The war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia have intensified the debate on the economic repercussions of a shift in global trade policy focus from mutual economic benefits of open trade policies to geopolitical considerations limiting interdependence. This column finds that a potential decoupling of the global trading system into two blocs – a US-centric and a China-centric bloc – would reduce global welfare in 2040 compared to a baseline by about 5%. Losses would be largest (more than 10%) in low-income regions that benefit most from positive technology spillovers from trade.

The major disruptions to global value chains caused by the Covid-19 pandemic have prompted politicians to think about reducing the reliance on imported inputs by decoupling from global value chains. This column quantifies the welfare costs of decoupling as well as the potential gains from reduced exposure to foreign shocks. The bottom line is that decoupling does not pay off. 

Deep trade agreements are widespread and have taken the world beyond tariff liberalisation in goods trade. As the importance of global supply chains and the services sector increased across the world, shallow tariff reductions gave way to deeper commitments that address non-tariff barriers and behind the border barriers to trade. By matching dissagregated trade data to the universe of deep trade agreements, this column examines their impact on trade in goods and services, and quantifies their welfare impacts. Welfare gains from the commitments involved in such agreements have played a crucial role in overall welfare gains since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.