Daniel Levy, Tamir Mayer, Alon Raviv, 01 April 2020

Economists and finance scholars faced harsh criticism for failing to anticipate the 2008 financial crisis. This column presents evidence from textual analyses of 14,270 working papers published between 1999–2016 that is consistent with this criticism. However, as soon as the crisis unravelled, economists appeared to dramatically increase their efforts in studying and understanding the crisis, its causes and its consequences.

Zuzana Fungáčová, Eeva Kerola, Laurent Weill, 28 March 2020

Trust in banks is a core determinant of financial system effectiveness. While it is well-established that trust in banks fell sharply following the Global Crisis and affected individual decision-making and risk preferences, the longer-term impact of banking crises on trust in banks has not yet been explored. This column looks at the effect of experiencing a banking crisis on people’s long-term confidence in banks. It shows that living through a banking crisis diminishes trust in banks, especially for more mature individuals, and that the loss of trust is long-lasting. 

Martin Hodula, 16 March 2020

The shadow banking system has become an important source of funding worldwide for the real economy over the last two decades. Europe is no exception, though research on shadow banking there has been relative scarce. This column shows that European shadow banking is highly procyclical, intertwined with insurance corporations and pension funds, and a terminal station for regulatory arbitrage. It also discusses the existence of two main motives that explain the growth of shadow banking, both prior and post-Global Crisis: a funding-cost motive and a search-for-yield motive. 

Henrik Müller, 14 March 2020

The coronavirus crisis is hitting economies hard. This column argues that policymakers risk doing too little too late – and creating plenty of confusion on the way. It also suggests some lessons that can be learnt from the response to the last crisis.

Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Deniz Igan, Paolo Mauro, Hala Moussawi, Alexander F. Tieman, Aleksandra Zdzienicka, 04 March 2020

During the Global Crisis, governments rescued banks with capital injections, asset purchases, and guarantees. Until now, we have had no clear idea what happened to that taxpayer money. This column uses bank-level data to compile a comprehensive accounting of the costs of, and returns on, these interventions. While initial public support cost $1.6 trillion, the total fiscal impact has been $250 billion – on average less than 1% of GDP.

Ugo Albertazzi, Francesca Barbiero, David Marques-Ibanez, Alexander Popov, Costanza Rodriguez d'Acri, Thomas Vlassopoulos, 25 February 2020

The response of major central banks to the Global Crisis has rekindled the debate on the interactions between monetary policy and financial stability. This column reviews empirical evidence on how monetary policy affects bank stability, focusing on unconventional monetary policy measures deployed by the ECB during the crisis. It argues that by stabilising the economy and averting a systemic crisis, these measures helped shore up stability, with the positive effects outweighing the adverse spillovers on banks’ intermediation capacity and risk-taking. However, such measures may need to be complemented with counterbalancing actions that go beyond monetary policy. 

Antonio Conti, Elisa Guglielminetti, Marianna Riggi, 13 February 2020

The weak relationship between wage dynamics and unemployment in the euro area since the Global Crisis is widely perceived as one of the main causes of the ‘twin puzzle’ of missing disinflation between 2009 and 2011, and missing inflation thereafter. This column attributes the weak response of nominal wage growth to employment dynamics since 2008 to the countercyclical behaviour of labour productivity, which is driven, in turn, by the exceptionally high persistence of the downturn and the subsequent recovery.

Masayuki Morikawa, 10 February 2020

Although long-term macroeconomic forecasts substantially affect the sustainability of government debt and the social security system, they cannot avoid significant uncertainty. This column assesses whether academic researchers in economics make accurate long-term growth forecasts, comparing ten-year growth forecasts made by Japanese economists in 2006–2007 with the realised figures. Even excluding the years affected by the Global Crisis, the results show that forecasts tend to be biased upwards and involve significant uncertainty, even for economics researchers specialising in macroeconomics or economic growth.

Emily Liu, Friederike Niepmann, Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 02 February 2020

After the Global Crisis, accommodative monetary policy also eased financial conditions in emerging market economies. This column shows that US banks contributed to the transmission of US monetary policy and that regulation and supervision attenuated it. Only US banks that performed well in the Fed’s annual stress tests expanded their lending to emerging markets in response to monetary easing. Banks that performed poorly left their lending unchanged.

Mariarosaria Comunale, Francesco Paolo Mongelli, 27 January 2020

Over the past 30 years, euro area countries have undergone significant changes and endured diverse shocks. This column assembles a large set of variables covering the years 1990-2016 and investigates possible links to fluctuations and differences in growth rates. The findings suggest a significant positive role for institutional integration in supporting long-run growth, particularly for periphery countries. Competitiveness and monetary policy also matter for sustained growth in the long run, while higher sovereign stress, equity price cycles, loans to non-financial corporations and debt over GDP have either mixed or negative effects in core and periphery countries.

