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The intensive course in Competition in Digital Markets will be held at the Barcelona GSE from November 20 to 22, 2019. This course offers the opportunity to understand how the digital economy works, and under what conditions competition may not function as it should in this sector. It provides participants with a thorough understanding of how to evaluate the substitutability between different offerings and when to view practices such as tying, exclusive contracts, price-parity clauses, and discriminatory access to platforms as anti-competitive (but also explain in what circumstances they are likely to be beneficial).

Course lecturers includes leading international competition scholars and practitioners with extensive experience of the application of economic techniques to competition cases in this area:

Giulio Federico (Head of Unit, CET, DG Competition European Commission)

Chiara Fumagalli (Associate Professor of Economics, Bocconi University)

Massimo Motta (Professor of Economics, ICREA-UPF and Barcelona GSE; former Chief Competition Economist, European Commission) - course director

Martin Peitz (Professor of Economics, University of Mannheim)

An Early Bird discount will be offered to participants confirming their attendance before October 20. A reduced course fee is also available to Regulators, Competition Authorities, Academics and Barcelona GSE Alumni.

Alexandre de Cornière, Greg Taylor, 15 August 2018

A general challenge facing competition authorities in the digital era is learning how to apply the traditional tools of competition policy in multi-sided platform environments. This column argues that the Google Android case offers a great example of the need to consider the implications of the market's two-sidedness. It also argues that bundling can, in fact, be profitable by virtue of its effect on competition once one accounts for some of the key features of mobile app markets.

Neil Gandal, Sarit Markovich, Michael Riordan, 19 September 2013

What are the competitive effects of bundling? This columns presents the results of an empirical study of the market for office productivity software in the 1990s. Counterfactual simulations suggest that the introduction of a bundled office suite increases consumer welfare – provided that preferences for word processors and spreadsheet programs are positively correlated, and that competitors do not exit the market.

Lawrence White, 22 August 2008

Lawrence White of New York University talks to Romesh Vaitilingam about the role of economics and economists in antitrust policy, notably for analysing the potentially anti-competitive effects of mergers, the impact of vertical restraints like bundling, and the use of predatory pricing. The interview was recorded at the American Economic Association meetings in New Orleans in January 2008.

Events

CEPR Policy Research