Enrico Perotti, 27 March 2020

Enrico Perotti tells Tim Phillips that while regulatory reform means that banks are unlikely to be at risk, the coronavirus shock poses a serious liquidity risk for the shadow banking sector, where significant funding has been extended on the basis of cash flow rather than real collateral. Avoiding financial panic is key, and will require liquidity support as well as targeted fiscal measures.

Enrico Perotti, 27 March 2020

Years of quantitative easing by the ECB have suppressed sovereign yields to historic lows. This has contributed to a shadow banking boom, as market participants invested heavily in various private asset constructions. This column argues that the coronavirus shock poses a serious liquidity risk for the shadow banking sector, where significant funding has been extended on the basis of cash flow rather than real collateral. Avoiding financial panic is key, and will require liquidity support as well as targeted fiscal measures. 

Iñaki Aldasoro, Gerardo Ferrara, Sam Langfield, Zijun Liu, Tomohiro Ota, 04 December 2019

Macroprudential regulation is in vogue, but liquidity requirements are typically seen only as a microprudential tool. This column shows how a macroprudential approach to liquidity requirements could improve regulatory efficiency. By concentrating liquidity in systemically important banks, financial stability can be enhanced without increasing aggregate requirements.

Emanuele Borgonovo, Stefano Caselli, Alessandra Cillo, Donato Masciandaro, Giovanni Rabitti, 12 March 2019

Alongside liquidity and store of value, is privacy an important attribute of money? Using laboratory experiments, the column shows that privacy matters, and increases the overall appeal of money. The experiments suggest that future competition between alternative currencies will depend on how the three properties are mixed.

Charles Calomiris, Matthew Jaremski, David Wheelock, 12 February 2019

Banks have direct contractual exposures to one another through a variety of channels, and regulators are concerned about the systemic risk that may result from this. This column examines the Great Depression in the US and describes how important contractual contagion occurred during the Depression which significantly worsened the failure risk of banks by increasing liquidity risk. The findings call for regulatory policies that take account of potential contractual contagion, and that require minimum prudential capital and liquidity buffers to take liquidity risks into account.

Filippo Ippolito, José-Luis Peydró, Andrea Polo, Enrico Sette, 10 May 2016

By providing liquidity to credit line borrowers and depositors, banks are potentially exposed to simultaneous runs on their assets and liabilities. This risk became a reality when the European interbank market froze in the summer of 2007. This column discusses the risk of double-bank runs, liquidity risk management by banks and the implications for the regulation of the financial sector, in particular Basel III. In 2007, banks with a larger exposure to the interbank market suffered a spike in drawdowns on their outstanding credit lines to firms, and were effectively exposed to a ‘double-run’. Importantly, this fragility was mitigated by active pre-crisis liquidity risk management by banks. 

Avinash Persaud, 14 April 2016

Since the breakup of Bretton Woods in the early 1970s, the housing market has been at the centre of the biggest banking crises across the world. This column considers the nexus between housing, banking, and the economy, and how these ties can be broken. It argues for two modest regulatory changes in banking and insurance. These would result in life insurers and pension funds providing mortgage finance, better insulating the economy and homeowners from the housing cycle.

Stefano Puddu, Andreas Wälchli, 12 December 2012

Did the Federal Reserve act as ‘lender of last resort’ during the worst of the crisis? This column contributes to the current debate on the appropriateness and effectiveness of non-standard measures that have been taken by the Fed. Quantitatively measuring the effect of the Term Auction Facility on participating banks’ liquidity risk, it seems that, because the Term Auction Facility programme provided banks with enough time to adjust exposures on their balance sheets, the Fed did act as ‘lender of last resort’.

Enrico Perotti, 25 October 2011

How should financial regulators address problems stemming from liquidity risk? This column argues that the liquidity coverage and net funding ratios proposed for Basel III are economically and politically impractical. It recommends using those ratios as long-term targets while imposing ‘prudential risk surcharges’ on deviations from the targets.

Viral Acharya, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Enrico Perotti, 14 September 2011

Liquidity risk – which was at the heart of the September 2008 financial meltdown and explains regulatory concerns about a Greek default today – remains an open issue in financial regulatory reform. This column presents a consensus view of several leading academics on what more needs to be done to close this regulatory gap.

Lasse Pedersen, 15 November 2008

What is liquidity? Why is it at the heart of the crisis? How can we fix it? This column explains it all in terms any trained economist can understand.

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