Eliana La Ferrara, 03 April 2018

Alex Klein, Sheilagh Ogilvie, 14 January 2018

A famous hypothesis posits that serfdom was caused by factor endowments, specifically high land-labour ratios. Historical evidence seems to refute this idea, but with substantial identification problems. This column uses microdata for more than 11,000 Bohemian villages in the year 1757 to control for other potential influences on serfdom. The results support the factor endowments hypothesis, with higher land-labour ratios intensifying serfdom, suggesting that institutions are partially shaped by economic fundamentals.

Prateek Raj, 04 January 2018

In medieval Europe, trade depended on personal relationships, which were usually mediated by merchant guilds. The column argues that increasing incentives to do business with merchants outside the guild system, and the availability of better information about those trading partners, led to the decline of merchant guilds in the 16th century. This occurred first in coastal cities that were early adopters of printing technology.

Paolo Buccirossi, Giovanni Immordino, Giancarlo Spagnolo, 11 October 2017

Schemes that reward whistleblowers who provide evidence of corporate fraud have been effective in the US, but have generally been resisted in Europe. This column argues that a policy that trades off rewards to those who blow the whistle against punishment for fabricating evidence would increase both detection of, and punishment for, fraud. This will only be effective, however, if whistleblowers are protected from retaliation and the policy also invests in making court findings more accurate.

Benjamin Enke, 21 September 2017

Daily life requires us to cooperate with a large number of – potentially unrelated – people. This column argues that cultural variation in the ways people cooperate with each other are empirically associated with fundamentally different religious beliefs, moral values, emotions of shame and guilt, social norms, and institutions. This suggests that various psychological, biological, and institutional mechanisms co-evolved to support specific social cooperation systems.

Giacomo Ponzetto, 13 September 2017

What is the link between citizens, insitutions and globalisation? In this video, Giacomo Ponzetto underlines the relevance of psychology and availability of information. This video was recorded at the Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in November 2016.

Joshua Aizenman, Yothin Jinjarak, Gemma Estrada, Shu Tian, 19 July 2017

The impact of the Global Crisis of 2008 played out differently in middle-income countries compared to developed countries. This column argues that the associations of growth level, growth volatility, shocks, institutions, and macroeconomic fundamentals have changed in important ways after the crisis. Educational attainment, share of manufacturing output in GDP, and exchange rate stability appear to increase the level of economic growth. Exchange rate flexibility, education attainment, and lack of political polarisation reduce the volatility of economic growth.

Debraj Ray, Joan Esteban, 04 July 2016

Kaivan Munshi, 29 June 2016

Emmanuelle Auriol, Jean-Philippe Platteau, 09 April 2017

The extent to which Islam is responsible for the problems encountered in countries in which it dominates has been the subject of much attention. This column explores the effect of religions with differing organisational structures on progressive institutional reforms, state corruption, and political stability. Decentralised religions such as Islam are more conducive to institutional stagnation and political instability than centralised religions such as Catholicism or Eastern Christianity, with negative consequences for long-term development.

Louis Kasekende, 19 September 2016

How to strengthen and create institutions that support development? In this video, Louis Kasekende discusses the role of formal and informal institutions in the financial sector.

Priyank Gandhi, Hanno Lustig, Alberto Plazzi, 21 August 2016

Governments and regulators are commonly assumed to offer special protection to the stakeholders of large financial institutions during financial crises. This column measures the ex ante cost of implicit shareholder guarantees to financial institutions in crises, and suggests that such protection affects small and large financial institutions differently. The evidence suggests that in the event of a financial crisis, stock investors price in the implicit government guarantees extended to large financial institutions, but not to small ones. 

Stefano Micossi, 20 August 2016

Some economists are approaching a consensus that the Eurozone’s financial architecture is now resilient enough to withstand another shock similar to that of 2010-11. This column argues that such a view may be overly optimistic. Economic and financial instability persists in member states and the banking sector, and institutions to tackle a shock remain incomplete. While the Eurozone remains vulnerable to a bad shock, the blanket application of burden sharing without consideration of current economic and financial conditions is unwise.

Melissa Dell, Pablo Querubin, 16 August 2016

The nature of US military interventions has become relevant in the face of new growing threats, particularly from so-called Islamic State. While top-down strategies that rely on overwhelming firepower are sometimes favoured by politicians, longer-term strategies use a bottom-up approach, gaining citizens’ support through civic engagement. This column introduces evidence from US actions during the Vietnam War to show that bottom-up approaches are more successful in countering insurgencies than violent, top-down interventions.

Paul Hünermund, Georg Licht, 08 July 2016

European countries are increasingly coordinating their national research and development policies. However, supra-national R&D programmes entail problems from a governance standpoint. This column discusses the problem of cross-subsidisation between participating countries. European joint programming initiatives are usually designed to avoid international transfer payments. Empirical evidence suggests that doing so comes at the price of decreased efficiency. 

Debraj Ray, Joan Esteban, 03 July 2016

Since 1950, more than half of the world’s countries have experienced situations of civil war. In this video, Debraj Ray and Joan Esteban discuss their research on the impact of conflict on economic development. In order to design the best possible institutions to cope with conflict, we need to understand the drivers of these conflicts. This video was recorded during the conference on “Economic Development and Institutions” held in Paris in June 2016.

Jean-Philippe Platteau, Catherine Guirkinger, 01 July 2016

Family is a key institution in many countries, particularly developing countries. In this video, Jean-Philippe Platteau and Catherine Guirkinger discuss the role of families in society. In countries where the judicial system is weak, families are important in settling conflicts and can replace formal institutions. Families can also change the impact of public policies. This video was recorded during the conference on “Economic Development and Institutions” held in Paris in June 2016.

Kaivan Munshi, 29 June 2016

Institutions are implicit or explicit rules that bring people with the same objective together. In this video, Kaivan Munshi discusses the role of informal community-based institutions in migration and the development process. Pre-existing social groups support migration and eventually development. This video was shot during the conference on “Economic Development and Institutions” held in Paris in June 2016.

Samuel Bowles, 27 June 2016

Institutions define the rules of the game, and understanding them allows to us to understand how economies change. In this video, Sam Bowles discusses the role of institutions for wealth inequality and redistribution of wealth. Politics and institutions are the key to understanding inequality. This video was shot during the Conference on Economic Development and Institutions held in January 2016 at the University of Namur.

Mariassunta Giannetti, Bige Kahraman, 09 June 2016

Theoretical corrections of price deviations in trade are not reflected in empirical evidence. This is surprising because institutional investors should be able be able to identify mispricing. This column explores how the organisation of the asset management industry may hamper trading against mispricing. Asset managers that are less subject to redemption risk exhibit a higher propensity to trade against mispricing. Organisational structures lowering the sensitivity of investor flows to performance strengthen asset managers’ incentives to trade against mispricing.



CEPR Policy Research