	1%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	4	1%
State trading enterprise	3	1%
Intellectual property protection	2	1%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	2	1%
State-controlled company	2	1%
Sub-national government measure	1	0%
Total	380	100%

**Table 6.108.** United Kingdom's implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	24	44%
Bail out / state aid measure	16	29%
Migration measure	8	15%
Export subsidy	6	11%
Export taxes or restriction	1	2%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	1	2%
Tariff measure	1	2%
Total	55	100%

Map 6.35 United Kingdom: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



# UNITED KINGDOM

Map 6.36 United Kingdom: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



# United States

**Table 6.109.** Foreign state measures affecting United States' commercial interests

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting United States' commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of measures affecting United States' commercial interests	674	581
Total number of foreign measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of United States' commercial interests [1]	214	194
Total number of foreign measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm United States' commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against United States' interests [2]	131	92
Total number of foreign measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against United States' interests [3]	329	295
Total number of implemented measures affecting United States' commercial interests	594	544
Total number of pending foreign measures likely to affect United States' commercial interests	80	37
Total number of pending foreign measures that, if implemented, are likely to harm United States' foreign commercial interests	65	26
Total number of trading partners that have imposed measures that harm United States' commercial interests	74	72

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "United States" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.110.** United States' state measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests.

Summary statistic of foreign state measures affecting United States' commercial interests	All measures	All measures except anti-dumping, anti-subsidy, and safe-guard actions
Total number of United States' measures affecting other jurisdictions' commercial interests	102	71
Total number of United States' measures found to benefit or involve no change in the treatment of other jurisdictions' commercial interests [1]	13	9
Total number of United States' measures that (i) have been implemented and are likely to harm foreign commercial interests or (ii) that have been announced but not implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign interests [2]	63	46
Total number of United States' measures that have been implemented and which almost certainly discriminate against foreign commercial interests [3]	149	138
Total number of 4-digit tariff lines affected by measures implemented by United States that harm foreign commercial interests	149	138
Total number of 2-digit sectors affected by measures implemented by United States that harm foreign commercial interests	42	40
Total number of trading partners affected by measures implemented by United States that harm foreign commercial interests	124	124

*Note:* As the Global Trade Alert database is updated frequently, the above data will change. Updates on the numbers in this table can be found by going to <http://www.globaltradealert.org/site-statistics>, and selecting "United States" in the "Affecting Trading Partner" and clicking the button "Get Stats".

[1] These measures are classified "green" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[2] These measures are classified "amber" in the Global Trade Alert database.

[3] These measures are classified "red" in the Global Trade Alert database.

**Table 6.111.** Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures affecting United States' commercial interests

Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Russian Federation	65
Argentina	26
China	23
Brazil	20
Indonesia	19
India	16
Belarus	15
Germany	12
France	11
Italy	11
Kazakhstan	11
Poland	10
Spain	10
Canada	9
Netherlands	9
Sweden	9
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	9
Finland	8
Australia	7
Austria	7
Belgium	7
Greece	7
Hungary	7
Ireland	7
Portugal	7
Republic of Korea	7
Romania	7
Slovakia	7
South Africa	7
Viet Nam	7
Bulgaria	6
Cyprus	6
Czech Republic	6
Denmark	6
Estonia	6
Latvia	6
Lithuania	6
Luxembourg	6
Malta	6
Nigeria	6
Slovenia	6
European Communities	5
Mexico	5
Pakistan	5
Japan	4



Foreign jurisdictions implementing measures	Number of measures
Ukraine	4
Egypt	3
Malaysia	3
Saudi Arabia	3
Switzerland	3
Venezuela	3
Algeria	2
Bolivia	2
Ghana	2
Morocco	2
Singapore	2
Thailand	2
Turkey	2
Uzbekistan	2
Cote d'Ivoire	1
Dominican Republic	1
Ecuador	1
Ethiopia	1
Gambia	1
Paraguay	1
Peru	1
Republic of Moldova	1
Sierra Leone	1
Sri Lanka	1
Togo	1
Uganda	1
United Arab Emirates	1
United Republic of Tanzania	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 6.112.** Foreign jurisdictions' commercial interests affected by United States' state measures

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
China	14
Mexico	10
Canada	7
India	7
Germany	6
Japan	6
France	5
Indonesia	5
Philippines	5
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	5
Australia	4
Belgium	4

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Brazil	4
Chinese Taipei	4
Finland	4
Israel	4
Malaysia	4
Pakistan	4
Republic of Korea	4
Russian Federation	4
South Africa	4
Sweden	4
Viet Nam	4
Austria	3
Colombia	3
Costa Rica	3
Denmark	3
Hong Kong	3
Hungary	3
Italy	3
Morocco	3
Netherlands	3
Singapore	3
Slovakia	3
Thailand	3
Turkey	3
Venezuela	3
Argentina	2
Bahrain	2
Bangladesh	2
Barbados	2
Bulgaria	2
Chile	2
Croatia	2
Czech Republic	2
Dominican Republic	2
Egypt	2
El Salvador	2
Estonia	2
Georgia	2
Ghana	2
Guatemala	2
Haiti	2
Honduras	2
Ireland	2
Jamaica	2
Jordan	2
Lithuania	2
Luxembourg	2

