Murillo Campello, Daniel Ferrés, Gaizka Ormazabal, 07 September 2017

Strategies for cartel detection and prosecution differ across countries. This column uses a US dataset to show that independent directors of cartel-indicted firms favour the implementation of corrective actions in order to mitigate damage to their personal reputations. Firms with a larger fraction of independent directors on their boards observe smaller value losses and lower cartel duration during cartel-busting episodes.

Martin Watzinger, Thomas Fackler, Markus Nagler, Monika Schnitzer, 19 February 2017

There is growing concern that dominant companies use patents strategically to keep competitors from entering their market. This column uses the landmark 1956 Consent Decree against Bell Labs to explore whether antitrust enforcement is an effective remedy to the problem. Results show that patents can indeed be used as an entry barrier for start-up firms, and that the compulsory licensing of patents can foster market entry and innovation. However, compulsory licensing is found to be ineffective in markets where dominant firms have other means of market foreclosure.

, 05 October 2016

How did Intel maintain its competitive advantage over AMD? In this video, Michelle Sovinsky explains how vertical constraints helped increase Intel's market share. This video was recorded during the European Economic Association's Congress held in Geneva at the end of August 2016. 

Giacomo Calzolari, Vincenzo Denicolò, 20 January 2016

Intel dominates the market for microchips, an essential component of innumerable electronic devices. This column proposes a structured antitrust test that could tackle the issue of how antitrust authorities make decisions on whether a dominant firm’s rivals can compete for exclusive contracts effectively. This decision depends on the size of the dominant firm’s competitive advantage, which isn’t something that we can easily measure but is something that is correlated with other variables, such as the firms’ market shares.

Hugh Rockoff, 04 October 2014

World War I profoundly altered the structure of the US economy and its role in the world economy. However, this column argues that the US learnt the wrong lessons from the war, partly because a halo of victory surrounded wartime policies and personalities. The methods used for dealing with shortages during the war were simply inappropriate for dealing with the Great Depression, and American isolationism in the 1930s had devastating consequences for world peace.

Vasiliki Bageri, Yannis Katsoulacos, Giancarlo Spagnolo, 23 March 2014

Competition policy is central to the management of a modern economy. This column analyses some key distortions caused by competition policy and argues in favour of criminal sanctions in nations lacking resources for an appropriate fine-tuning of antitrust fines.

Mario Mariniello, 09 November 2013

Since the adoption of the Anti-Monopoly law in 2007, the Chinese competition authorities have stepped up enforcement of mergers and anti-competitive practices. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce has relied heavily on behavioural remedies in merger cases (as opposed to the more efficient structural remedies favoured by the European Commission). Furthermore, merger policy has been used to protect domestic industries from competition. In contrast, Chinese fines for cartels have shown no foreign bias, and if anything have been too low.

Duarte Brito, Ricardo Ribeiro, Helder Vasconcelos, 27 September 2013

Horizontal acquisitions affect prices through two channels: by eliminating competition between the firms involved, and by changing the incentives for collusion in the affected industry. This column summarises recent research that quantifies these two effects using a new methodology – one that accounts for the difference between financial interests and corporate control. A study of the disposable-razor industry shows that small firms have the greatest incentive to undercut pricing agreements. After acquisitions, acquiring firms have greater incentives to collude, whereas other firms in the industry are more likely to defect.

Dennis Carlton, 26 March 2009

How effective is US merger policy? US policymakers lack any systematic quantitative study to answer the question. This column says that merger policy studies should measure the systematic bias in price predictions of the antitrust agency and see what methods work best. Such data-driven assessment would result in analysis replacing opinion as the basis for judging merger policy.

Events

CEPR Policy Research