Carmen Reinhart, Kenneth Rogoff, 28 March 2011

With public debt in the US higher than it's been since 1945 and private debt burgeoning, governments are panicking about the impact of debt overhang on growth. In CEPR DP8310, Reinhart and Rogoff argue that governments have increasingly resorted to undercover restructuring by using the tools of "financial repression" that characterized the Bretton Woods era. If states continue to ignore or distort their debt problems, the authors predict, their bond markets could become ever more repressed.

Nicola Gennaioli, Alberto Martin, Stefano Rossi, 17 November 2010

Recent sovereign defaults in developing countries have put severe strain on the defaulting country’s banking system. This column argues that these events teach us how the development of private financial markets plays a critical role in reducing the risk of government default and thus in supporting public borrowing.

Andrew Scott, 11 March 2010

The high levels of government debt have raised concern among policymakers and commentators. But this column argues that markets have financed much larger levels of debt than are currently predicted for the UK and US. Given the enormous financial shock these economies have experienced, they might actually be better off with high debt for a long period of time.

Charles Wyplosz, 14 December 2009

Greece’s public debt is in turmoil. This column says that the country is nowhere near defaulting, but the Greek government should heed the financial markets’ warning and end three decades of fiscal profligacy. It suggests that Greece adopt immediate deep spending cuts and reform its budgetary process to credibly enforce discipline.

Charles Goodhart, Dimitri Tsomocos, 26 November 2009

Standard DSGE models do not include the possibility of default. This column says that makes them useless for analysing financial crises. It proposes explicitly incorporating default and money into the microfoundations of DSGE models so as to offer a new framework for monetary and regulatory policy analysis.

Charles Goodhart, Dimitri Tsomocos, 12 November 2009

Liquidity and default are inseparable. Liquidity problems fuel defaults and vice versa. This column discusses the shortcomings of current regulatory proposals to address liquidity and default. It says that regulators must address “systemic markets”, not just systemic institutions, and need informative measures of financial stability.

Carmen Reinhart, 26 January 2009

Financial crises are historically associated with the “4 deadly D’s”: Sharp economic downturns follow banking crises; with government revenues dragged down, fiscal deficits worsen; deficits lead to debt; as debt piles up rating downgrades follow. For the most fortunate countries, the crisis does not lead to the deadliest D: default, but for many it has.



CEPR Policy Research