Nijolė Valinskytė, Erika Ivanauskaitė, Darius Kulikauskas, Simonas Krėpšta, 12 April 2018

The leverage ratio requirement should supplement microprudential the risk-based capital requirements framework to serve as a backstop that ensures sufficient levels of equity in banks. However, the 3% level for this ratio should not be treated as the end-goal, as recent research on optimal capital levels points to substantially higher leverage ratios. This column examines the relationship between risk-based and leverage ratio requirements, and the motivation for the macroprudential use of leverage ratio requirements.

Zsofia Doeme, Stefan Kerbl, 24 January 2018

Risk weights define each bank's minimum capital requirements, but many doubt the comparability of the risk weights that banks report. This column quantifies the variability of these weights across banks, and finds that the country where a bank is headquartered creates statistically significant and economically important differences. Model output floors, as recently agreed upon by the Basel Committee, would reduce this unintended risk weight heterogeneity.

Yener Altunbaş, Simone Manganelli, David Marques-Ibanez, 14 November 2017

Prudential supervision of banks has increasingly relied on capital requirements. But bank capital played a relatively minor role in predicting bank solvency during the Global Crisis, except for scarcely capitalised banks. This column argues that while capital is a helpful tool to support bank financial stability, it is complex for supervisors to calibrate it precisely. Macroprudential authorities should be able to complement capital-based tools with additional, borrower-based prudential instruments.

Thomas Gehrig, Maria Chiara Iannino, 21 April 2017

The first Basel Accord initiated what has become a three decade-long process of regulatory convergence of the international banking system. This column argues that by trying to regulate minimal capital standards, the Basel process itself contributed to an ever-increasing shortfall in aggregate bank capital. Consequently, European banks have become increasingly exposed to systemic risk, suggesting that expansive monetary policy could adversely affect the resiliency of banks. 

Jens Hagendorff, Francesco Vallascas, 16 December 2013

Recent research shows that capital requirements are only loosely related to a market measure of bank portfolio risk. Changes introduced under Basel II meant that banks with the riskiest portfolios were particularly likely to hold insufficient capital. Banks that relied on government support during the crisis appeared to be well-capitalised beforehand, suggesting they engaged in capital arbitrage. Until the regulatory concept of risk better reflects actual risk, the proposed increases in risk-weighted capital requirements under Basel III will have little effect.

Lev Ratnovski, 02 June 2013

Bank competition policy seeks to balance efficiency with incentives to take risk. This calls for an intermediate degree of competition. This column argues that although the traditional policy tools are rules on entry/exit and the consolidation of banks, the Crisis showed that a focus on market structure alone is misplaced. There are other, newer ways in which competition policy can support financial stability: dealing with too-big-to fail and other structural issues in banking, as well as facilitating crisis management.

Takeo Hoshi, 23 December 2012

Rejigging financial regulation is in vogue. But, in the world of international finance, how well do different regulatory systems join up? This column argues that the US Dodd Frank Act and Basel III are, in part, incompatible and that harmonising them may lead to unintended consequences. The US ought to tread carefully here but should also try hard to maintain the spirit of better financial regulation.

Enrico Perotti, 25 October 2011

How should financial regulators address problems stemming from liquidity risk? This column argues that the liquidity coverage and net funding ratios proposed for Basel III are economically and politically impractical. It recommends using those ratios as long-term targets while imposing ‘prudential risk surcharges’ on deviations from the targets.

Avinash Persaud, 14 September 2010

The role of financial institutions in the global crisis has led to a consensus that financial regulation must change. This column argues that the banking lobby, far from depleted, has struck back with a vengeance. It has managed to postpone the much needed regulation for a time when the need for it will be forgotten.


CEPR Policy Research