Jeffrey L. Furman, Markus Nagler, Martin Watzinger, 31 March 2019

It is a concern amongst policymakers that the disclosure component of patents is insufficient in stimulating subsequent innovation. Using evidence on patent trends around Patent Depository Libraries in the US, this column shows that the availability of information on prior art positively impacts innovation in the field. In the pre-internet era, these libraries helped reduce geographical barriers to knowledge diffusion.

Itai Ater, Oren Rigbi, 20 January 2018

The ability to compare prices openly and easily is widely thought to foster competitiveness, but mandatory disclosure of pricing information can also facilitate collusion between sellers. This column uses evidence from before and after the introduction of price disclosure regulation in the Israeli supermarket industry to evaluate how price transparency affected food prices. Mandatory disclosure decreased the dispersion and, to a lesser extent, the levels of prices. On average, Israeli consumers saved about $27 per month thanks to the regulation.

Ginger Jin, Michael Luca, Daniel Martin, 22 July 2015

Theories of voluntary disclosure suggest that even when disclosure is voluntary, market forces can drive firms to completely reveal information about their quality. This column investigates these predictions in an experimental setting. Laboratory results suggest widespread failures of the theoretical predictions – senders do not fully disclose, and receivers are not fully sceptical about non-disclosure. This suggests a role for policymakers to help customers understand the sound of silence.

Clemens Bonner, Iman van Lelyveld, Robert Zymek, 01 November 2013

What are the determinants of banks’ liquidity holdings and how are these reshaped by liquidity regulation? Based on a sample of 7,000 banks in 30 OECD countries, this column argues that banks’ liquidity buffers are determined by a combination of both bank- and country-specific variables. The presence of liquidity regulation substitutes for most of these determinants while complementing the role of size and institutions’ disclosure requirements. The complementary nature of disclosure and liquidity requirements provides a strong rationale for considering them jointly in the design of regulation.

Xavier Freixas, Christian Laux, 17 April 2012

Faith in market discipline has been shattered by the financial crisis. This column argues that the failure of market discipline has different roots. It points to a lack of transparency and efficiency, particularly when it is needed most. In order to rectify this, however, it is not enough to merely increase the provision and disclosure of information. Instead, transparency depends on how that information is interpreted and used.

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