Pierluigi Bologna, Arianna Miglietta, Anatoli Segura, 29 October 2018

Proponents of contingent convertible bonds, or CoCos, argue that they are effective instruments for bank recapitalisation. Sceptics argue that they introduce too much complexity, with potentially destabilising consequences. This column addresses this dispute empirically, using the dynamics of the CoCo market in 2016. The CoCo market at the time exhibited adverse dynamics that can’t be explained by banks’ fundamentals. Though some of this instability may have been transitory, the findings imply that the market should be monitored as it develops.


1:00 pm - 2:00 pm; This webinar will address the new regulatory treatment of Contingent Convertible Debt instruments and the development of the underlying CoCo bond markets. The contractual feature of the existing stock of CoCo debt will be analysed along various dimensions. First, in terms of their regulatory effectiveness in absorbing risk. Second, in terms of their impact on risk incentives and thus on their preventive effect. Third, we will look at the empirical evidence on the market response to their issuance. Finally, time allowing we will discuss the recent evolution on the CoCo bond market in terms of issuances and prices.

Enrico Perotti is Professor of International Finance at the University of Amsterdam, Member of the Scientific Committee of the Florence School of Banking and Finance and CEPR). His advisory work has focused on policy advice on issues of banking, financial reforms and stability to the EC, ECB, IMF, DNB, Bank of England, the World Bank and the UK Treasury.


This free online seminar on the 9th of March at 1pm - 2pm CET, with Professor Enrico Perotti (University of Amsterdam and CEPR) will offer a critical approach to capital requirements with a particular emphasis put on risk absorption capacity in the context of the new Capital Requirements Directive (CRD4) and the Financial Stability Board’s Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) standard.

Two alternative views of capital requirements will be lined out: the buffer view and the incentives view. As part of the webinar, the risk absorption potential of equity, bail-in debt and, Contingent Convertible Debt instruments (CoCos) will be explored.

Enrico Perotti, Mark Flannery, 09 February 2011

Contingent Convertible (CoCo) bonds have been suggested as a way to ensure that banks keep aside enough capital to help them through financial crises. This column proposes a market-triggered CoCo buffer to maintain risk incentives during periods of high leverage. It argues that this will also activate risk information discovery through the market prices of bank securities and increase activism by outside shareholders.

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