Johannes Breckenfelder, Victoria Ivashina, 27 November 2021

The onset of COVID-19 led to heightened uncertainty and a ‘dash-for-cash’, particularly in the mutual fund sector which faced fire sale pressure. Typically, banks trading securities absorb such pressure and support market liquidity, but regulation may limit their ability to do so. This column analyses the role of bank leverage constraints as an amplifier of bond market illiquidity. It concludes that leverage ratio regulation can have negative side effects by increasing bond market illiquidity in times of economic distress, suggesting that the optimal leverage ratio is procyclical.

Kathryn Judge, Anil Kashyap, 17 September 2021

In March 2020 we all assumed there would be some reaction to Covid-19 on Wall Street but, when markets did the opposite of what most people expected, the Fed had to step in to stabilise the economy. Anil Kashyap and Kathryn Judge tell Tim Phillips what happened, why, and how to stop it happening again.

Read more about the research behind this: VoxColumn: Reforming the macroprudential regulatory architecture in the US, Kathryn Judge, Anil Kashyap

Josh Lerner, Amit Seru, 14 September 2021

Financial innovation is intensely controversial, yet we know little about where or by whom these new products and services are developed. This column looks at over 24,000 financial US patents applied for between 2000 and 2018 to analyse the nature of financial patents. A surge in financial patenting was driven by IT firms and firms in industries outside of finance. Financial regulatory actions seem to have adversely affected innovation by financial firms, while regions with the highest technological opportunities attracted financial innovation by IT and non-financial firms.

Kathryn Judge, Anil Kashyap, 21 July 2021

That a shock the size of the Covid-19 pandemic would trigger distress in financial markets is far from surprising. What is surprising is how much of the distress arose in domains that could have been identified posing a potential threat to stability well before the pandemic hit. This column explores how the US financial regulatory regime is falling short and proposes reforms to increase the likelihood that policymakers will identify and address threats to stability – before they harm the real economy. 

Thomas Lambert, Enrico Perotti, Magdalena Rola-Janicka, 06 July 2021

Political considerations have become important in finance research, with significant implications for policymaking. This column summarises new research presented at the CEPR conference on the Political Economy of Finance, including work on opaque investments in political influence, electoral impact of credit and regulation, the role of institutional complexity in shaping reforms and incentives of central bankers. The conference kickstarted the PolEconFin initiative aimed at providing a meeting point for researchers in this topical area.

Giovanni Cespa, Xavier Vives, 01 July 2021

Over the past two decades, governments and regulators have worked to foster competition among trading venues, leading to market fragmentation and contributing to a drastic reduction in the cost of trading. But this also led exchanges to heighten their reliance on revenue generating activities such as the sale of market data, co-location space, and fast connections to matching engines. This column argues that a connectivity fee or entry regulations could work well from a regulatory perspective, and highlights the important role of exchanges’ technological capacity decisions as a driver of liquidity.

Hans Degryse, Mike Mariathasan, Thi Hien Tang, 29 January 2021

Frequent bailouts during the Global Crisis showed that governments cannot credibly commit not to support large financial institutions. This inability leads to moral hazard and motivated the Financial Stability Board’s framework for ‘global systemically important banks’. This column explores the net effects of this framework on the real economy, focusing on changes in corporate lending and the availability of credit as the basis to evaluate whether the framework is an effective way in which to reduce moral hazard and promote robust financial markets.

Qing Hu, Ross Levine, Chen Lin, Mingzhu Tai, 18 July 2020

The financial conditions facing parents can have effects on children’s education outcomes, both in terms of schooling and parental support at home. This column presents evidence from the US, arguing that changes in banking regulation across states can cause changes in the experience of children through a number of channels. These effects are not uniform across household income brackets and can be mitigated when there are other family members such as grandparents that are able to help children with their personal development.

Thorsten Beck, Orkun Saka, Paolo Volpin, 10 July 2020

A rapidly expanding literature has shown the importance of political economy factors for legislative and regulatory actions in the financial sector and ultimately financial sector stability and efficiency. This column reports on recent research in this field, presented at the first London Political Finance, including work on financial fragility leading to the rise of right-wing extremist parties, private interests in financial regulation, financial gains from political connections, political beliefs and financial decisions and the role of media in financial decisions.  It lays out some of the important takeaways and suggests directions for further research that can shed light on the remaining issues.

