Paul Tucker, 06 November 2017

If another big bank fails, it is going to be very problematic. In this video, Paul Tucker underlines the need to design and implement new reforms. This video was recorded at the "10 years after the crisis" conference held in London, on 22 September 2017.

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This free online seminar on the 9th of March at 1pm - 2pm CET, with Professor Enrico Perotti (University of Amsterdam and CEPR) will offer a critical approach to capital requirements with a particular emphasis put on risk absorption capacity in the context of the new Capital Requirements Directive (CRD4) and the Financial Stability Board’s Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) standard.

Two alternative views of capital requirements will be lined out: the buffer view and the incentives view. As part of the webinar, the risk absorption potential of equity, bail-in debt and, Contingent Convertible Debt instruments (CoCos) will be explored.

Viral Acharya, 25 October 2011

The Vickers Commission recommends separating commercial and noncommercial banking activities in order to protect core financial functions from riskier activities. This column warns that such ring-fencing may fail because there are still incentive problems in traditional banking activities. The accompanying risk-weighted capital requirement recommendations will address this only if we do a better job of measuring risks.

Marc Flandreau, Norbert Gaillard, 26 June 2009

How did the rating agencies come to have such a prominent role in the regulation of securities? This column traces their history back to the Great Depression. Ironically, the agencies became a regulatory instrument to address concerns about securities originators’ conflicts of interest, the very problem plaguing the agencies today. The lesson may be that no fixed regulatory solution is durable in the long run.

Rafael Repullo, Javier Suarez, 14 July 2008

Basel II’s goal was to reduce incentives for excessive risk taking. Making banks’ capital requirements risk-sensitive, however, also set the system up for credit crunches during economic down turns. This column argues that small cyclical adjustments to the confidence levels set by regulator could preserve Basel II’s value-at-risk foundation while avoiding painful credit crunches during periods of economic distress.

Events

CEPR Policy Research