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Netherlands Antilles	2
New Zealand	2
Nicaragua	2
Norway	2
Peru	2
Poland	2
Portugal	2
Romania	2
Spain	2
Swaziland	2
Switzerland	2
Syrian Arab Republic	2
Trinidad and Tobago	2
Tunisia	2
United Arab Emirates	2
Uruguay	2
Albania	1
Algeria	1
Aruba	1
Bahamas	1
Belarus	1
Bermuda	1
Bolivia	1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1
Botswana	1
Brunei Darussalam	1
Cambodia	1
Cameroon	1
Cayman Islands	1
Cuba	1
Ecuador	1
Ethiopia	1
Fiji	1
Greece	1
Guyana	1
Iran	1
Kazakhstan	1
Kenya	1
Kuwait	1
Lao People's Democratic Republic	1
Latvia	1
Lesotho	1
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	1
Macedonia	1
Madagascar	1
Malawi	1
Mali	1

Foreign jurisdictions affected	Number of measures
Mauritius	1
Mongolia	1
Namibia	1
Nepal	1
Nigeria	1
Oman	1
Panama	1
Saint Kitts and Nevis	1
Saint Lucia	1
Saudi Arabia	1
Slovenia	1
Sri Lanka	1
Tokelau	1
Turkmenistan	1
Ukraine	1
Uzbekistan	1
Yemen	1
Zimbabwe	1

**Table 6.113.** Implemented measures that harm United States' commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Tariff measure	112	24%
Bail out / state aid measure	86	19%
Export taxes or restriction	36	8%
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	34	7%
Export subsidy	25	5%
Migration measure	22	5%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	21	5%
Import ban	16	3%
Local content requirement	13	3%
Public procurement	13	3%
Investment measure	10	2%
Trade finance	10	2%
Quota (including tariff rate quotas)	9	2%
Consumption subsidy	8	2%
Technical Barrier to Trade	7	2%
Other service sector measure	6	1%
Competitive devaluation	5	1%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	5	1%
State trading enterprise	5	1%
State-controlled company	5	1%
Import subsidy	4	1%
Intellectual property protection	3	1%
Sub-national government measure	1	0%

Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Total	460	100%

**Table 6.114.** United States' implemented measures that harm foreign commercial interests, by type


Type of measure	Number of measures	As percentage of measures
Trade defence measure (AD, CVD, safeguard)	10	34%
Bail out / state aid measure	6	21%
Local content requirement	4	14%
Public procurement	3	10%
Tariff measure	3	10%
Import ban	2	7%
Export subsidy	1	3%
Migration measure	1	3%
Non tariff barrier (not otherwise specified)	1	3%
Other service sector measure	1	3%
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measure	1	3%
Trade finance	1	3%
Total	29	100%

**Map 6.37** United States of America: Worldwide incidence of harm done by this G20 member's discriminatory measures



# UNITED STATES

**Map 6.38** United States of America: Harm done to this G20 member's commercial interests by others



In 2011 the world economy has been buffeted by a number of developments that were not foreseen at the time of the Seoul G20 Summit. These unanticipated, adverse macroeconomic developments now coincide with election cycles and political leadership transition cycles in a number of jurisdictions, increasing the risk that some political leaders will court short-term popularity by resorting to protectionism. Moreover, now that many governments are cutting government budgets and interest rates cannot fall much further in many countries, restricting foreign competition is one of the few tools available to policymakers when responding to pleas from domestic firms and trade unions. The sooner global economic growth recovers its previous pace the better. One welcome side effect would be taking the some of the wind out of the protectionist sails.

Plenty of evidence is presented in this, the 9th GTA report, to show that the pick-up in protectionism since the Seoul G20 summit coincides with the deterioration in economic sentiment. Moreover, the information that has come to light since November 2010 calls into question the roseir assessments of protectionist dynamics in 2010. It now seems that the only third quarter of 2010 saw a dip in the resort to protectionism. Otherwise the 2010 data are on track to be as bad as the latter half of 2009 in terms of closing borders to trade. The optimism of many observers about falling protectionism in 2010, which we shared, now seems misplaced.

The message is clear: Policymakers—in particular from the larger G20 countries—must renew their vigilance against protectionism. Otherwise a 'people in glass houses' dynamic will reassert itself, whereby governments won't criticise others that close borders to trade precisely because they know their own protectionist acts will come under scrutiny. The global trading system does not need another bout of collective non-compliance that it suffered during 2009.

## Centre for Economic Policy Research

77 BASTWICK STREET • LONDON EC1V 3PZ • UK

TEL: +44 (0)20 7183 8801 • FAX: +44 (0)20 7183 8820 • EMAIL: [CEPR@CEPR.ORG](mailto:CEPR@CEPR.ORG)

[WWW.CEPR.ORG](http://WWW.CEPR.ORG)