Thorsten Beck, Consuelo Silva-Buston, Wolf Wagner, 04 September 2019

Following the Global Crisis, countries have significantly increased their efforts to cooperate on bank supervision, the prime example being the euro area’s Single Supervisory Mechanism. However, little is known about whether such cooperation helps improve the stability of the financial system. Using panel data for a large sample of cross-border banks, this column examines whether a higher incidence of supervisory cooperation is associated with higher bank stability. It finds that supervisory cooperation is effective, working through asset risk, but not for very large banks, which are the ones that pose the highest risk to financial stability.

Thomas Eisenbach, David Lucca, Robert Townsend, 17 June 2016

The two main elements of bank industry oversight are regulation and supervision. This column provides a framework for thinking about supervision in relation to regulation. Using US data on supervisory hours spent, it finds evidence of economies of scale for bank size. Additionally, less risky banks receive substantially lower amounts of supervisory hours. The findings highlight that supervisors face resource constraints and trade-offs.

Javier Suarez, 13 October 2008

Government guarantees are no substitute for supervision – they are a complement. Free from short-term liquidity pressures, supervisors should focus on banks’ long-term prospects and limit their behaviour or encourage restructuring as needed.

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