Alminas Žaldokas, 21 June 2018

Investors ask companies for greater information disclosure in order to make better investment decisions. Alminas Žaldokas discusses his research on whether increased disclosure to investors may be helping firms collude on prices, harming consumers. This video was recorded at CEPR's Third Annual Spring Symposium.

Paolo Buccirossi, Catarina Marvão, Giancarlo Spagnolo, 14 July 2015

EU anti-cartel decisions have imposed billion of euros of fines in recent years, but private actions by cartel victims are also possible. This column discusses a 2014 EU Directive that facilitates private actions by cartel victims while attempting to reduce conflicts between private and public enforcement.

Vasiliki Bageri, Yannis Katsoulacos, Giancarlo Spagnolo, 23 March 2014

Competition policy is central to the management of a modern economy. This column analyses some key distortions caused by competition policy and argues in favour of criminal sanctions in nations lacking resources for an appropriate fine-tuning of antitrust fines.

Duarte Brito, Ricardo Ribeiro, Helder Vasconcelos, 28 September 2013

Horizontal acquisitions affect prices through two channels: by eliminating competition between the firms involved, and by changing the incentives for collusion in the affected industry. This column summarises recent research that quantifies these two effects using a new methodology – one that accounts for the difference between financial interests and corporate control. A study of the disposable-razor industry shows that small firms have the greatest incentive to undercut pricing agreements. After acquisitions, acquiring firms have greater incentives to collude, whereas other firms in the industry are more likely to defect.

Mario Mariniello, 22 September 2013

Cartel fines imposed by the European Commission routinely reach hundreds of millions of euro, having increased since the new 2006 fining policy. This column argues that they are still below their optimal level and come too slowly. Fines were often lower than the additional cartel profits and imposed 10 to 20 years after making the law-breaking decision was made – sometimes after the responsible managers had retired. To speed investigations, the Commission should Increase resources dedicated to inquiries; fines should also be raised.

Ari Hyytinen, Frode Steen, Otto Toivanen, 14 June 2013

If cartels are a clear and ever-present violation of market economics, what can authorities do to combat them? This column presents new research that helps economists understand cartels better. The better the information we have about the formation of cartels, the better governments around the world will catch them out.

Simon Evenett, Frédéric Jenny, 15 February 2012

After several decades of quiescence, global commodity prices almost doubled in 2008 and, after a brief fall, rose again in 2011. The papers in this new CEPR eReport aim to identify and assess the importance of the factors responsible for the recent increases in the levels and volatility of commodity prices.

Richard Tol, Dritan Osmany, 23 June 2010

In 1994, Scott Barrett predicted that international environmental agreements had either many signatories who promise to do very little, or a few signatories who promise to do a lot. This column tests this suggestion by considering the role of other coalitions. One result is that, to solve global problems, the UN forum should hold negotiations with the largest emitters only.

Ari Hyytinen, Frode Steen, Otto Toivanen, 05 May 2010

Should cartels be regulated? This column outlines a new economic toolkit that models the creation of cartels and compares these predictions with real-life observations. Focusing on forty years of postwar data from Finland, this column finds that once cartels are formed, they are long-lasting. If unregulated the amount of cartels will only increase.

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