Thorsten Beck, Wolf Wagner, Philip Lane, Dirk Schoenmaker, Elena Carletti, Franklin Allen, 20 June 2011

This CEPR report argues that policy reforms in micro- and macro-prudential regulation and macroeconomic policies are needed for Europe to reap the important diversification and efficiency benefits from cross-border banking, while reducing the risks stemming from large cross-border banks.

Enrico Perotti, Javier Suarez, 07 November 2009

There is a post-crisis consensus on the need to address systemic liquidity risk and its role in propagating turmoil. This column, which accompanies the release of a new CEPR Policy Insight, refines the implementation details of a new macro-prudential tool – liquidity risk charges – to discourage systemic risk creation by banks.

Stefan Gerlach, Alberto Giovannini, Cédric Tille, 17 July 2009

What lessons should central bankers take away from the financial crisis? This column summarises concerns about macro-prudential regulation, inflation expectations, and the interaction between monetary policy and financial regulation

Guido Tabellini, 16 July 2009

It’s time to start drawing conclusions about the global crisis. This column, the first of a two-part series, assesses the causes and nature of the problems. Although the crisis originated in financial market failings, policymakers are much to blame. Regulatory failure amplified private sector errors, and poorly planned policy responses exacerbated the troubles.

Marc Flandreau, Norbert Gaillard, 26 June 2009

How did the rating agencies come to have such a prominent role in the regulation of securities? This column traces their history back to the Great Depression. Ironically, the agencies became a regulatory instrument to address concerns about securities originators’ conflicts of interest, the very problem plaguing the agencies today. The lesson may be that no fixed regulatory solution is durable in the long run.

Avinash Persaud, 24 June 2009

Policymakers embraced the rhetoric of macro-prudential regulation in response to the crisis, but most of their proposals have just suggested more micro-prudential regulations of the sort that already failed. This column criticizes those proposals and outlines what real macro-prudential approaches would look like.

Willem Buiter, 09 March 2009

Financial regulation is a now-or-never proposition as the sector’s lobbying power is greatly diminished. This column argues that we should embrace robust regulation now, risking over-regulation. Correcting mistakes later would be better than risking another era of “self-” or “soft-touch” regulation.

Charles Calomiris, 12 February 2009

The financial crisis happened because the rules of the game – shaped by government policy – promote the wilful undertaking of excessive, value-destroying risks by managers who were not effectively disciplined by shareholders. This column outlines the six key areas where regulatory reform is essential to preventing a repeat.

Events

CEPR Policy Research