Luc Laeven, 25 October 2011

Recent financial regulatory reforms target banks’ risk-taking behaviours without considering their ownership and governance. This chapter argues that bank governance influences how regulations alter bank’s incentives. Banks with more powerful owners tend to take more risks, and greater capital requirements actually increase risk-taking in banks with powerful shareholders. Bank regulation should condition on bank governance.

Hans Gersbach, 12 October 2011

Current macroeconomic policymaking suffers from an inadequate range of instruments and the absence of a comprehensive assignment of responsibilities. This column introduces a new CEPR Policy Insight designed to remedy these shortcomings. It proposes a framework for monetary, macroprudential, and microprudential policies.

Olivier Jeanne, Patrick Bolton, 25 April 2011

The Eurozone crisis has thrown into relief the dangers of financial contagion. The authors of CEPR DP8358 analyze the causes and consequences of sovereign debt crises in zones with financial integration. They conclude that without fiscal integration, the supply of government debt in these areas reaches an inefficient equilibrium, with safer governments inefficiently issuing too little of their high-quality debt and riskier governments issuing too much.

Svetlana Andrianova, Panicos Demetriades, David Fielding, Badi H Baltagi, 25 March 2011

International donors provide large amounts of financial capital to Africa in the form of aid and grants, but there are also large financial flows in the opposite direction. Many African banks invest large sums abroad and lend relatively little to local businesses. This column explains that this is because many banks suffer from a shortage of information about the creditworthiness of some of their customers.

Avinash Persaud, 14 September 2010

The role of financial institutions in the global crisis has led to a consensus that financial regulation must change. This column argues that the banking lobby, far from depleted, has struck back with a vengeance. It has managed to postpone the much needed regulation for a time when the need for it will be forgotten.

Richard Grossman, 23 July 2010

Richard Grossman of Wesleyan University talks to Romesh Vaitilingam about his new book ‘Unsettled Account: The Evolution of Banking in the Industrialized World since 1800’. Among other things, they discuss the problems of striking a balance between a dynamic banking system and a stable banking system. The interview was recorded at a conference on ‘Lessons from the Great Depression for the Making of Economic Policy’ in London in April 2010.

Thorsten Beck, 14 May 2010

Thorsten Beck of Tilburg University talks to Viv Davies about his current research in the areas of finance, growth and development - and the policy lessons for developing countries. The interview was recorded at Tilburg University in April 2010.

Alberto Giovannini, 22 November 2008

Simplicity and transparency, two major causalities of recent financial market changes, are essential to restoring trust in financial markets. This column suggests that distinguishing two types of financial intermediaries – client servicers and capital managers – would be a big step in the right direction. Today’s lack of distinction means one set of regulations is applied to the two very different functions.

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