Viral Acharya, 25 October 2011

The Vickers Commission recommends separating commercial and noncommercial banking activities in order to protect core financial functions from riskier activities. This column warns that such ring-fencing may fail because there are still incentive problems in traditional banking activities. The accompanying risk-weighted capital requirement recommendations will address this only if we do a better job of measuring risks.

Jon Danielsson, 27 June 2011

A debate is raging on capital adequacy requirements for banks. The UK wants to be allowed to “top up” the agreed levels, i.e. to impose stricter capital standards than the EU minimum. This column argues the UK is right, and that the German and French opposition might be motivated by weaknesses in their banking systems.

Viral Acharya, 17 June 2011

Viral Acharya of New York University talks to Viv Davies about capital requirements and measuring systemic risk. Acharya describes the development of the NYU Stern systemic risk rankings of US financial institutions and what he considers to be the dismal failure of the Basel risk-weight approach to addressing systemic risk. He cautions against the blanket call for more capital and instead recommends for more capital against systemic risk contributions of financial firms. He also discusses the shadow banking sector and how banking risk and sovereign risk are becoming dangerously intertwined. The interview was recorded in London on 2 June 2011. [Also read the transcript]

David Miles, 25 February 2011

David Miles of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee talks to Viv Davies about ‘Monetary Policy in Extraordinary Times’, a speech he delivered in London on 23 February 2011. Two very large shocks have hit the UK economy – the near collapse of the banking system and, more recently, a sharp increase in commodity, energy and food prices. The first shock is deflationary, the second inflationary. Miles discusses how best to set monetary policy in the wake of these shocks and analyses how regulation and monetary policy can most effectively reduce the likelihood of future financial instability. [Also read the transcript]

Avinash Persaud, 13 June 2009

There is a strong consensus that banks had insufficient reserves set aside for a rainy day and that they should be required to hold more capital. This column says we should differentiate institutions less by what they are called and more by how they are funded. Encouraging individual risks to flow to those who can absorb them would make the system safer and introduce new players with risk capacities.

Enrico Perotti, Javier Suarez, 11 February 2009

Most financial system reform proposals rely on better managed, anti-cyclical capital requirements, or some sort of insurance. This column argues that mandatory liquidity insurance would be more effective. The insurance premiums – linked to maturity mismatch and term structure – would essentially be pre-payment for the cost of future financial crises and held in an Emergency Liquidity Insurance Fund.

Hans Gersbach, 07 September 2011

Current regulation imposes fixed capital requirements on banks. However, this makes it impossible to use regulatory capital as a buffer against negative macroeconomic shocks. This column explains how this paradox could be resolved by basing capital requirements each year on average bank equity capital in the industry.



CEPR Policy Research