Marcel Fafchamps, Julien Labonne, 31 May 2016

Politicians may have the opportunity to interfere with the allocation of public services to help to achieve their electoral objectives. This column argues that politicians share rents with central players to build and sustain coalitions. Using detailed data from the Philippines, it examines social networks and the allocation of municipal services. Households with greater potential to broker political coalitions do indeed appear to receive more services from their municipal government. 

Assaf Razin, Efraim Sadka, Benjarong Suwankiri, 17 January 2015

Allowing greater immigration may raise tax revenue and help pay for the welfare state, but it also affects the future composition of the voting population. This column discusses a political-economy model in which the largest group in a winning coalition chooses tax and immigration policies, and explains how the composition of the voting population changes over time.

Richard Tol, Dritan Osmany, 23 June 2010

In 1994, Scott Barrett predicted that international environmental agreements had either many signatories who promise to do very little, or a few signatories who promise to do a lot. This column tests this suggestion by considering the role of other coalitions. One result is that, to solve global problems, the UN forum should hold negotiations with the largest emitters only.

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CEPR Policy Research