Kateřina Šmídková, Jan Zapal, Roman Horváth, 13 November 2011

Does the publishing of voting records improve the transparency of monetary policy? This column argues voting records indeed contain informative power about future monetary policy but only if there is sufficient independence in voting across board members and if the signals about the optimal policy rate are noisy.

Anne Sibert, 15 September 2011

The European Central Bank was once known for its focus on price stability. Since the global economic crisis, however, its role has extended to saving banks and sovereign countries. This column argues that such a move has badly harmed the institution’s legitimacy – something that will damage both its policy effectiveness and confidence in the governing bodies of the EU as a whole.

Barry Eichengreen, 17 June 2010

Financial crises feed on uncertainty. This essay warns that the longer the Eurozone crisis is allowed to linger, the greater will be the damage. But Europe can take concrete actions to bring it to an end. It should make bank stress tests public, provide more clarity on its special purpose vehicle, move forward with restructuring Greece’s debt, and support growth through quantitative easing.

Helmut Reisen, Dilan Ölcer, 17 February 2009

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative has directed the international community’s attention to a sector that has traditionally been veiled in secrecy. But it has not been effective in producing change. Why have so many resource-rich countries failed to lower perceived corruption? This column points to low-quality information provided in reports and weak civil societies in resource-rich countries as possible explanations. Reforms and improvements are needed.

Carin van der Cruijsen, Sylvester Eijffinger, Lex Hoogduin, 12 August 2008

Transparency is the new trend in central banking, but it has both costs and benefits. This column discusses research aimed at identifying the optimal level of transparency. The results suggest that US and European central banks may be too transparent.

Christopher Crowe, Ellen Meade, 31 July 2008

Theories arguing that independent, transparent central banks fight inflation better are widely accepted, but the evidence backing them is surprisingly scarce. This column presents new empirical estimates suggesting a payoff to central bank independence and transparency.

Christopher Crowe, Ellen Meade, 27 July 2008

The European Central Bank is under fire from Nicholas Sarkozy. This column introduces a new set of measures of central bank independence and transparency, which shows that the ECB is markedly more transparent than the Eurozone members’ central banks were in the 1990s.

Ellen Meade, David Stasavage, 26 June 2008

Central banks are increasingly transparent but is the spotlight is stifling? Analysis of FOMC transcripts before and after Committee members knew that they would be published shows how transparency deadened the debate and reduced the number of challenges to Greenspan’s position.

Camille Cornand, Frank Heinemann, 27 May 2008

Central banks and international institutions often call for greater transparency in financial markets. This column argues, however, that in a context where central banks make inevitable forecast errors, it is efficient for central banks to disseminate information to only a limited audience.

Alan Blinder, Michael Ehrmann, Marcel Fratzscher, Jakob de Haan, David-Jan Jansen, 15 May 2008

Central banking has undergone dramatic change in recent decades, and many banks now favour transparency in communicating their policies and forecasts. What does this mean? This column argues that our understanding of the role of central bank communication is still in its infancy and it remains unclear what constitutes an optimal communication strategy for central banks.

Axel Leijonhufvud, 13 May 2008

The US Federal Reserve has used unorthodox policy instruments to reduce recent financial turmoil. In this column, the author of CEPR Policy Insight 23 argues that the crisis raises more fundamental questions about core tenets of modern monetary orthodoxy – inflation targeting and central bank independence.

Petra Geraats, Francesco Giavazzi, Charles Wyplosz, 07 February 2008

Central Banking works by guiding the expectations of savers, investors, consumers and markets – not an easy job. This column, based on the latest report in CEPR’s series ‘Monitoring the European Central Bank’, argues that the job would be easier if the ECB published its anticipated interest rate path and voting records.

Charles Wyplosz, 21 July 2007

The ECB’s opacity, lack of open debate and refusal to decide by voting bear at least some responsibility in the declining support for the euro. This makes the ECB an easy target for politicians looking for scapegoats. For the good of the Euro-area citizens, the ECB ought to change its ways.

Francesco Giavazzi, 19 June 2007

Sarkozy repeatedly criticised the European Central Bank during the campaign; his intuition was correct but his aim was off. By forcing the ECB to be more transparent and accountable, he would contribute to improving monetary policy in Europe.

Pages

Events

CEPR Policy Research