Pierluigi Balduzzi, Emanuele Brancati, Marco Brianti, Fabio Schiantarelli, 20 February 2020

The effects of shocks to political risk can be captured by the change in the spread of sovereign credit default swaps. This column shows how the rise of populist movements in Italy following the financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis affects domestic and euro area financial markets, and also impacts the Italian real economy. Italy has been an ideal laboratory to explore and learn about the economic consequences of political risk shocks, and the instability there implies that this is likely to continue to be the case in the future.

Kai Gehring, Stephan A. Schneider, 18 February 2020

Secessionist parties draw upon rhetoric on cultural identity and political autonomy to garner votes. However, the parties’ electoral success is also influenced by the availability of regional resources. This column examines two secessionist parties in the UK – the Scottish National Party and the Welsh Plaid Cymru – and the divergence in their performance following the discovery of oil within Scotland’s hypothetical maritime borders. It finds that a 10% increase in relative regional wealth is associated with an increase of 3 percentage points in the vote share of secessionist parties. Relative regional resource wealth is more important than absolute wealth, and changes in regional resource wealth only play a role when there is baseline support for secession.

Giuseppe Albanese, Guglielmo Barone, Guido de Blasio, 04 February 2020

There is a rapidly growing empirical literature on the causes of the recent rise of populism in Western countries, but much less is known about solutions. This column, part of the Vox debate on populism, shows that in areas facing similarly adverse economic shocks, the exposure to the EU regional redistribution policy has helped lowering the support for populist parties. This suggests that, at least in the short term, fiscal policy can be an effective tool against the populist backlash.

Laura Barros, Manuel Santos Silva, 24 January 2020

Brazil plunged into economic crisis between 2014 and 2018, the year when far-right populist Jair Bolsonaro won the presidential election. This column, part of the Vox debate on populism, argues that Bolsonaro’s surprising victory is partially explained by the way the economic crisis interacted with prevailing gender norms. In regions where men experience larger employment losses, there is an increase in the share of votes for Bolsonaro. In contrast, in regions where women experience larger losses, his vote share is relatively lower. This may be explained by men feeling more compelled to vote for a figure that embodies masculine stereotypes as a way of compensating for a decline in economic and social status.

Yotam Margalit, 20 December 2019

A common explanation for the rise of populism is economic insecurity driven by forces such as trade, immigration, or the financial crisis. This column, part of the Vox debate on populism, argues that such view overstates the role of economic insecurity as a driver. In particular, it conflates economic insecurity being important in explaining the overall populist vote and being important by affecting election outcomes on the margin. The empirical findings indicate that the share of populist support explained by economic insecurity is modest.  

Lubos Pastor, Pietro Veronesi, 12 December 2019

Economic anxiety and insecurity are often cited as drivers of populism, so why has populism emerged over the past few years in rich countries and in good times? This column, part of the Vox debate on the topic, argues that income inequality plays a role. When the economy is strong, everyone fares well but the rich fare especially well, fuelling inequality and resentment. Populism in the form of anti-globalisation may reduce everyone’s consumption, but it affects the rich disproportionately and thus appeals to many voters in richer countries. In poorer countries, however, voters are less willing to give up consumption for equality.

Italo Colantone, Piero Stanig, 10 December 2019

Populist parties tend to share an anti-establishment stance and the claim to represent ordinary people versus the elites. This column, part of the Vox debate on populism, argues that despite these similarities, populist parties are fundamentally heterogeneous and the drivers of their support tend to be diverse. It also argues that the economy and culture should be seen as tightly interrelated rather than mutually exclusive explanations for the populist surge, and that rather than being a simple ‘protest vote’, the surge might reflect a new political cleavage resulting from the contraposition of winners and losers from structural economic changes.

Sergei Guriev, 29 November 2019

The mobile internet, promises to give us access to information anywhere, 24 hours a day. So how has it influenced trust in governments, politics, and politicians? Sergei Guriev tells Tim Phillips about how, all over the world, 3G has reduced trust in government and aided the rise of populism. 

