Since the Great Financial Crisis, bail-in has been introduced as an approach to address too-big-to-fail and contagion risk problems. This column uses a multi-layered network model of the European financial system to study the implication of bail-in design on financial stability. It shows that early implementation of a bail-in and stronger bank recapitalisation lead to lower contagion losses. However, current bail-in design seems to be in the region of instability and the political economy of incentives makes reforms unlikely in the near future.
J. Doyne Farmer, Charles Goodhart, Alissa Kleinnijenhuis, 01 October 2021
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