Andrew Lilley, Matteo Maggiori, Brent Neiman, Jesse Schreger, 24 January 2020

The ‘exchange rate disconnect’ describes the difficulty of explaining exchange rate movements using classical models and fundamentals. This column presents evidence of an ‘exchange rate reconnect’ – a substantial co-movement of the US dollar with global risk premia and US foreign bond purchases since the Global Crisis. Though short-lived, this relationship between these factors could shed new light on the nature of financial crises and risk.

Roel Beetsma, Josha van Spronsen, 24 January 2020

For the last decade, euro area countries have undertaken substantial debt issuances in order to maintain or bolster international capital market access. This column shows that the ECB's unconventional monetary policy dampens yield cycles in secondary markets for euro area sovereign debt around new debt auctions. This dampening effect tends to be larger when market volatility is higher, and this can be used to minimise any instability generated, for example, by different countries’ issuances occurring close together or the spillover effects of one country’s auctions on another. 

Jennifer Castle, David Hendry, Andrew Martinez, 21 January 2020

Real wages and productivity in the UK have stagnated since 2007, whereas employment has risen considerably. Many commentators lament the consequent failure of `living standards’ to rise at historical rates. But real GDP per capita has grown by more than 20% since 2000 despite the Great Recession, so aggregate living standards have in fact risen. This column resolves the apparent paradox.

Christiane Nickel, Elena Bobeica, Gerrit Koester, Eliza Lis, Mario Porqueddu, Cecilia Sarchi, 25 November 2019

Wage growth in the euro area over 2013 to 2017 was subdued despite notable improvements in the labour market, leading some to claim a breakdown of the output–inflation relationship. This column presents comparative analyses of wage developments in the euro area, showing that the Phillips curve is alive and well and can be used to explain much of the weakness in wage growth during 2013-2017. Other factors also found to have played a role include compositional effects, the possible non-linear reaction of wage growth to cyclical improvements, and structural and institutional factors. 

Mario Monti, 04 November 2019

What would happen if another crisis were to occur? In this video, Mario Monti discusses potential differences and challenges. This video was recorded at the "10 years after the crisis" conference held in London, on 22 September 2017.

Willem Thorbecke, 02 October 2019

Japanese exports in electronic parts and components dramatically fell in value after the Global Crisis and have not recovered until today. This column investigates why Japan lost this comparative advantage. It argues that capital inflows seeking safe havens during the crisis led to a sharp appreciation of the yen and caused yen export prices to tumble relative to production costs. Plummeting profits then hindered Japanese firms from investing enough in capital and innovation to compete with rivals.

Hakan Yilmazkuday, 21 August 2019

During the Global Crisis, international trade decreased more than overall economic activity, despite standard trade models predicting a one-to-one relationship. This ‘Great Trade Collapse’ has been investigated extensively in the literature, resulting in alternative competing explanations. This column evaluates the contribution of each story using data from the US. The results show that retail inventories have contributed the most to the collapse and the corresponding recovery, followed by protectionist policies, intermediate-input trade, and trade finance. Productivity and demand shocks have played negligible roles.

Marcus Miller, Lei Zhang, 16 August 2019

Externalities can have a powerful effect on financial stability. This column studies the amplification effect that can operate despite value at risk regulation, which suffers from the ‘fallacy of composition’. It shows that the magnitudes of booms and busts are amplified by two significant externalities triggered by aggregate shocks: the endogeneity of bank equity due to mark-to-market accounting and of bank liquidity due to 'fire-sales' of securitised assets. In addition to economic models, legal and political factors should also be considered. 

Anne-Laure Delatte, Pranav Garg, Jean Imbs, 21 May 2019

The ECB's unconventional monetary policy package implemented in February 2012 changed collateral requirements. This column examines the effects in the French credit market, using data on corporate loans. Credit indeed increased after the liquidity injection, exclusively driven by supply. There was also strategic risk-taking by a group of banks, an unintentional implication of the policy.

Pascal Michaillat, Emmanuel Saez, 13 May 2019

Academics and policymakers alike have debated how to structure an optimal stimulus package since the Great Recession. This column revisits the arguments related to the size of the multiplier and the usefulness of public spending, and offers a blueprint for future stimulus packages. It finds that the relationship between the multiplier and stimulus spending is hump-shaped, and that a well-designed stimulus package should depend on the usefulness of public expenditure. The output multiplier is not a robust statistic to use, and instead the ‘unemployment multiplier’ should be used. 



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