Laura Kodres, 28 April 2020

Amid the uncertainty of the COVID-19 pandemic, the movements in equity markets’ around the world have mirrored the spread of the virus and its virulence. Attempts to limit market crashes, volatility, and financial contagion have taken a number of different forms. This column explores the two main policy responses available to financial market regulators – bans on short sales versus circuit breakers – and reviews them in the context of some ‘best practices’ for market regulation.

Ester Faia, Maximilian Mayer, Vincenzo Pezone, 26 April 2020

Directors of corporations often sit on several boards at once. This column asks whether this connectivity is beneficial for firm value (due to a wider network of knowledge sharing), or if it is simply crony-capitalism built on a deep exclusivity at the board level. Exploiting data from Italy, the authors suggest that network centrality may not always translate into a gain for consumers, and that policymakers must be cautious in accommodating the appropriate reactions for cases that may have different implications for consumer welfare.

Nicola Pierri, Yannick Timmer, 18 April 2020

Technology adoption in lending can enhance financial stability through the production of more resilient loans. Motivated by the recent surge of FinTech lending, this column analyses the implications of lenders' information technology adoption for financial stability. Banks that adopted IT more intensely before the Global Crisis were significantly more resilient when the shock hit. These banks had significantly fewer non-performing loans, and issued more loans during the crisis itself. Loan-level analysis indicates that high IT adoption banks issued mortgages with better performances and did not offload low-quality loans.

Ozlem Akin, José M. Marín, José-Luis Peydró, 18 March 2020

There is a broad discussion surrounding the excessive risk-taking by banks and whether this constitutes a reliable early warning signal for future banking problems. This column presents evidence that many top executives of US banks sold their own shares in the buildup to the Global Crisis. This trends appears to be stronger for banks with higher real estate exposure, and weaker for independent directors or middle officers. Although the top bankers in riskier banks sold more shares, thus furthering their own interests, they did not reduce bank risk exposure.

Martin Hodula, 16 March 2020

The shadow banking system has become an important source of funding worldwide for the real economy over the last two decades. Europe is no exception, though research on shadow banking there has been relative scarce. This column shows that European shadow banking is highly procyclical, intertwined with insurance corporations and pension funds, and a terminal station for regulatory arbitrage. It also discusses the existence of two main motives that explain the growth of shadow banking, both prior and post-Global Crisis: a funding-cost motive and a search-for-yield motive. 

Anat Admati, 06 December 2019

Anat Admati discusses what’s needed to get financial regulation that works.

Aerdt Houben, Janko Cizel, Jon Frost, Peter Wierts, 05 November 2019

Macroprudential policies are being implemented around the globe. A key question is whether these policies prompt substitution toward the non-bank financial sector. This column presents compelling evidence of such ‘waterbed effects’ after macroprudential policy action. Substitution towards non-bank credit is stronger when policy measures applied to banks are binding and are implemented in countries with well-developed financial markets. While systemic risks may nonetheless decline, waterbed effects highlight the importance of developing macroprudential policies beyond banking. 

Patrick Bolton, Stephen Cecchetti, Jean-Pierre Danthine, Xavier Vives, 03 June 2019

While the decade since the Global Crisis has seen clear improvements in financial regulation and supervision, there is still work to be done in several crucial areas, and political constraints may bite.This column introduces the first report in a new series on ‘The Future of Banking’, which tackles three important areas of post-crisis regulatory reform: the Basel III agreement on capital, liquidity and leverage requirements; resolution procedures to end ‘too big to fail’; and the expanded role of central banks with a financial stability remit.

Francesco Franzoni, 03 June 2019

The asset management industry has become increasingly concentrated in recent decades. Regulators are concerned about the systemic risks this may pose. Using data from the US, this column suggests that the increased concentration has led to more volatile prices of stocks held by large institutional investors. This poses challenges for regulators trying to weigh price efficiency and economies of scale.

Timur Kuran, Jared Rubin, 28 April 2018

Poor people pay much more for credit than wealthier people because they are believed to be more likely to default, but this might not always be the case if the enforcement of repayment is biased in favour of wealthy people. This column uses evidence from Ottoman Istanbul to show that where courts favoured the rich and wealthy, these groups faced higher relative borrowing costs. Those with the greatest capacity to invest in capital and entrepreneurial activities thus paid the most for credit, possibly contributing to the slowdown of economic growth in the region.

Thomas Huertas, 03 November 2017

What does the future of banks and financial institutions look like? In this video, Thomas Huertas talks about the regulatory environment and advances in technology. This video was recorded at the "10 years after the crisis" conference held in London, on 22 September 2017.

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