Sergei Guriev, Nikita Melnikov, Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 31 October 2019

Information and communication technology has no doubt had a positive economic impact globally, but its political bearing is less clear. This column shows that the proliferation of mobile technology reduces citizens’ confidence in their current governments, especially in places where news broadcasting is censored but the internet is not. Furthermore, by reducing the cost of reaching voters, the internet has also led to increased support for both left-wing and right-wing populist movements.

Dani Rodrik, 29 October 2019

There are essentially two schools of thought on the roots of populism, one that focuses on culture and another that focuses on economics. This column, part of a VoxEU debate, examines the drivers from each of these perspectives. It also argues that there are times when economic populism may be the only way to forestall its much more dangerous cousin, political populism.

Barry Eichengreen, 29 October 2019

Explanations for variants of populism are typically framed as a contest between culture and economics. This column, part of a Vox debate on the subject, looks at the arguments for both and uses data from the British Election Study surveys to show that populism, and Brexit in particular, is as much about economics as it is about culture and identity. Populism rooted in economics can be addressed with policies that enhance socioeconomic mobility, reduce income disparities, increase economic security, and help left-behind places. It is less clear how to address authoritarian, xenophobic populism rooted in cultural identity concerns.

Sergei Guriev, 29 October 2019

The rise of populism is one of the most important political, social, and economic phenomena in recent years. This column introduces a new Vox debate which focuses on four broad questions:  What is populism and how can we quantify its rise? What are the drivers of the recent rise of populism? What are the implications for economic growth, for other socioeconomic outcomes, and for political institutions? And if the recent rise of populism is a problem, what should be done about it?

Stephanie Bergbauer, Jean-Francois Jamet, Hanni Schölermann, Livio Stracca, Carina Stubenrauch, 20 September 2019

Recent successes of populist movements in Europe might seem to reflect eroded trust in the EU’s institutions. This column asks what global lessons can be drawn from recent research on Euroscepticism at the ECB and elsewhere. It argues that taking citizens’ concerns seriously and addressing salient issues, building on a sense of togetherness, and caring about public trust should inspire a course of action at the global level. Insufficient progress along these dimensions has played a key role not only in Brexit, but also in the backlash against the multilateral world order underpinning globalisation.

Michele Cantarella, Nicolò Fraccaroli, Roberto Volpe, 11 July 2019

'Fake news' has undeniably been biased in favour of populist or anti-establishment parties. As politically charged misinformation has been proliferating online, it is no wonder that many have been questioning whether the spread of fake news has affected the results of recent elections, contributing to the growth of populist party platforms. This column examines evidence from a natural experiment occurring in Italy and discusses how fake news might have played a less than obvious role in influencing political preferences during the general elections of 2018.

Clemens Fuest, 04 June 2019

Marco Tabellini, 25 May 2019

Recent waves of immigration in the US and Europe have triggered debate around the economic and political impact. This column uses evidence from migration of Europeans to the US in the first half of the 20th century to show that large cultural differences can incite anti-immigrant sentiment despite their positive economic impact. Therefore, policymakers should give due attention to cultural assimilation and cohesion policies.

André Sapir, 24 May 2019

André Sapir discusses how Europe's institutions can reconnect with its citizens and the benefits this can bring.

Hélène Rey, 10 May 2019

Hélène Rey of London Business School and CEPR discusses economic challenges for Europe.

Karl Aiginger, 20 April 2019

Populism represents a challenge to liberal democracy, pluralism, human rights, and the exchange of ideas. This column examines the features and drivers of populism, as well as the potential strategic response by the EU and its member states. This includes a vision for Europe to become the role model for high-income societies providing well-being, lower unemployment, and less inequality, and a leader in decarbonisation and public sector management.

Mathieu Couttenier, Sophie Hatte, Mathias Thoenig, Stephanos Vlachos, 02 April 2019

Populists often claim that immigration is a threat to the interests of the majority. This column quantifies the extent to which the media coverage of immigrant crime fuelled populist political support in a Swiss referendum. It finds that disproportionate coverage of immigrant crime increased an anti-minaret vote by 5%.

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